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CHURCH AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICA

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THE RECENT decision of the Supreme Court barring sectarian religious instruction from the public schools is one of the most important actions of that body in many years. We may hope that it will interrupt the trend back toward discredited practices of European countries.

It should be understood that the ruling of the Court is not based upon its interest in the woman who brought the action or in any minority group. It is merely a reaffirmation of the Constitution of the United States of America. Mrs. McCollum is to be congratulated for her understanding of the American way of life. If Roger Williams had been living in Champaign, Illinois, the action would have been brought by a Baptist who would have carried the issue to the Supreme Court; if Thomas Jefferson had lived there, he would have been her partner in the fight. Publicly employed teachers can teach the history and theory of government, but they should not, nor should anyone else from the outside, teach partisan politics. These same teachers can teach the history of religions, the arts, and even the morals and ethics advocated by each, but neither they nor anyone else should divide our youth into denominational camps on school property or on school time.

Although a trend has been interrupted, the problem which is primarily that of separation of church and state has not been solved. In my community, for several years there has been what appears to be an organized attack on the public schools which are being publicly denounced as inefficient, secular, godless, and the major cause of the moral delinquencies of our age. The remedy that is offered, by those who are the most outspoken critics, is the parochial school, in which religion is a part of the instruction in every class. And many of those who advocate this change from our American way are insistent in their demands that the parochial schools be supported by public taxes.

It is quite obvious that those who have this purpose, failing to obtain the program in its entirety, should approach it by carefully planned minor stages. The first objective would be to undermine the confidence of the American people in the public school system; the

second, to identify the public schools as the chief cause of child delinquency; third, establish the idea that this delinquency would be cured if religion were taught to children every day in school; fourth, the introduction of halfway methods such as release time for religious instruction during school hours or the teaching of religion in the public schools by ministers, priests, and rabbis, both of which might be expected to fail but which would have helped to prove the primary point. Another statement being made is that religion must be taught in the schools because the homes and churches have failed.

There are some reasons to believe that, whatever its weaknesses, the United States of America is the greatest nation in the world. There are some reasons for believing that the public school system has been the greatest agency in the making of our democracy, and that it is the only system of schools that should receive any assistance from a local or national treasury. There are many proofs that the strength of American churches and religion is to be traced to that freedom which was provided by Roger Williams in a colony where a man was at liberty to worship God as Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Quaker, or not to worship him at all. With these thoughts before us, let us briefly review the problem.

The first schools in America were private, religious, and highly sectarian, reflecting the desire of the parents. Only privileged children attended. Following the Revolution, the French political philosophy of republican government which believed in the perfectability of all men led to the idea of universal education. This humanitarianism caused some states to grant tax aid to private schools for tuition of children of poor families.

Massachusetts adopted the first law providing public schools for all children without charge in 1827. Religion was a part of the curriculum and caused no difficulty, for the citizens were practically all Protestants. Large immigrations of Catholics after 1830 broke down this religious homogeneity. From 1837 to 1842 Horace Mann led the movement for the elimination of doctrinal religion from the public school curriculum in Massachusetts on the ground that such teaching violated the religious liberties of minority groups. The schools then adopted the practice of reading the Bible without comment. Most other states followed this example, within the next twenty years.

The churches, disturbed by what they termed the godlessness of the public schools, attempted to re-establish private, sectarian schools. They besieged the states with demands for tax aid. In 1842, New York State adopted a law prohibiting the use of tax funds to support sectarian schools, practically all of which were not Catholic but Protestant. This policy was followed by the other states. During the last half of the

nineteenth century, several states passed laws appropriating money for the direct support of sectarian schools, but these were declared unconstitutional by the state courts.

The distribution of free textbooks to parochial school pupils was disallowed in New York State in 1922. But a similar law was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the ground that the benefit was to the child rathen than to the school. This "child-benefit" theory was apparently used to justify the same practice in Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, and West Virginia. It is the principle upon which the United States Supreme Court allowed transportation in New Jersey. However, the decision only strengthens the fundamental principle that tax money shall not be used for the support of other than public schools. The laws of Arizona, Delaware, and New Jersey forbid teachers in public schools to conduct religious exercises. Fifteen states prohibit the use of sectarian material. Twelve states require the reading of the Bible and most of the others allow it.

The practice of excusing pupils for attendance at weekday church school began in Indiana in 1913; Texas and Wyoming forbid it, and Iowa requires pupils to make up the loss of time. In about a dozen states, religious instruction by church teachers has been permitted inside public school buildings during school hours. While allowed, neither of these last two ideas has been widely practiced. These innovations have been promoted by the Ku Klux Klan, Catholic and Lutheran groups, and in some states by other Protestant denominations. From reports that I have been able to obtain, many "release time" programs which were started have been abandoned. A characteristic report is that from the public education system of San Francisco which states that only eleven communities have wanted the plan and in the thirty-six schools involved only ten per cent of the pupils have asked to be dismissed for religious education. The report says that "the release time plan is innocuous in theory but dangerous in practice. The plan makes children conscious of religious differences, engenders hatreds and accentuates antagonisms." According to the United States Office of Education, a study made for the years 1932-1940 of the life expectancy of excused time projects reveals that over half of those started were abandoned and that the average life of the experiments was only two years.

The battle for the separation of the church and state was fought out in Virginia in 1786, not against Roman Catholics, for they represented no more than one per cent of the population, but between Protestants. In the 1790 census of the United States, Catholicism represented less than one per cent of the population. By 1829 it was only 2.8 per cent. After the Episcopal Church was deprived of state support,

an act was proposed to the General Assembly to levy a general tax for the support of "teachers of the Christian religion." In this plan the Episcopalians were joined by the Methodists, and it was the Baptists, Presbyterians, and Quakers, assisted by Jefferson, Madison, and Patrick Henry, who fought this measure until it too was defeated.

For many years the Federal government had no clearly established position on the church school issue because education was considered a purely state and local matter, but President Grant in his remarks to the Army of the Tennessee at its reunion in Des Moines, September 29, 1875, addressed himself directly to this issue which was being hotly debated in many states when he said:

> . . . Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar of money appropriated to their support, no matter how raised, shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian school. Resolve that the State or Nation, or both combined, shall furnish to every child growing up in the land the means of acquiring a good common-school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistic tenets. Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church, and the private school supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the Church and State forever separate.[1]

The principle of the separation of church and state is undoubtedly one of the explanations for the greatness of the United States. It was a correction made because of the conflicts and disasters which have for hundreds of years existed in European countries. In 1888, Lord Bryce declared:

> Half the wars of Europe, half the internal troubles that have vexed European states . . . have arisen from theological differences or from the rival claims of church and state. This whole vast chapter of debate and strife has remained virtually unopened in the United States. There is no Established Church.[2]

The characteristic thought of Americans has been that two institutions cannot combine without one becoming the servant of the other. This thought does not seem to be that of the Roman Catholic Church when it has sufficient influence within a nation. Many European countries might be used as examples of the unification of the church and state. Perhaps the Vatican, a political-religious state, is the Roman Catholic model for the world.

The destruction of the American principle in a country may be seen, in its early stages, by observing the Catholic leadership in changing the

[1] *World's Best Orations* (St. Louis, 1900), vol. x, p. 3947.

[2] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (Macmillan, 1891), II, p. 570.

once nonsectarian, purely American, Boy Scouts into what it has now become, an organization of Catholic Boy Scouts, Jewish Boy Scouts, etc. It may be seen in the development of veterans' organizations such as the Catholic War Veterans and the Catholic War Mothers. Its development is even more evident in the growth of the parochial school system. The destruction is most mature in those entanglements whereby we have an American ambassador to the Vatican and a Vatican ambassador in Washington. My motive in mentioning these facts is in no way a denial of the right of any religious group to have its own ideas, nor is it a denial of the right of that group to change completely the principles upon which a country has been founded and by whose benefits it has grown. It is merely a desire for us to see clearly what our choice must be.

Of the boys and girls in the United States of elementary and secondary school age, ninety per cent attend public schools, nine per cent attend Roman Catholic schools, and one per cent attend other private or religious schools. It is from this nine per cent that various demands have been made for tax support. There is no question about the right of any group in America to establish and support schools that provide that type of instruction which its constituents desire for their children; but if these schools were ever supported by taxes, we would experience not only the destruction of our principle of separation of church and state but an increase in the number of minority-interest schools that would be appalling. In 1947 J. Paul Williams, professor of religious history and literature at Mt. Holyoke College, said:

> The creation of a system of free public schools is one of our greatest national achievements. The public schools are part of the glory of our democracy . . . . If Protestants had chosen a hundred years ago to back the parochial school idea their churches might now be stronger institutions. But our nation would almost surely have within it greater diversity, more intolerance . . . .[3]

We should ask ourselves: Shall tax funds be used to support schools for Jehovah's Witnesses? Shall tax funds be used to maintain schools for Christian Scientists who object to student health programs? Shall tax funds be used for schools for children of radical thinkers who desire the overthrow of our American system?

The following statement ought to cure us of any self-deception that we could accomplish anything by compromises in this matter. It was made by the Reverend Cornelius T. H. Sherlock, Roman Catholic diocesan superintendent of Roman Schools, Boston, Massachusetts, at

[3] "Protestantism and Public Education" in the *Christian Century*, March 12, 1947, p. 330.

Merrimack College, a new Roman Catholic institution, at Andover, Massachusetts, on September 22, 1947:

> A few educators and many noneducators feel that religious subjects, introduced into a teaching curriculum, which is otherwise secular, can supply the acknowledged need for religious education. This the Catholic college must deny. It is necessary that every subject, nay, every learning situation should be permeated by Catholic thinking and Christian attitudes. To use the words of the Holy Father, Pope Pius XI, ". . . it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of the school, and its teachers, syllabus, and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit, and under the direction and maternal supervision of the church; so that religion may be in very truth the foundation and the crown of the youth's entire training, and this in every grade of school, not only in the elementary but in the intermediate and higher institutions as well."[4]

From this, it must be increasingly evident that the proposals for release time (which would be a failure) and for the teaching of religion in the schools by priests, rabbis, and ministers (which would also fail) are but ways of ultimately discrediting the public schools and strengthening the argument for support of parochial schools. Albert Wiggam has well said:

> . . . see to it that no hand but that of Truth touches our public school and college, that no Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Gentile, Old Soldier, Young Soldier, Laborite, Capitalist, Radical, Conservative, Optimist, Pessimist, Democrat, Republican or Mugwump *as such*, that no special interest under heaven lays its blighting hand upon the minds of our youth, but that only the child of light and tolerance, the liberal, the truth-seeker, the brave, the free—the educator who knows no passion but knowledge and beauty, no goal but liberty, shall mold their character and outlook, then . . . the world can and will enter, without observation, without bombs or blood, into a truly great age of the human spirit.[5]

Next, I think we should ask ourselves just why so much criticism has been levelled at the public schools and just why all of the moral delinquencies of our age should be blamed upon them. In fact, I think we ought to ask ourselves: Are our young people as bad as they have been made out to be? Any honest approach to the problem would indicate the need for careful research, for the gathering of facts. Otherwise, we will be led merely by our emotions and prejudices. Such a change in our American way should never be made until statistics of crime have been traced to group sources, social levels, economic, religious or irreligious backgrounds. So far as I know, no such study has been made.

Have we a right to single out the public schools as the cause for our ills in a period when humanity has gone through two world wars, during

[4] *Congressional Record*, Nov. 18, 1947 (Hon. Thomas J. Lane, Massachusetts).

[5] Albert Wiggam, *The New Decalogue of Science*, 1923, p. 204.

which the relative importance of every moral custom has been questioned by every individual (by this I mean: When murder is legalized, how sacred are honesty, fidelity, purity, and the other personal virtues?); a period in which millions of mothers were urged to abandon their families, for the larger part of each day, for employment that was voluntary or recompensed but solicited by the insistent national appeals that only by their aid could the war be won?

Why point our criticism at the public schools when every adult has had to rethink the basic values of democracy in contrast to many of the promises and some of the successes of fascism, nazism, communism? Why hold the public schools responsible for the morality of youth in a time when everyone has been affected by the disruption of home life through the constant migrations of our American population, in the breaking of family ties caused by our industrial civilization? Why blame the public schools when people who, by every social inheritance, have been accustomed to rural life, with the inquisitiveness of neighbors and the restraining, critical remarks of friends for every unconventional innovation, now find themselves living undeterred in large cities where no one knows who they are or cares what they do?

Why blame the public schools when movies, by their suggestiveness and concrete portrayals of immorality, have broken down the ideals, of practically everyone, of what morality was once really supposed to be? Why blame the public schools when psychiatrists are warning us that the overstimulation given by many radio programs is creating tensions that are dangerous to the bodies, minds, and morals of adults as well as children? Why blame the public schools when so much crime is accompanied by drunkenness of a degree sufficient to render the participants incapable of those controls which are lost when the upper areas of the brain have been anæsthetized by alcohol; and while religious leaders of practically every faith have carefully refrained from denouncing this malicious enterprise?

Why ask the public schools for release time for religious instruction when two full days remain for the church to do its work, especially when most churches have complacently allowed or have even campaigned for the abandonment of Sunday as a day on which man should refrain from his usual activities and devote himself to God? Why not ask ourselves what we are doing with the day we have? I think we ought also to ask ourselves: Is is true that the family and the church have failed? From my own experience, I feel that the church and families with which I am most familiar are not failing in the development of fine Christian character in the lives of their children. That most of our churches should do more for those families and children unreached by religion is undoubtedly true.

But, why not place the blame upon the churches instead of upon the public schools?

For the most part, Protestantism abandons the lower income groups of America. It is interested, all too often, in securing members who can support its churches; and abandons churches in underprivileged areas. When abandoned, the churches in the slums become boys' clubs for recreational purposes with the definitely stated principle that no religion shall be introduced. We have heard so many times that the public schools are godless and we keep on hearing that secularism is the curse of America today. E. Stanley Jones, a Methodist missionary of world fame, once said:

> I do not believe that the chief enemy is secularism—the chief enemy is evil, and evil may be in secularism and it may be in religion. I am not sure that religion per se is necessarily a good thing. Some of the cruelest things in history have been done and are being done in the name of religion in east and west. I refuse to stand with all religion against all secularism. There are times when I find I am nearer in spirit to the secularist than I am to the religionist. I am closer to Jawahir Lal Nehru, the secularist, with his strong and tender passion for an economic and social justice that will free the poor from their thraldom, than I am with the priests crying, "Religion is in danger," at every attempt to change conditions in behalf of human need.[6]

As part of our constructive self-analysis, I think that we should recall the fact that Jesus was most severe, not with secularists, not even with sinners, but with the leaders of religion, with those whom he called "scribes, Pharisees, hypocrites, blind leaders of the blind." He was hurt by the lack of vision and devotion in those who had the responsibility for organized religious institutions in his day. Fosdick is right when he insists that "the genius of Christianity lies in reverence for personality":

> Wherever personality is being cramped, fettered, debilitated, and abused, there Christianity is being denied. If the churches would put that idea in the foreground of their minds they might get some Christian things done instead of remaining what too largely they are—societies for the propagation of an outgrown mythology.[7]

Practically every advance that has come to the world has come through someone who, either by martyrdom or through the opportunity of free inquiry such as is given in public schools and free universities, has discovered new laws of God and the universe until then unknown. Such men were, with few exceptions, quite unorthodox: Copernicus, Galileo, Giordano Bruno, Darwin, Spinoza, John Stewart Mill, Jefferson, Hamil-

[6] "Let's Go Forward" in the *Christian Century*, March 14, 1934, p. 359.
[7] H. E. Fosdick, *As I See Religion*, Harper, 1932, p. 51.

ton, Lincoln, Einstein, Socrates, Jeremiah, and Jesus. They, along with most of the great leaders in government and science and increasingly in religion, believed not in supernaturalism which to many is subnatural; they believed in nature and its law-abiding, unbreakable character. They believed in a God who was law, who made laws, and who does not break them; and that no man can break the moral laws—he is only free, in revolt, to break himself upon those laws. That is what the public schools teach—it is a belief that we need in government and in personal moral life today. Public schools do better in this than many churches.

If churches have failed, then we should reopen the question of whether they should continue to be tax exempt. If homes have failed, then we should concentrate our efforts upon the building of better homes and better houses, where mothers care to stay and to which children are eager to return. We should endeavor to build better families, where the name of God is not only mentioned but revered. In our unlimited preoccupation and generosity in providing recreational opportunities for underprivileged children in clubs, playgrounds, and community centres, we are apparently uninterested in providing these people with better homes.

We should ask ourselves: Are we not unconsciously following the patterns of Hitler and Stalin, whose efforts to control youth in social and state programs anticipated the disintegration of family life? Homes were the first temples, fathers were the first priests. We should recognize that the most American institution is the public school, where German, Swede, Italian, Greek, English, Russian, French, or Pole is equal—whether poor or wealthy; Protestant, Catholic or Jew; bright or backward. There young Americans learn to know each other.

As churches, we should realize that "the fields are white unto the harvest and the laborers are few." We should rededicate ourselves to the winning of Americans to religion, not by forcing it upon them during hours when children are required by law to be in a certain place, but rather through the means by which the early Christians made their great impression on an inattentive world. They "outlived, outthought, outloved, and outdied" any people the pagans had produced. In this way we may hope to keep our country a haven for lovers of brotherhood and a home of hope and love.

THE NEW RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

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THE ERA just past has been an age of science, an age characterized above all others by discovery and invention. One aspect after another of the physical world succumbed to the methods of science, and the investigator appraised the constituents of the distant star and was able to unlock the forces resident in the atom. Not alone in its own province did it find favor, but the methods of science reached into the sphere of the social studies, and we had brave efforts at a science of history and a science of sociology. At the touch of science, psychology became an afterthought of physiology, and the experience of the mystic and the poet became a phase of metabolism.

But it was the practical application of science in the conquest of space and time which drove home its point with the plain man. Its bestowal of laborsaving and comfort producing devices proved it a benefactor. The conquest of nature became well-nigh complete, and man became a monarch on earth who did not fail to pay his respects to the power behind the throne—science. This had proven itself by its results, and its claim to represent the whole of reality went unchallenged.

Developed carefully at first, and later bolstered by the attitude and position of science, was the social thought of the period from which we are just now struggling to emerge. By and large this thought was characterized by the submergence of the individual in the larger social entity whose claims had priority. The individual was dealt with as a cog in the machinery of society, a unit in the structure of society, or as a cell in the social organism. In a society of a million members he was a neutral entity equivalent to one millionth of a million, an entity which took on whatever characteristics it might possess from the institutions of that society. In order to insure progress, which was the *raison d'être* of society, the little group of directors sought to change institutions in a preconceived direction. This little group of the elite wrote as if they were dealing with insects, and as if the limitations his nature imposes upon man did not apply to them. Rousseau might as well have written, "Ants are born free but are everywhere in chains." One detects a strong sense of *We* and *They* in the writings of the prominent sociologists during the past century and a half: "We" are those unto whom the way has been revealed; "They" refers to the rest of humanity. This long emphasis on the rights of the group as over

against those of the individual helps explain the fate of men who stand in the way of "progress," not alone in the practice but also in the theory of our time. The theory is working out to the bitter end its own internal logic with none of the deterrents which early collectivists carried over from the gentlemanly eighteenth century.

Scientists claimed that by their methods they had access to all reality; whatever could not be investigated by the scientific method simply did not exist. It was the measurable and quantitative aspects of things which were amenable to the method, and the way of explanation was in terms of antecedents. Distinctions of quality were denied, the realm of values was declared illusory, nor did purpose or ultimate goals come within the purview of the scientific method. Laplace declared with the naïveté that charms, "I sweep the heavens with my telescope, but do not find God."

Science is truly progressive; one generation can take up where the former generation left off. We can travel ten times as fast as our forefathers even if we can't write poetry ten times as good or act with ten times the measure of justice. The obvious progress of science impressed social thinkers, and they felt that the same progress was possible in society using the methods science provided. But it was possible to use these methods only on neutral entities, each one of which behaves like the other, and to deal with these in their quantitative aspects. Hence the vogue of social thought in which the individual was an unfortunate accident, hardly to be considered—unless he stood in the way of the execution of a plan for the good of society. If such were the case, society was thought justified in exerting its prior claims. It must progress even at the expense of the individuals who compose it.

In the scheme where the only approaches to reality are via the scientific method, and where society counts more than the individual, religion is irrelevant; it does not pertain. Perhaps it is a toy for the young before their idealism wears thin, and a refuge for old women with vague pains—but for the virile individual it does not signify. Religion is concerned with the ultimate goals toward which men should strive, with the purposes of living, with values; but these things cannot be investigated by the methods of science and if these methods are alone revelatory of reality the things of religion are delusions. Religion is concerned with individuals; with a rich, full, free life for individuals. The quality of institutions matters to religion, but its assertion of the primacy of the individual means that its concern is to reform men, and through them their society—the character of a society being nothing else than the collective character of the individuals who compose it. The social thought of the era just past, reasoning from certain premises, posited

social goals which were to be reached by the aid of unlimited force if that became necessary. It had scant regard for individuals, because individuals are arbitrary, defy calculation except in mass, and upset the preconceived strategy of social planners. Its criterion of desirability in a social institution is the latter's ability to run by rote, to operate as an automaton exempt from human frailty and cussedness. The geometrical flawlessness of the institution would, it was believed, straighten out the individuals who lived by it. The actual result, as we who are living through it now realize, is much the same as the consequences of forcing a clubfoot into a normal shoe in order to restore it. Social dreamers, acting with the noblest of motives and the faultiest of premises, laboriously laid the ground for the blackest thing in human annals—totalitarianism. The modern state which is most nearly the approximation of the dreams of the collectivist idealists of the past century, and which was once the repository of the hopes of generous men the world over, now operates with an actual tyranny and fanatic fury indistinguishable from the practices of a state based on gangsterism and brutality, with no intellectual or ideal antecedents. The road we have been following has brought us to the edge of extinction. Our predicament demands a radically new orientation whose point of departure is the individual, and not a half-hearted attempt to patch up the very fallacies that brought us to this impasse

There is now a growing public awareness of what has long been insisted upon by philosophers, that the scientific method has access to but an aspect of reality. Reality is more various than we once thought, and doesn't yield up her choicest secrets to a single approach. The realm of values, which was excluded by the old view, has been reinstated. We can again talk in terms of qualitative distinction, purpose, ultimate aims, and goals; and that is to talk the jargon of religion.

If individuals are neutral entities, the only area of social reform is with institutions. That idea has backfired with terrific repercussions in several modern states. The collectivist ideal bred of the evils of capitalism, coming into contact with the latter, has produced an explosive compound differing from either of its constituents. The experience of these years disposes us to the view that individuals are very much what they are and that their institutions reflect this. Social reform must begin with individual reform if it is not to end in a despotism; and when we talk of making better individuals we are talking the language of religion. The goal of religion is the production of strong, salient, personalities for whom life is a joyful and gratifying experience. Once there appears on earth a significant number of these individuals, they will create their own institutions, and we can no more tell what these will

be like than we can describe the other side of the moon. The best we can do is describe them negatively and say that they will not resemble the prescriptions based on the theory that men can be dealt with as pawns in a game. Institutions will be created out of the needs of the kind of men who signify, and only they can declare what their needs are; these cannot be forecast.

The Kingdom of Man cannot be taken by a direct frontal assault, by the imposition of institutions or the elaboration of apparatus for the production of the goods of life. The approach must be as subtle and direct as the capillary seepage of water, looking toward the inculcation of a new mood, a disposition to accept a new orientation. In the older sociology the idea of progress was supreme: Progress outlined in terms of increased production, distribution, and consumption of goods. It was barely suspected that the whole nature of man was not covered by these categories. The suspicion that he was in part a spiritual being was downed by the elusive nature of the spiritual when sought by the methods of science. But our elusive preoccupation with material things has not brought us even a material paradise. It is true that under the stimulus of war we were able to release our powers and use our producing system to capacity, but the nature of that stimulus was spiritual, freeing us temporarily from sordid business motives. Now, after the war, we are like the victim of an hysterical paralysis, or like the centipede trying to decide which leg comes after which and succeeding only in multiplying waste motion. There is a stalemate, and the one certainty to which every group clings is that some other group is to blame.

Before the war there was world-wide stagnation, with physical waste measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and which led by direct steps to war as a device to stave off internal anarchy caused by the juxtaposition of the contraries poverty, unemployment, and industrial potential. A more interesting example of the influence of our mistaken emphasis on things is to compare the increase in the amount of energy at the disposal of man in the course of the last hundred years with the increase in real wages during that period. The disparity is charged to exploitation, and advanced thinkers sought to mitigate that exploitation by legislation; whereas its real cause is to be found in the idea pervading all levels of society that the aim of life is the accumulation of more things, rather than the spreading of beauty, the establishing of justice, the promotion of right thinking and well doing. These latter things are the immediate province of religion.

The rule of expediency would dictate that every ill from which society suffers be attacked immediately by legislation to punish some group selected as the cause of the specific ill, rather than to ascribe the

evils as due to mistaken ideas subscribed to by all. Proposals for legislative interference have "a specious air of benevolence," says Aristotle, causing an audience to accept them with delight, supposing, "especially when abuses under the existing system are denounced as due to private property, that under communism, everyone will miraculously become everyone else's friend." But, Aristotle comments, "the real cause of these evils is not private property but the wickedness of human nature." Here is the emphasis which we had lost and are now regaining, that there are irreducible elements in the individual which upset the nicest calculations of the theorists who try to fit them into neat, artificial categories; and furthermore, that there is an element of contrariness in human nature which under certain circumstances produces evil results. This is the language of religion; and this the business of religion, to deal with individuals in all their cussedness and change their orientation from self to God, or whatever the term used to designate the supreme good.

One of the most curious sidelights of history is the manner in which even the better minds of an era seem fastened in the grooves of delusion. The palpably absurd has always exerted an obscene fascination over the human mind, and an age is swept by delusions which seem to it the very word of truth made obvious. Then a generation passes and circumstances conspire to expose the hypnosis which confused fact with fantasy, but our certitude that the ancestral ways were false is tempered by the awareness that we too operate with blind spots. We don't have the same blind spots as the preceding era, however, and can see them for what they are. The debacle of the social and scientific approach of the late era has exposed the fallacies which warped its outlook. It couldn't see the individual for the institutions and it believed that one road, and one road alone, led to reality. The impasse to which these beliefs have led does not automatically insure the reinstatement of religion, let alone a particular religion; the first mood is despair or even a complete cynicism. But among the more thoughtful is a disposition to re-examine the claims of high religion, which today can be considered on their merits where a generation ago the common world view excluded this.

Thus the peculiar relevance of religion at this time in mens' affairs. It pertains with a relevance which it has not possessed for a century and a half or longer. Even those who will walk after strange gods walk now with a faltering step. An avenue long blocked has been opened. It is no highway but only a rugged path; yet along that way the human enterprise has a future.

A CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN SUFFERING

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JOB'S PROBLEM was never more pressing nor apparently further from solution than in our contemporary world. In more settled periods only abstract thinkers may fully recognize the implications of human suffering, but in times like our own even those least given to rational analysis must be aware of some of the questions it raises. This is peculiarly true today both because there are few not already mourning with Job for their own present misfortunes or future uncertainties, and also because the quality of faith attained by Job is so largely lacking. The first reaction of the man in the street to suffering may be something like this: if there were a God, he would not permit wars, starvation, and violent death. These exist; therefore he does not. Such a conclusion is easily reached and seems to satisfy many of the less curious minds. A variation of this view, leading to the same conclusion, is well illustrated by a recent article in a popular magazine. The author, a minister's daughter whose son was killed in the war, writes that she had always been taught and had believed that the prayers of those obedient to the will of God were answered. She had lived a godly life, had prayed confidently for her son's return, yet he had nevertheless been taken. Only one conclusion, she decided, could be drawn to her syllogism—God does not exist. Job under similar circumstances decided that he was unjust, but that possibility did not seem to occur to her.

Among those who retain their faith in God in the face of suffering, many take the attitude illustrated by a pastor recently who was called upon to conduct the funeral of a returned veteran. This young man had survived the war and had come home to his rejoicing parents, only to be killed in an unusual automobile accident. The pastor assured the father that while man cannot comprehend the reason for God's having taken the son, it is certain that he had a purpose for doing so, and in that fact the family could find some consolation. This second view assumes God's existence, and assigns all suffering to his direct will and purpose.

A third view, held chiefly by those of a more philosophical and theological turn of mind, is that of accepting God's existence but of denying that he is both all-good and all-powerful. One of these characteristics, these say, cannot be true of God, for an all-good God would not want man to suffer and an all-powerful one would be capable of preventing all suffering. The fact that suffering does exist would then imply that he is lacking in one or the other of these qualities. Since God's all-goodness

seems to be more significant to the worshiper than his all-power, it is the latter which is usually taken to be lacking, and God is believed to be finite in potency. The limitations to which he is subject have been presented in varying ways. Those who believe in a devil find limitations through the agency of a personal being, as evil as God is good. A second view, derived largely from Plato, would hold him limited by the nature of the material or "stuff" with which he works in making his universe. In recent times the theory has been offered in this country that neither of the above views is the correct one but that his finiteness is the result of certain limitation within his own nature. Despite the differences of approach, all three of these views agree that the evils of life are so real and so terrible that a good God would have eliminated them had he been able to do so.

None of the views above expressed recommends itself to the writer of this paper. It would be presumptuous for any thinker on this subject to claim the possession of a complete explanation for suffering in all its multiform appearances; yet it is possible at least to go beyond the views expressed and, positively, to indicate the relation of certain generally accepted elements of Christian theology to this perennial problem. Not comprehending reality as God does, one must in all humility admit the difficulties of "justifying God's ways to man" in completely satisfying fashion. Until God's final purposes are understood we are in no position to judge him either finite or, with Job, unjust. The judgments we arrive at must then be both tentative and partial; yet if they can be shown not inconsistent with Christian belief, particularly as that is found in the teachings of Jesus, we might conclude that our finding have at least some validity.

Any discussion of evils which does not first define the ultimate goods of life is finally inconclusive. To assume that every instance of pain, loss, death is necessarily evil in an ultimate sense because it results in discomfort, sorrow, unpleasantness, is to imply that real good is the pleasant, the accustomed, and the nonirritating. It further implies that evil means any experience which at the moment of its being experienced seems undesirable. This is a position which no theologian would care to maintain; yet it is, perhaps unknowingly, the presumption underlying much that can be said for the three views first discussed in this paper. Suffering is taken to be evil, without rational explanation, and so the problem of God and his relation to it is raised. But the true criterion for judging the evil of any event is the degree to which it hinders one from attaining that good which is the goal of human life. The problem of the nature of good and evil is, consequently, most intimately interwoven into the whole field of philosophical and theological thought. It cannot be treated in isolation, as though it had no relation to the problems of God,

freedom, and immortality. Rather, it must find its solution in terms compared to the answers brought to these related questions. In this paper these problems cannot be discussed; so it must needs suffice to say that the theological insights of Christianity are the structure within which our inquiry is being conducted. This approach to our problem would seem to be a very evident one; yet, strangely enough, it is often underemphasized even by philosophers. Labeling an experience as finally and definitely evil, and then denying God's existence or else accusing him of lack of power or goodness because of its supposed finally evil condition, without attempting to discuss the basis for what is good in terms of the final goods of life, is scarcely a procedure to be recommended. So we return to our point that any final judgment concerning this problem must be made on the basis of one's insights in theology and philosophy, and we begin by accepting the truth of the Christian beliefs.

The first assumption we make bearing upon this question, is that of the purpose of creation. The theological answer here accepted is this: that God created the world and man because of his goodness. Being by nature a God of love, he wished to share his goodness with other beings, and so created man in his own image, giving him the possibility of sonship as his highest potentiality. Man exists because of the goodness of God, and the purpose of man's existence is that he might love God, become in character like him, and so dwell in unity with him forever. The final good for man's life is accordingly, the attainment of that love and character which will make for the realization of this goal. This purpose is variously phrased in the New Testament and in Christian tradition. It is to "grow into the image of God," "to become like unto God," "to live as God's son in his kingdom," and the like. However it is worded, the meaning is this: the goal and final purpose of character discovered in him, with all the implications these carry for living in fellowship with man. From this understanding, and not by reference to tests of pleasantness or unpleasantness, the standard for judging evil is derived. In the final analysis, that which leads toward this end is good and whatever is used oppositely is evil.

A second assumption which is very significant for our discussion is one held by Christianity in common with other religions. It is the belief that the essential person does not cease to exist when his body dies, but in some way continues to be. In what form he continues and the nature of his state is, evidently, variously conceived. This faith seems to receive much less weight in discussions concerning evil than it ought. It is surprising to find the frequency with which those who presumably accept the basic elements of Christian faith including personal immortality fail to appropriate the full significance of this belief in their evaluation of those

sufferings in life which are generally supposed to be most severe. If death is actually merely an event which has no final significance, a "condiment," an occurrence in which one "suffers a sea change," yet remains in possession of full selfhood; then its sting is largely lost and with it the bitterness of most of life's suffering.

We have then two assumptions which we might treat as axioms in our approach to this problem: 1. the belief that the goal of life for which man was created by God is that he might grow into God's likeness, as regards character; and 2. the belief in personal immortality. The problem that next arises is that of how this purpose can be realized. To bring into being creatures like himself was God's problem, for character is not a thing which can be created by fiat, nor a deed which can be performed by omnipotent might. Character cannot be bestowed: by its very nature it must be attained. A parent may bestow on a child all the goods he might wish, and do all the deeds he can for it, but finally the child must wish to choose rightly before he can be said to have maturity of character. This means, and this is a fundamental point in the argument, that God was *unable* to create perfect beings. This inability is not to be taken as a lack of goodness, for it was out of his goodness that he wished to create in the first place. Nor is it a lack of power in the sense of there being factors in physical nature or within himself not completely under his control. Rather, God's inability at this point is due to the nature of character. For it is a quality of the personality, a quality which the personality, itself created by God, reaches through the values it has come by free acceptance and choice to accept and use to direct its life. That is to say, just as God is not held to be finite because he cannot make a square circle, due to the nature of a circle, so God is not to be held finite because he cannot create a being perfect in character because of the nature of character, which always implies freedom of choice. God is then able to make beings capable of attaining perfection of character, and he is able to make a world in which that can be achieved; yet he is unable to create perfect character, and still is not thereby finite! It therefore follows that when God created man with the potentiality of becoming like him in character, he at the same time had to accept a limitation upon himself at this point. He could not have made an automaton with perfect character, for the reason that an automaton cannot make free choices. Had he made a robot instead of man, he would have run no danger of having his will defied, but by the same token he would have created no possibility of obtaining a being with whom he could have fellowship. By his willing to make man he imposed upon himself a self-limitation which consisted in creating a being capable on the one hand of becoming, through its free choices,

like him, yet, nevertheless, capable, on the other hand, of defying his will.

On the basis of the above analysis we can now approach the problem of human suffering. The causes for suffering are of two kinds: those arising as the consequence of the desires and actions of men, and those arising from nature and its acts apart from interference by human beings. The first explanation for human suffering bears upon the former of these two. Man's decisions, as a result of his freedom of will and of choice, are frequently such as to bring in their train consequences which are harmful to the one acting or to other human beings. The possibility that such might be the case is inevitable once it is accepted that man, for the reasons above suggested, is given freedom of the will, and is not made by God as a robot. Choices that are in conflict with the rules of health bring illness; egotistic choices result in narrowing of interests, boredom, loss of meaning to life; choosing the short-range values leads to lack of appreciation for or even to denial of the existence of higher purposes. Individuals acting as such through their choices become responsible for the whole gamut of evils recorded by St. Paul; while individuals acting together in larger groups are responsible, again through their choices, for poverty, suffering, and world wars. Most of life's suffering is the consequent of man's seemingly often fatal gift.

That suffering which is the consequent of natural forces apart from man's control is obviously in a very different situation. Man can in no way be held responsible for this suffering, since it is the result of the orderly process of nature. How then are these instances of suffering, in the light of the above suggestions, to be explained? Do they not seem to suggest God's inability to control all aspects of his creation, or else that he does not care what the effects on man are? While admitting freely the difficulties of accounting satisfactorily for all the varied problems raised concerning the question of natural evils, we are suggesting that the choices and decisions mentioned above cannot be decisions and choices apart from a world governed regularly. That is to say, the possibilities of suffering, both as a result of freedom of choice and as a result of natural disasters, are most intimately related, although at first glance they may seem to have little in common. The explanation of this close relationship is to be found again in the purpose for the creation of human beings which, as was above suggested, is to make as the ultimate goal the development of beings like in character to God. In order that freedom of choice may be meaningful there is also required for the created subjects a world in which cause-effect relationships are invariable. A world in which consequences of action under similar circumstances would vary would be a world in which no attainment of a proper system of values and no attainment of a stable

character would be possible. For character is the result of the forming of proper habits of choice based on the achievement of a true scale of values. This, in turn, is the consequent of having experienced certain results following upon certain actions, which same results can be anticipated again when similar action is taken. That is to say, if the world were not based on dependable causal relationships, no choices could be made with any degree of certainty in the results of those choices, and consequently character could not develop. A dependable, law-abiding universe is the second requisite, along with freedom of choice, for a world in which "sons of God" might appear. But a law-abiding universe is at the same time a potentially dangerous universe, just as freedom of choice is a dangerous gift. For the very laws which may result in a favorable or desirable consequent at one time may, at another, result in great human suffering. The same power that makes the automobile a useful servant for man can bring about injury and death when not properly controlled. The natural evils, in brief, are the result of the condition of regularity in the universe, necessary for the attainment of the purposes of creation, yet in their particular operation at times injurious to human beings. Under this category we find earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, hereditary illness, etc. Our conclusion is that the sufferings of mankind are the continuing possibility in any world in which the attainment of sonship with God is both possible and the end of life. This is not to claim any final or complete answer to many of the problems of detail that might be raised, nor is it to suggest that modern science knows all about the basic structures of this natural order and so can tell with any kind of final certainty what is or is not possible. Prayer and faith, for instance, can and often do bring about physical effects. The ESP and other experiments performed at Duke University suggest other areas not yet thoroughly investigated and understood, concerning which no final conclusions can be reached at this time. Granted this limitation of man's knowledge of his world, it is still maintained that a regular universe is the prerequisite for the achievement of character and is a necessity for man to grow into the love of God.

It is claimed that evil must be a possibility in any world in which the goal of life is sonship with God. God need not then be thought lacking in either goodness or power. The only question that might still be raised concerning God's goodness is whether it is better, taken all in all, to have a world with these possibilities of suffering in order that "sons of God" may appear, or to have had no creation of man at all. Most would prefer the world we know.

God does not leave man alone or helpless in a universe of law. He provides him with instincts through the use of which he can protect

himself from deficiency, suffering, and death. He provides him also with the ability to reason, and with memory to retain the consequences of that effort and of experience. He sends him, "prophets," culminating in Jesus, to bear outward witness to him, and gives him the "inner voice" to draw man to himself. It is as though man were a knight being sent out to fight his battles; equipped with the armor of intellectual, physical, and spiritual equipment; advised and directed by the experience of his fellows and of those who went before; informed of the direction to take to reach his goal by those who had achieved before him and his own inner "compass"; yet left to take his risks and win his way. Only through the struggle and the possibility of suffering is there any likelihood of winning the prize.

A position can frequently be high lighted by considering its opposite. Were the "good" man never to suffer any of the misfortunes of life, it could only mean that in some way God was arranging matters so that no matter what his choices might be they would always, because of his goodness, lead to pleasant consequences. Were he to make mistakes, be absent-minded or otherwise perform actions that in terms of dependable law ought to bring unpleasant consequences, these results would be set aside. But causes and effects exist in a very complicated system and thus to set aside causal regularity for a few chosen ones would have incalculable results. The person himself and those with whom he would come into contact would find themselves living in an undependable universe because of its being one in which dependable predictability would never be possible. Choice would then be discovered to have no firm basis of expectation, and the entire purpose of man's life, or at least the possibility of its fulfillment, would be frustrated.

It is frequently said, further, that the existence of a world war proves the position that there is no good and powerful God. Such a view implies the following: either that God is expected to let men go this way but then to interfere when their decisions have carried them too deeply into evil, or else that men have no real freedom of will, and consequently God should operate his world well. Were the former to take place, under such conditions the necessity for man to use every effort to escape harmful consequences would be done away with. Like children skating on thin ice, human beings would stray onto the thin edge of evil knowing that were they to plunge in God would reach out a saving arm to them. The effect of relying upon God's direct intervention at such crises would be destructive of the very purpose for which freedom is granted. *Because* man has been entrusted with so much, in a regular world on which he can depend, the risks he runs are so great.

It is interesting to attempt to imagine the sort of world which the naïve person would wish to live in—a world of pleasure, peace, ease, with no possibility of suffering, parting, injury; in short, a hedonistic paradise such as is frequently pictured in popular descriptions of heaven. One can readily imagine how life would soon become in such a world. There would be relaxation of almost all earnest effort, except in the most rare individuals; a lowering of the ideal of life and the purpose for living to that of enjoying, not achieving; a breaking down of all that has been achieved in human intellect and ideal through centuries of human effort. The human bow would be unslacked and would soon become useless. All direction to living would be gradually lost and with it all effort and improvement. Historically, the period in the United States between the wars, during which time many people enjoyed "prosperity," illustrated very well the kind of degeneration that comes to man's highest functions and values in even a relatively easy and comfortable life. And, contrarywise, men who had relaxed back into such a life of no necessary effort looked in retrospect to their war experiences as the period when life was truly exciting and worth living, because they then had to call upon and use all their resources. A world in which no possibility of suffering existed would be a dying world, so far as humanity would be concerned.

Finally, the Christian faith has much to say about the uses to which suffering can be put. It seems doubtful whether any human being of great stature ever reached his development apart from severe struggle against enemies outward and inward. At the centre of our religion stands the cross. Jesus himself suffered and died and *therefore* draws all men unto him. This by itself is a topic not within the scope of this paper but it is necessary to mention, at least, that suffering is not just to be stoically borne. It is to be accepted and used, as has been done in Christian history. It is therefore the key to, rather than the final interrogation point of, life. Christianity was sown in the suffering and death of Christ, grew in the blood of the martyrs, and even today reaches its finest forms under difficulties and persecutions. It promises no easy, effortless life to its followers; but it does offer life that is "life indeed." It does say that for those who comprehend life as it truly is, and who love God and their fellows, everything, finally and ultimately, does work together for good. For God too loves man, and sympathizes and suffers with him.

The discerning reader will no doubt be aware of many unanswered questions. Many of these difficulties are recognized by the writer. The question of why man is not given a greater degree of insight and intelligence; of the waste of life; of the great periods of geological time, and

why they should have been necessary—these and many others are left unanswered. It will be noticed also that this view is antithetical to the view that salvation is attained only through a kind of grace which has no relation to the moral worth of individuals but proceeds freely and mysteriously from the will of God alone, for his "glory" or "honor." This raises the problem of fundamental theological approach, but no more can here be said than that a God who condemns man with no relation to him, his choices and activities, is a God neither of love nor of justice and so has no rightful place in any theology that is Christian. That position seems to this writer to be one that raises insuperable logical and religious difficulties.

"THE LIBERTY OF PROPHESYING"

A Tercentenary Essay of Appreciation

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THREE YEARS ago we celebrated the tercentenary of Milton's *Areopagitica,* one of the truly magnificent manifestoes in the long struggle for freedom in our English-speaking world. 1644 also produced a work by New England's outstanding prophet of freedom: I refer to Roger Williams' *Bloudy Tenent of Persecution,* another call for more elbowroom in a madly pushing and confining world. The year 1947 brought another significant three-hundredth anniversary. In 1647 Jeremy Taylor, priest of the Church of England, sent forth his work, commonly known as *The Liberty of Prophesying,* a long, close-packed, closely-reasoned plea for more *Lebensraum* in "this believing world." Its seventeenth-century English, delightful to the person who savors the riches of an antique style, may be an impediment to the busy student who wants straightforward Americanese. Its clutterings of long quotations of Latin and Greek will frighten many away. From our point of view, its rather repetitious fullness could be pruned, and the argument condensed to half the length. Withal it is a treasure chest of good things, and a truly notable achievement for its time. Furthermore, its carefully wrought plea for tolerance in the Christian world has more than a little to say to our age of embattled ideologies. It has surgery and healing balm for use wherever men are inclined to scorn and hurt one another for the fancied glory of God.

Jeremy Taylor's fame in the Christian world at large, of course, rests upon those twin classics of devotion that we know as *Holy Living* and *Holy Dying.* Once again we fear that the language barrier, the different rhetorical idiom, the more leisurely-paced prose, may deter many persons from the use of these genuine classics. But we must not leave them to students of English literature alone; they still belong primarily to the Christian in his quiet closet, and there they have a golden reward to bestow. For the eager reader, the element for which we seem to find no other word than that threadbare one of "quaintness" will quickly vanish as a barrier and change into sheer delight. Taylor's life and work have been evaluated by several competent biographers. Reginald Heber's memoir of 1828 prefaces the collected works from which we shall quote in this essay. George Worley (1904) and W. J. Brown (1925) have written in this century. The English literary critic Edmund Gosse did a useful volume (1904) on Taylor. The English style of Taylor at his

best is of such distinction as to exhaust the adjectives of its admirers. Gosse is of the opinion that *The Liberty of Prophesying* does not belong to the days of Taylor's best style, though "written in a style very clear, simple, and unadorned."

The phase of Taylor represented by *The Liberty of Prophesying* has been finely dealt with by W. K. Jordan in the fourth volume (1940) of his commanding study of religious toleration in England's sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Works of Lecky and Tullock and Dowden and others, all cited by Jordan, and the standard histories of seventeenth-century England, will help the reader to see Taylor's treatment of tolerance in its true perspective. For such a time as 1647 was in England (or almost anywhere, for that matter), the Anglican Taylor's work seems most remarkable for its cool-mindedness, its sweet-temperedness, its lack of party spirit, its profound Christian charity. Parliament had abolished episcopacy in 1643. 1646 saw Laud's execution. Militant, dogmatic Presbyterianism was in the saddle.

Taylor's title is of the old full type: *Theologia Eklektiké, or A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying, with Its Just Limits and Temper: shewing the Unreasonableness of Prescribing to Other Men's Faith, and the Iniquity of Persecuting Differing Opinions.* The Greek title, which I have transliterated, is according to a practice common to that century: see for like practice the list of the works of the Puritan and Congregationalist John Owen. The word "prophesying" is of course practically equivalent to "preaching." Had we been writing the book today we might have named it *The Liberty of Propaganda.*

Taylor begins his work with a long dedicatory letter to the Right Honorable Christopher Lord Hatton, his benefactor. This "Epistle Dedicatory" fills forty-four pages in Heber's 1828 edition; and, even as Calvin's notable dedication of his *Institutes* thoroughly repays the reader who does not venture into the solid body of the work, so it is with Taylor's. Here the reader has a good taste of the quality and substance of all the rest. He tells of his lack of books in his Welsh retreat. If this treatise was written away from many books, it certainly represents an astonishing feat of memory. Jordan believes, however, that the work may really have been begun as early as 1643.[1] Taylor is of the opinion, however, that such a thesis as he is setting forth is one in which "I needed no other books or aids than what a man carries with him on horseback, I mean, the common principles of Christianity, and those *axiomata,* which men use in the transactions of the ordinary occurrences of civil society."[2] Here we detect

[1] W. K. Jordan, *The Development of Religious Toleration in England,* Harvard University Press, 1938, vol. IV, p. 379.

[2] *The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D.,* etc. (in fifteen volumes), London, 1826, vol. VII, p. cccxvii.

the sources of his authority for his defense of religious tolerance, namely, the basic spirit of love in our Lord's and his Apostles' teachings, and the natural human wisdom, born of experience, in which we carry on all our peaceful relationships. Near the end of the dedication, he expresses his belief that his argument is "agreeable to the great precepts and design of Christianity, consonant to the practice of the apostles, and the best ages of the Church, most agreeable to Scripture and reason, to revelation and the nature of the thing."[8]

It is plain that we are on the broad road of Anglican thought of which Richard Hooker before him was a noteworthy champion. Hooker, it will be remembered, answered the narrowly Scriptural appeal of the zealots in the polity quarrels with the twofold appeal to Scripture, or Revelation, *and reason.* Narrower men, in the fierce seventeenth-century battle of polities, were to fix Anglicanism in a more rigid pattern of *jus divinum* episcopacy. But between 1600, when Hooker died, and the Restoration Church of 1660, the so-called Latitudinarians, of whom we usually distinguish Chillingworth, Hales, and Falkland, enunciated the broader principles in which Taylor was to be at home. Chillingworth's *The Bible the Religion of Protestants,* appearing ten years before *The Liberty of Prophesying,* is the outstanding work of the school, and breaks up much of the ground in which Taylor was himself to plow. These men sought to puncture the swollen claims of fixity and finality and to lead men to a more modest view of the power of the human mind in the attainment and definition of ultimate truth. But the British Presbyterians, fixing their doctrine of Westminster as Laud and King Charles were ripening for the scaffold, had no use for such thought. The Latitudinarians, and Taylor with them, were truly ahead of their time, as a green island of peace in a stormy sea, an island that tells the weary mariner that the mainland is not far away.

Taylor's proffered counsel of healing in that age of civil strife may be compared in some measure with the *Essays* of Montaigne in war-weary France two generations earlier. We are not trying to define such words as *skeptic, humanist, rationalist,* in this brief essay of appreciation for Taylor; yet each of the words does bear a certain reference to his thought and its roots, devout Christian that he was. Montaigne also has in him some element of all three. *Humanist* may be the best word. After the prolonged bloodletting of the so-called religious wars of France, he offers his cooling skepticism, in humanity's name, to allay the fevers of crusading dogmatisms and party feuds.

Taylor's counsel, we repeat, was premature. Before religious peace

[8] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. ccccxxxiii—ccccxxxiv.

should arrive, the sea of intolerance was to rise to the flood and cause untold misery. The prisons were to be filled to overflowing with nonconformists, notably Quakers. With 1689 and the Toleration Act, something of Taylor's spirit was written into the law of the land. The mentor of this advance was none other than John Locke, who was reminding his fellows again of the limitations of the human mind when confronted by the stupendous sum of reality. I see Taylor's plea then as a kind of middle point between the best mind of Elizabethan comprehension and the breathing space for the spirit afforded by the advent of the Orange king, thenceforth to broaden continually on British soil.

Here is the temper that our author tracks down through the Christian—or, after reading him should we say the sub-Christian?—centuries: it is the temper of the angry, opinionated, power-loving heresy hunter who is apt to imagine God delights in the odor of roasting heretics' brains. In Taylor's eyes the age of the apostles knew no such spirit. The church fell when with power in its hands through the close coöperation of the civic authority it began condemning those who deviated from the dogmatic standard. He tells how "restraint of prophesying, imposing upon other men's understanding, being masters of their consciences, and lording it over their faith, came in with the retinue and train of Antichrist," with "the cooling of the first heats of Christianity," and "the abatements of Christian simplicity when the church's fortune grew better, and her sons grew worse, and some of her father's worst of all."[4] Such convictions on the fall of the church stamp Taylor, whatever else he is called, as a child of the Protestant Reformation.

Taylor's knowledge of Christian history is broad and profound and detailed. I find this work one of the best histories of Christian heresy and its fate. He sees the shame of persecuting men for the variant opinions that inevitably arise from the very facts of varying environments, traditions, courses of education, or the lack of such. He believes there is abundant room in God's house for differences of opinion so long as we agree on the plain fundamentals of redemption. He reminds us that premillennialism was the prevailing faith of the early Christians, and therefore presumably of apostolic authority. And "Why did never any general council condemn, in express sentence, the Pelagian heresy, that great pest, that subtle infection of Christendom? And yet divers general councils did assemble, while the heresy was in the world."[5] Purgatory is to him an opinion he would tolerate. Prayers for the dead he feels need cause no quarrel among Christ's followers. Indeed, Taylor even avers that he can tolerate transubstantiation, so long as its adherents will live

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, pp. cccclx—ccccx.
[5] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 487.

and let live. He is here not speaking, of course, as a practical ecclesiast, but rather as a peace-loving Christian citizen of a land badly fretted over religious issues. He knows from study and experience that the strong arm of flesh and steel cannot cure the soul's diseases or bestow the gift of correct belief.

Taylor has a beautiful sense of "the varieties of religious experience," and of the futility of trying to corral them into one neat and orderly fold. He writes often of the chances men run of being "invincibly deceived." He wants us to cultivate a charity and tolerance like God's, who surely condemns no man whose belief is incorrect because all his circumstances have contributed to that result. ". . . if God will not be angry at men for being invincibly deceived, why should men be angry one at another?"[6] William Penn had just such a conviction: "For my part, I frankly declare that I cannot think that God will damn any man for the errors of his judgment."[7]

Taylor makes much of the distinction between heresy and error. "For heresy," he writes, "is not an error of the understanding, but an error of the will."[8] And again, "No man is a heretic against his will."[9] He had a mighty forerunner when he expressed such a distinction, for the mystical Meister Eckhart had spoken centuries before in his own defense against the charge of heresy: "I may err but I may not be a heretic—for the first has to do with the mind and the second with the will!"[10] Wise Christians know that there must always be room for the *adiaphora,* those variations of doctrine and opinion which do not seriously touch the central concerns of salvation. But the mad persecutors have confused these mental errors with willful and perverse disobedience, with defiance of God and church. When, we may ask, does error go over into heresy? A good answer has to do with Cyprian and the Donatists. Cyprian contended for the rebaptism of the heretic and schismatic; but who has ever dared call Cyprian a heretic? We can say he was honestly and invincibly deceived, if we follow Taylor at this point. But the Donatists, the strange heirs of Cyprian's contention, were willful, stubborn troublemakers, and that is different. The church can rightly exercise its discipline where such defiance as theirs is concerned. But discipline does not call for the drawing of blood. "The pure and chaste designs of Christianity," in Taylor's fine sentence, "[admit] no blood but Christ's, and the imitating blood of the martyrs."[11]

[6] *Ibid.,* vol. VIII, p. 231.

[7] Quoted in Sharpless, *A Quaker Experiment in Government,* vol. I, p. 118.

[8] Taylor, *op. cit.,* vol. VII, p. 461.

[9] *Ibid.,* vol. VII, p. 466.

[10] Quoted in R. B. Blakney, *Meister Eckhart, a Modern Translation,* Harper, 1941, p. xxiii.

[11] Taylor, *op. cit.,* vol. VII, p. ccccxviii.

Taylor sees a remedy in the simplicity of doctrine that characterized the apostolic age. One is reminded of the impulse that sends Baptists and Disciples back to the New Testament as their sole ground of faith and practice. " . . . those creeds," wrote Jeremy, "are best, which keep the very words of Scripture."[12] Our Anglican author sends us, however, to the Apostles' Creed as the full and adequate sum of Christian doctrine. What is more than this is of the ages of the fallen church, of the dogfights of the ecumenical councils, and the heresy hunters of the Inquisition. Yes, even the Nicene Creed is implicated in this tragic course. It is not that Taylor specifically disapproves the essential work of these councils, or fails to grasp what was the profound necessity of defining the Christological core of our faith. But the Nicene Council started that habit of the makers of dogma who have incorporated the devilish anathema into the very body of their statements. Human beings are simply not endowed by God with the possibility of reaching the certainty and finality that the Jove-like anathema implies.

His quarrel with the Catholic centuries is that they added such a towering superstructure to the simple foundations, and condemned and hurt men who questioned the presence of any of the bricks in that soaring Babel tower. Listen to some of his own language: " . . . if the church, by declaring an article can make that to be necessary, which before was not necessary, I do not see how it can stand with the charity of the church so to do, especially after so long experience she hath had, that all men will not believe every such decision or explication; for, by so doing, she makes the narrow way to heaven narrower, and chalks out one path more to the devil than he had before, and yet the way was broad enough, when it was at the narrowest."[13] One might profitably study Taylor's thesis as over against Newman's theory of development. If Ockham applied his razor to the lush development of scholastic analysis and definition, may we not say that Taylor and the Latitudinarians, following Acontius and Socinus and other Continentals, also sharpened their particular blades against multiplying doctrinal requirements? For them it is that *credibilia non multiplicanda.*

Taylor spends a great deal of ink on the Anabaptists in a section that we should consider an appendix, and possibly a somewhat irrelevant one.[14] He evidently felt very keenly the force of the Baptist argument against infant baptism, since he, even as they, professes to return to apostolic beginnings for his standard. He sets forth their view very fairly indeed. Then he spends a much longer time trying to demolish it,

[12] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 485.
[13] *Ibid.*, vol. VII, p. 453.
[14] *Ibid.*, vol. VIII, pp. 150-211.

apparently convinced that antipedobaptism is an error. But an error calls for loving persuasion, and the Baptists are his brothers in Christ. King Charles I, then in his imprisonment, read Taylor's work, and specifically disapproved of its mild handling of the Anabaptists. He forthwith charged his chaplain Hammond to answer it. It is plain that Taylor's breadth and charity were offensive to the angry partisans of that strife-torn age. It was the brief period of Presbyterian dominance and of the Westminster Assembly. One of the Westminster divines had gone to Chillingworth's burial to fling in his last fiery curse on the great Latitudinarian and his famous book. The Scottish mystic, that violent Presbyterian, Samuel Rutherford, loudly answered *The Liberty of Prophesying*. This aroused Milton to write his scathing sonnet against "The New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament."

Of course Taylor is afraid, as were most of his contemporaries, of the men of the Münsterite strain of Anabaptism. But such libertarian anarchy as the extremists might invoke is for the state to restrain. And the same is true for dangerous practices from the Roman side. Münster was more than a century behind him; but the Spanish Armada was only two generations past, and the English memory was deeply grooved with fears of Latin Christian ambitions. Certainly Taylor's calm magnanimity in 1647 is worthy of remembrance.

The reader of Taylor's life is likely to remind us that Taylor himself, when he later became a bishop in Ireland, did not live up to his magnanimous platform of 1647. This is true enough, and were we here weighing Taylor as a man, and trying to round out an appreciation of his life's work, we should have to take this into account. We charitably draw the veil closed before the Restoration brings another and a sadder chapter in his life.

The core of Jeremy Taylor's Christianity is ethical, without being moralistic and without reducing Jesus to a mere teacher. If the Apostles' Creed were his standard, he would not have followed the Ritschlians who sought to recover the "religion of Jesus" and rest in that alone. But he surely would not go with the extremists who dismiss the Sermon on the Mount as a mere law. Daily cross-bearing is the hallmark of his type of Christian. The main thing is to live a good life. He would suspect any creed that breeds the will to hate and persecute. With a wealth of relevant learning and an aptitude for epigram he pleads the goodly cause of understanding and charity and peace. One is reminded often of Erasmus, who to this day is a favorite with many Anglican leaders; and of the English John Colet who influenced Erasmus with his call to a simple, practical Christian faith. Christian humanism is the term most often applied to this school.

A work like this is far from irrelevant to our age of hardening ideologies, devastating and world-embracing wars, and the terrifying threat of total destruction. The essay is indeed very incomplete as a handbook for the broad field of liberty and restraint. It avoids many questions that seem inevitable to ask. Can Jeremy Taylor help us today? What would he say about Jehovah's Witnesses? Would he imprison or commit to slave labor the conscientious objectors to war? Would he counsel toleration, within our democracy, of the express foes of that tolerance and that democracy? Would he urge Protestants to refrain from mission work in Latin America? Would he give any breath of support to the apparent call to a holy war against the Red world that sounds forth from various quarters? He cannot answer such questions for us. But his fine Christian charity has healing power. Surely Jeremy Taylor's comprehensive heart would approve every honest effort toward the reconciliation of races and nations. He would make us see how ridiculous are our own claims to superiority in race and culture and nationality and creed. He kindles the imagination, and we see ourselves as others see us. And even if rightness and goodness have a closer relationship than he seems to imply, he is surely close to the gospel when he exalts the costly loving following of the Christ as above all the creeds. "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?"

THREE LETTERS

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I

In this letter, dear friend, I should like to consider creation with you—not so much man's creation of himself (but what a letter that would make!), but the creation of things *by* man, *for* himself.

You must understand that the word "thing" is a very important one to me—one which goes over and around us—back to the deepest of the experiences which any of us is likely to have. This "thing" which is created is to me not merely the finite product, but the creator and his idea as well. Much that is difficult or obscure in life eventually becomes clear through this—the realization of things. In this connection, I quote you this passage from Thoreau concerning the way in which we may recognize a "thing" completely. Only in this manner can we come to a "thing" to welcome it as our friend.

> A fact must be the vehicle of some humanity in order to interest us. Otherwise it is like giving a man a stone when he asks for bread. Ultimately the moral is all in all, and we do not mind it if inferior truth is sacrificed to superior, as when the annalist fables, and makes animals speak and act like men. It must be warm, moist, incarnated, *have been breathed on at least. A man has not seen a thing who has not felt it.*[1]

We need only substitute "thing" for its manifestation here, and the idea of how a thing may be recognized and and cared for becomes clear, particularly in the words which I have italicized.

You may argue that in earlier letters my cry for art has been one of absolutism. I hear you say in amazement. "Why do you quote me this? Have you not said, repeatedly, that one must come to a work of art with no thought of value to be received? Is not art sufficient in itself?" I answer you, "Yes," but my interpretation goes deeper. Valid art must have its own reason for existing; it must stand complete, with no outside commentary—that is its lesson as well as its moral—thus it becomes a "thing," finite in its own four walls. It is accepted by the multitudes of other "things" that exist, whether man recognizes it to be so, at any one given moment, or not. Eventually he will be happy to admit the existence which has been around him for some time already, providing

[1] Henry David Thoreau, *Winter,* Houghton Mifflin, 1887, p. 430 (entry for February 23, 1860)—italics mine.

that it is an honest existence. In case you doubt this ultimate acceptance, examine the history of art, particularly that of the past two centuries. You will find that virtually all important work of this period has had a poor reception at first. Finally, some new stage is reached from which stance it is possible to view what went before, with perspective. The difficult, queer, things take their proper places, and the preceding period is acknowledged. The newest stage is still disliked, but it rests confident of itself, and is willing to wait.

As for processes by which "things" come into being, I refer you to nature for the growth of living organisms. For art, I cannot do that. Art which attempts to copy nature is necessarily bad. Art may learn from the functions of nature, but its own spirit and existence grow along a parallel line. Art flourishes in itself—agreeing and acquiescing with nature, but never reflecting her. The creator must love his creation, or rather, the process by which he arrives at his "thing." But, as much as possible, he must adopt the standing-aside-after-the-wheels-are-set-in-motion of nature. This is not always a possibility with man; because of his developed emotions it never can be perfect in the measure which he allows emotion to seize upon his work. The demands made upon us by a work of art are in some way connected with all this, although certainly they do not stem directly from it. The greatest artists are the freest from this man-made moral concern for the fate of their ideas. More than this it is impossible to say. The completely sublime piece of work—the thing which is "god," man-made—has never existed, and perhaps it never will, but I do not believe that this is due to some heavenly taboo. One may not climb too high, but only because the limits of emotion and concern shut in at some point; this failure is the only punishment, and it is the god and devil of accomplishment in all walks of life. Split a hair a thousand times, and you will still have too thick a line between.

Do not be deceived by this, the application is much larger than to the restricted sphere which we designate "art." I have come back from my wood lot with fuel for my fire; I lay it, and the flame to which I am entitled comes into being. I must watch carefully, not to choke its mouth at first, but in the end I shall burn whole trees—and the vast bulk which goes into my fire fills me with astonishment. So it is with ideas; the strange, heavy lumps are turned into fire eventually, and vast things are accomplished. But if I rattle the sticks about in my stove before the fire is once fairly started, all the emotion which I am able to muster will never kindle damp wood. I must stand aside until the dampness has given way to fire, and usually it will come. Similarly, do not beat your head or your hands: "things" will come in their own time, as surely as seasons come. You have done things, but they are better done as you

learn to let them alone. And I assure you that the satisfaction of my fire, or of my carpentry, is as great as any that I may feel when I finish my poem. The warmth is the same.

Lastly, I should like to speak to you of faith—that difficult, difficult word, and even more difficult realization. Do not brand any man as one of no faith. His living is a proof of faith—there is nothing in the universe that has asked any of us to become a part of it. We exist. What faith that takes! So in the smaller world of art; the "thing" that impels a man to create—where no one solicits or asks for his contribution—is the most powerful conscious faith of all. We hear it said that men of art, in particular, have lost their faith. Do men say this because they do not see the stained glass windows or the paintings of saints which were common in past ages? It may be, in part. It seems more likely that the strange, new manifestations make men uncomfortable, foreshorten at first their appreciation as well as their understanding, and make them exclaim that the one is bad, another neurotic, and still another a devil with sound. Certainly, this must be the explanation, for the artist is the man of deepest faith—conscious as well as inherent. Although his hands are never raised in supplication, and although he may not set foot in the common places of worship, there are prayers which come to his lips in doing—in creating and knowing the "thing." For you it may be different in form; but, as you live, always remember that you too are a man of faith. It is perhaps better when this faith is never realized in conventional lip-service—it has become one with us, and escapes the risk of being comfortable.

So, dear sir, I recommend "things" to you. Do not imagine that my problems are solved; it is only that in these letters they take form, and may help us both—that is all. Should you be so inclined, read the letters of the great German poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, and you will find there this faith in, and realization of, "things."

II

You ask me, dear sir, concerning man's relation to his fellows, and you have spoken of a moral obligation. Insofar as I am able to answer you, I shall have to disagree with the things which you have raised as objections to the faith-in-living of which we spoke before. You tell me, "This is no time to think of personal development. Too much is at stake." (I quote your words since they are incisive and well presented.) Let me consider these things in order:

At the risk of appearing a child (and many times I wish I still were one), I ask you, "What is 'moral obligation'?" Is it an obligation to interfere with my fellow man, to spy on him, to chalk his misdeeds against

him? This is one interpretation—a very narrow one, I admit. I feel that your objection is rooted elsewhere. There are many who consider moral obligation in the light of the boy scout creed: to remove bottles from the roads, to lend aid to the infirm and helpless. There are worse things which may be done with one's life, certainly; but the decision as to whether I will really benefit mankind by doing these things can come only after a long period in which I learn to recognize myself. Thus to our growing store of words I will add "aloneness." If you can withdraw into yourself, can understand at least a part of yourself—and the things which happen (including the reasons for them!) when you use machines, or speech, or nature itself—then I give you full rein to help humanity. Otherwise I do not feel myself entitled to do so. Since a life well-lived spends its whole time in attempting to understand itself, there can be no time for a half-understood service to others. Do not think me selfish; far from that, it is only that I fear too many demons will be unleashed by a bungling of these high motives, to grant indiscriminate rights to blind men. "First, cast out the beam . . . ." No, dear sir, your service to humanity will be far greater if you consent to let it alone, except insofar as men border you. Remember "aloneness."

As men live *apart* from one another, the relation commonly called "coöperation" becomes more actual. Conscious striving towards unity can cause nothing but disunity after the furore of so-called "mass accomplishment" has cleared away. As each one begins to understand himself (never well, unfortunately), the problems of all become simpler. To travel alone is the true definition of brotherhood to me. It is just here that I quarrel with the nation—its existence as a binding society. Here, all efforts and large ideas are supposedly blended—bent towards a common good—and the result is almost invariably a common evil. If I am right, the age-old question, "Why do the nations rage so furiously together?" is answered. Nations in their attempted blending sometimes achieve a certain degree of solidarity, and as soon as they taste the blended flavor of themselves, they wish to influence other nations—other blends. But if we consider men as individuals, their irreconcilable differences and preferences become evident, and the ideal state becomes an impossibility, since it presupposes a membership of more than one. A nation is too large a unit—responsibility and moral obligation to others entail too wide a dissemination of individual weakness and ignorance. Learn this second difficult lesson: "aloneness."

You may argue that I have dragged in this notion with no apparent reference either to what has gone before, or to the small world of art, which is, after all, our main consideration. I feel, however, that your use of such phrases as "moral obligation" or "Too much is at stake" pre-

supposes an interest in world affairs on your part and a fear of living which never could stem from that quiet world of love where art is born, but is a natural outcome of a concern over outside pressure—the various crises which men would have you believe to be important. I beg you, dear sir, to give up such diffuse considerations, as difficult as that may seem to you when all external forces are ready to cloud a man's ability to think of things in terms of himself.

And now your two further comments: "This is no time to think of personal development. Too much is at stake." Can you not see that these statements of yours are taken and set in juxtaposition with the timeless problems of man, while they admit by their very phrasing that they are temporal? Why did you not end your statement, "This is no time to think"? It is as sensible as the completed phrase. Were the problems of personal development solved, the heaving and straining of all man's world would become very much less labored. We shall have to return to "aloneness" once again, and there, perhaps with no tools other than our bare hands, begin to reconstruct—*from ourselves,* and not from some apparently pressing social problem, which in being a problem in the aggregate is already obsolete and dead.

And "Too much is at stake." Here, you voice the opinion of millions: This is a time never before equalled or even paralleled. I cannot agree with you. Man is able to communicate his wrongdoings on a wider scale, more efficiently than formerly; but the evil itself is no worse. You will realize this if every pond can become an ocean for you, and every tree a forest. The principle of war and pillage is no different than the one involved in a family feud. Both evils are strong and actual; neither one can be called the greater. Much was at stake when men climbed trees and threw rocks at one another. Much *is* at stake—but not "too much."

I already hear your objection: "Even if what you say is true, the mass of humanity will never give up what it thinks to be of service to itself for your experiment; of what use, then, is the whole idea?" And I answer this as many lonely men have done: It is not a question of what others do; I must do as *my* will directs *me* to do. It is a tragedy, but certainly a real enough thing, that the distances between the closest beings are further apart than the limits of space. When a man learns this, his "aloneness" can become a tool in his hand, and he has one more chisel with which to hew out his "thing." For an artist this is a natural conclusion; for others it may be more difficult, but it is nonetheless true.

III

Your answer to my last letter, dear friend, was above all honest and

candid, and in my opinion we have come closer together, even though we cannot agree on many points. I can understand your trepidation when it comes to experiments such as the ones we have been discussing—particularly, when outwardly, at least, your condition is a happy one. I shall not try to influence your thinking. It is your undisputed right. Asked an opinion, I will give it to the best of my ability, but I am not ready to teach others what I can but half guess for myself.

You ask me what to do about advice—that which is given you as the experience of some older person. I cannot force you or advise you strongly, but I have found it expedient thus far to ignore about ninety per cent of the things told me "for my own good." Ignore politely, but firmly. The other day I set out ice fishing and was stopped by a neighbor, who, seeing my equipment, became fearful for me. He advised me not to go, and I asked him if he knew the ice to be unsafe. From former experience with late winter thaws, he was certain that it would be so. I was not deterred, and found nine inches of solid ice on which to stand. This was not stubbornness on my part; from my own acquaintance with this particular winter I had found it to be a very cold one—the frost penetrated very much more deeply than in other years. Thus my personal observation served me far better than what might have been correct *in general* in my neighbor's advice. Beware generalities. The "experiences" of the old (as of the young) are miserable failures for the most part, but where they are not, a general law is not a safe thing to follow. As you discover things for yourself, constantly sort out the chaff—generalities—and work from what you know of the particular case at hand. Begin from nothing—build your "aloneness" and your "things" from that. It will be hard to discard so much. At first you will see nothing; but when a tree is planted, if the head is cut back, the new crown is often superior to the old—although the bare trunk is denuded for a season. So it is with human life—at least my own—and I assure you that, for me, a giant who sees less far than the top pygmy in a troup of acrobats is to be revered far more than that pygmy. By juggling, a semblance may be achieved; by standing firmly, reality exists! This is the great rule of art, and eventually of life.

As I have said before, dear sir, these letters are not the results of my achievement, but of my hope. You may be able to do things otherwise. I do not dispute your right. All that I could suggest would be that you solve your problems—whether they be as mine are, "things" and "aloneness," or some other questions—solve them in a highly personal manner. So many moralities clamor to be heard that one must build his own or fail entirely.

A RELIGION FOR ONE WORLD

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THE QUESTION is how religion can contribute to the making of one world. What part should and can religion play in the improving of international relations? Religion is a force in history which either divides men or draws them together. It is hard to overestimate its potential power for good or ill with respect to our achieving one world. Some religions have often been, and actually are now, sources of conflict. It has been proposed that the abolishing of religions is a step toward concord among groups and nations. There is obviously a strong element of truth in this suggestion.

But can religion be abolished? History testifies that man is rather generally an incurably religious animal. An analysis of religion can bring out the fact that a man's religion is his basic relation to the universe. Religion is what to a man is most worth while in view of what he considers to be true. All men are religious in their way, for to be religious means to respond meaningfully to the world that we find.

We cannot abolish religion except by destroying human life. What we *can* do is to find what is universally good for us in this actual world. The main fact under consideration is the oneness of our world. This is obviously true geographically, in terms of our modes of communication; politically, in terms of rapidly converging interests, overlapping relations, and intensified interactions; economically, in terms of increasing interdependence and expanding desires; and intellectually, in terms of an ever more frequent and absorbing consciousness of all the other peoples in the world; but this is not equally true in terms of common interests and faiths.

We need a world faith, a community of universal interests and ideals. This can come imperialistically, as one faith does to death the other faiths in a long struggle. In this case, religion adds to the world's conflicts and confusion. For this crucial time, at least, it will drain men's energies and destroy their will to universal coöperation. Or it can come by the method of free inquiry ever rooted in the concern for the common good. In this case, the concrete religions, even while seeking universality, will implement whatever general good will may already be found. The second approach is ours.

I

A religion for one world must be based on truth. This must be a beginning for us from which we must never depart. Naturally, each

religion will have to start where it is. We know no presuppositionless thinking. Universality must be an expanding edge, differing according to the capacity of each religion to meet man's deepest, permanent needs. Truth must be approached in the spirit of democratic pluralism. Only the future can tell to what extent a basic universality can be freely combined with the relative elements which characterize human understanding, preferences, and choices. If any religion is sure of its intrinsic universality, it ought the more readily to consent to free inquiry and concomitant coöperation. *Some sort* of democratic pluralism of many religions, or of one, seems altogether probable as a result. This does not preclude a universal aspect and orientation common to all.

If free inquiry is to find the fullest truth of religion, it will find it a grounded faith. What is *most* real and important cannot be proved in terms of what is *more* real and important without doing violence to rational discourse. A false use of reason has handicapped us. Futility of life is not a little due to falsity of light. The fullest and clearest use of our reason should find us seeing that religion cannot be reduced to reason without reducing whole-life to part-life. Not understanding this, teachers have often quashed vital religion by means of false criticism. In doing this, they have helped to injure the root of creative civilization.

There has been, in any case, much confused thinking about the relation of religion to reason that has thwarted and perverted both. That religion must be based on truth means that it must use reason fearlessly for the full facts, and for all the reasons that can identify and clarify truth. Yet vital religion *uses* reason; it *lives* creatively and courageously beyond what can be proved in terms of what now is. How else could it help to improve the world? How else could faith have any power for the good which we want to see actualized?

The trouble with dwellers in the academic world is often that they have carried over the attitudes and disciplines of their particular approach into the religious realm without regard to the distinctive nature of religion. In this way they have helped to undermine the faith of the best leadership in religion, leaving the field that much freer to those who have lower ideals and more partial loyalties.

Religion should make the fullest use of philosophy, but philosophy cannot become a substitute for religion. Philosophy is basically concerned with knowledge. It can be concerned with creative and living knowledge. But when it becomes the full faith of life, it has to that extent gone beyond its proper discipline. If the philosophy of the good life is made a vital life decision, it constitutes the content of that person's faith. It is his religion. Commitment is the very nature of religion. Disinterestedness

is good as a method, for a part of life. Full life requires creative and concerned interest.

In his extensive survey of history Toynbee comes to the conclusion that "when philosophies and religion meet, the religion must increase, while the philosophies must decrease."[1] The reasons for this are obvious: "The fatal and fundamental weakness in philosophy, from which all derive, is a lack of spiritual vitality."[2]

If man is to have a full-rounded and well-working societal situation, including its political relations, he must thus have a universal faith grounded in truth. "As political philosophy derives its sanction from ethics, and ethics from the truth of religion, it is only by returning to the eternal source of truth that we can hope for any social organization which will not, to its ultimate destruction, ignore some essential aspect of reality."[3] Man cannot live by the bread of knowledge alone, but must also live by the word of the living truth. Unless this distinction is seen, we shall not see what religion can contribute to the making of one world, how it can help to improve international relations.

The truth which can help us to improve our present situation must be had previously through faith, and must therefore be basically self-evident and self-verifying. Yet since reason is a part of life without which it cannot be whole, truth must always be confirmed by reason.

Historic religions accumulate much debris of which they must be cleansed. Within is some kernel of truth. Primitive man thinks in terms of pictures. For that matter, depth-thinking is mostly analogical with us all. Hence we get myths which are meaningful to the whole man. There is something primitive about religion in the sense that it seeks language that speaks to the whole man. Creeds are mostly rationalizations of myths. A problem arises because of the fact that reason tends to make life conform to its language, to logical abstractions, which satisfy only a part of man. Myths and creeds, on the other hand, tend to avoid the light of facts and reasoning and thus keep the whole man from being satisfied, with the demands of reason left out. Somehow the eternal in history which forms the heart of myth must be related to knowledge as a whole.

In doing this, some pose faith against reason, and some reason against faith; and both sides are to that extent wrong. For man to be whole, for religion and reason both to be strong, both must be satisfied according to their proper proportions. Religious thinkers can rationalize myths so as to satisfy the demands of most minds, but often also

[1] A. J. Toynbee, *The Study of History*, V, p. 557.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 558.

[3] T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 64.

so as to destroy their primitive power. Or they can choose to cleanse myths in terms of the demands of reason as such and thus leave man in the long run with impotent philosophy. You cannot extract the heart of myth and keep it a power in history. What needs to be done is to recognize that religious thinking to be sound must primarily be within the context of faith, yet a faith strong enough to be self-critical with regard to objective facts and reasons which check or challenge its claims. In this way the heart of religion is not hurt even though change and growth become part of its inner life. A religion for one world can never be constructed by reason; it must grow out of our new situation, developing its own appropriate language.

This is simply to say that religious thinking becomes impotent when rationally abstract. *We must work with concrete religions.* If human hearts meet at a deep enough level, their heads will always find the thoughts and their hand the acts of cooperation. In this respect Hocking's idea of reconception as a method contains much wisdom. Religious thinking is involved thinking, involved with the depth-decisions of life out of which issue both our reasoning and our rationalization. The objective facts of science and the coherence of philosophy should furnish data for religious thinking which sink it into its deeper life of living commitments, or its anguished problem solving, and weave it into a living language which speaks to the whole man. Not to observe such facts and reasonings is to make religion defensive and isolated from the full life in the world. To reduce religion, on the other hand, to such facts and reasonings is to kill its reality and effectiveness, as authority and motivation, by reducing it into part thinking. No universal abstraction will capture the imagination of one world. Each religion must be immersed into the common depth struggle of life, changing from a closed to an open community.

The final confirmation of religion by thought is within the context of the whole of experience. Religious truth, by the nature of its inmost reality, is experiential. It is operational, in the full sense of the term. To reduce the efficacy of the operational method to certain areas of sense data or formal thinking is to do rude, even if not deliberate, violence to the fuller truth of experience. All over the world educated mankind is wistfully longing to return to a faith that will give meaning and zest to life without doing violence to their intellect. Spengler may be right that we shall find nothing but "a morbid inner life, bringing a touch of warmth to wizened souls." If so, the reason will be that we cannot get away from the part-experience of reason to the power and satisfaction of whole-experience, including reason. Accordingly, we may perish from our own peculiar kind of ortho-differentiation, the overdevelopment of the frontal

lobe, to the neglect of the even fuller development of the life of the spirit.

But this need not be. The cross-fertilization of cultures and religions can lead to the *birth* of an adequate religion for one world, or to its acceptance, if now present in principle. Wise leadership is needed within the religions and the proper coöperation by other leaders of thought can help.

II

A religion for one world makes coöperation central in the discovery of truth. We are not thinking, of course, of some general consensus of opinion, or of some deification of the average understanding or attainment of man. Religious faith always points to the future; a world religion must be grown, or born, out of the needs of our concrete situation. Truth that can help us draws, rather than pushes; it beckons, rather than stands where we are.

Yet religion is a personal affair. There is no effective way to force faith. Faith arises from within, in response to a situation. A world faith, if it is to be meaningful and vital to an individual, must arise from within that individual. A faith for the whole world must spring out of the situation of the world as it appears true to the individual believer. He responds to what is most worth while in the light of what is true.

No religion now is adequate for man except it exhibit, in Amos Wilder's terms, "responsible freedom." Responsible freedom includes free thought. There must be available the fullest conditions for free thinking. Where thought is curbed, religion cannot be at its authentic best. Differing religions can find larger areas of understanding and coöperation only on the basis of truth. There must, therefore, also be freedom to differ, even on basic matters. If this is not given, faith is forced. As such it may survive and be organizationally strong, but not fully satisfactory to the groping mind. Yet freedom must ever be responsible. It must be for the common good. The individual should, therefore, be morally responsible to show intelligently and coöperatively the fuller truth. Religions cannot differ either on the right to differ or on their duty to find increasingly the fuller common truth. Though faith cannot be forced, it must be free only within the growing truth.

Responsible freedom involves the implementing of religion in life. Religious freedom is freedom for the common good. Such freedom is, therefore, also faithfulness. Religion is not first of all thought. Nor is it first of all worship. It is first of all fellowship. It is first of all responsible living.

We cannot start with freedom, and then go to fellowship. The community is a given fact. So is man's gregarious nature. The fact is that

his natural bent to self perverts his community life. Individualism is an abstraction. The fact is not that the individual wants to live for himself by himself; rather he wants to live for himself by means of, and in terms of, others. We cannot choose isolation, as individuals or nations. We must, rather, choose the kind of relations which we are to have. Such freedom should be with others for all, including the legitimate, mature needs of the self or the country.

Naturally such coöperative living will involve social, cultural, and religious pluralism. There is no way that we know that religions can come together overnight. Threatening disaster may hasten the process out of which a religion for one world may develop or be accepted. Yet even so, the background and traditions of the separate religions are necessary as an emotional basis, at least for a transition period. If one religion is found to be generally true, at least sufficiently true to absorb the rest, the other religions will bring along their own contributions into it.

The method, however, must be religious pluralism in the sense that no external force is applied. Nor should exchange of thought be forced persuasion. The method must be neither aggressive nor defensive in an insecure sense. No religion should have externals which either separate or are the occasions for superiority. Each religion must rather be a struggle with the common problems and for the common truths, and the patient and humble sharing of each other's seeing, until the truth which is adequate for one world can be established. It is hardly thinkable, and very likely not desirable, anyway, that a religion for one world should exhibit uniformity in features and approach. It very likely would be a coöperative inquiry and sharing of faith. It is to be hoped, however, that eventually a common general ground in ultimate truth, and a consequent universal ethos, can be attained.

As the world works, this is naturally an ideal picture. Much struggle will be imperialistic and of a crude nature. Externals will separate and men will identify superiority with security. Actual religions represent to a large extent cultural lags. Yet intelligent and devoted leadership, sensing a common threat and a common opportunity, can serve as bridgeheads over which pass such elements of the common truth as may erupt *in history's own way* in whatever faith is built, or comes to be built, on the fullest truth to satisfy man's deeper need.

A religion for one world will come the easier the more all responsible people will help in all areas of life to make effective a coöperative world. The more men of vision work for understanding among the nations, for the united nations, for one political world of coöperation, the more a religion for one world is given a chance. Working together for common ends is a good prelude to a common faith. The more work for a

coöperative world consciousness is done, in public opinion, in tough politics, in economic realms, in education, in culture and travel, the more the presuppositions for a religion of one world are wrought out. The more each concrete religion works now in giving physical aid and political understanding to the needs of one world, the more they will prepare for their coöperative living and thinking together.

Truth is both external and internal, both objective and subjective. Coöperative conditions depend upon coöperative consciousness. Coöperative spirits also need conditions conducive to coöperation. Half-truth is heresy. The part-truth perverts. *Religion should help to make mankind socially sensitive.* It should give him the vision and feeling of one world. Yet such sensitivity becomes sentimental and thwarts one world unless it issue in concrete actions that create the conditions for coöperation. Here Whitehead is right in maintaining both that religion is what an individual does with his own solitariness and that religion is world loyalty.

The point is that we cannot construct a religion for one world rationally. It must be born, not made. It will be called forth out of the womb of man's enlarged needs. What we can do is to help develop the needed world consciousness of responsible concern, both by including one world in worship and in thought and by working for it together, as different, concrete religions, all the while letting there be a sincere search for, and surrender to, the fuller faith as it grows into universality extensively and intensively. In this way coöperation in faith, thought, and work will prepare for the larger unifying life, whether one now existing enlarged, or one now existing modified, or some new religion, incorporating the basic truths of all and any religions now extant. If this religion will not be born, or at least until it is, all religions should coöperate in every way, in thought and deed, to prepare for and make effective a world politics, economics, and culture.

Religion, when real and vital, is a mighty wielder of public opinion at the point of action. Religion is the whole man reaching for what is worth while in the light of what he considers to be the truth. Thus religion uses the method of coöperation in finding a religion, or kinds of religion, that will help to create and implement a coöperative one world. Responsible freedom for the individual thereby becomes the same thing as social faithfulness.

III

A religion for one world will find that coöperation is itself an essential part of the truth that we need. Organic needs point to the kind

of universe which has produced them. Things are not true because they are desirable, but they are genuinely desirable because they are true. Things are not true because they are needed, but they are needed because they are organically true. Things are not most deeply real because we crave them, but we most deeply crave them because they are real.

Needs even now witness to their environmental counterpart. Our superficial reason abstracts into categories of explanation which cannot be lived, because they spring from partial perspectives, and deal with mere aspects of reality. Yet need, even more, witnesses back to its organic origin. Human beings are newcomers, comparatively speaking, in cosmic history. Humanity is inexplicable in origin, nature, and function apart from the larger environment within which it is but a part. Man must not be split off from nature. His origin and needs tell us something truly about his being and operation. The effect hails back to the cause; the product, to the larger process out of which it springs; human purposes to the Purpose which preceded them long before they appeared in history at all. Human purposes cannot be accounted for by any purpose less than themselves. Even our intellectual need to know, for itself, and in order to do, reflects on the nature of reality.

In this world, we need to coöperate. If we do not, we shall not get along constructively. True religion is the fullest possible deliverance from evil and the attainment of the greatest possible good. Coöperation is an essential aspect of true religion, even as religion is our most worth while response to what is worth while in terms of what is true. Coöperation is thus an essential aspect of reality. Our historic actuality becomes fashioned according to the way in which we use our freedom to coöperate with this positive aspect of reality.

But coöperation is thwarted by narrow interests, defensive suspicions, and selfish seeking. Fear, ignorance, inertia, and ill will stand in the way. What we all need is simple and straightforward trust in the Source of the Ultimate Good for each and for all. We need to see that only such faith will transcend both inner and outer barriers to the larger concord and coöperation. Such trust involves responsibility, beginning with the fear of the consequences of evil in this kind of universe, and rising through the call of duty, until it reaches the point of gratitude for the fact that this is the kind of world where evil brings destruction and good is the prerequisite for satisfactory living together.

IV

The basic task of a religion for one world is to make real the truth of the inclusive and coöperative consciousness. Actually this now depends

on this universality being an aspect of our concrete religions. They cannot prepare for fuller unity without common world concerns, without the feeding of the hungry, the caring for the homeless, the fighting for freedom. Responsible political participation is a necessary aspect of genuine world consciousness. Without it such a consciousness cannot be created. What the religious bodies are already doing along these lines, however, is amazing and deeply encouraging.

Yet the task goes back of such concrete acts to the educational program of each religion. In spite of our present political muddles and obstacles we must teach our children *and adults*—for this is urgent—in terms of the enlarged perspective of our one world. To think in world terms along religious lines is, moreover, to think in terms of a coöperative consciousness, where individual freedom is responsible, and where community life respects individuality. The enlargement of our modes of community must not mean a return to primitivism, where the individual has little value. It must mean the growth of social sensitiveness to every individual need and minority expression. The more creative each one is, and each group, the richer is the community. Thus the teaching of world loyalty involves *the teaching of democracy* at home—in race, economics, culture, politics, and religion. Nor can such teaching be effective of the coöperative consciousness unless it is *lived*. True teaching is the creative acting out of the coöperative life. All facts and theories which are learned in school or church become compellingly real in proportion as they are absorbed into the blood stream of social living.

Behind effective education lies vital religious experience. For it, there is no substitute. What is worth while needs to be rooted in truth. No rationalizing will do. Meaning must melt the mind, if it is to mold character. Disinterestedness chills life. The warmth of religion becomes constructive in thought and life insofar as it is aborbed into life from the central warmth of Cosmic Concern. Hocking has well stressed the idea that righteousness must be conceived of as a cosmic demand. When the moralism of demand, however, is transcended into the free coöperation of fellowship, life's authority and motivation are quickened accordingly into fear-freed effectiveness.

It is hard to tell what will happen to our actual religions. One world will, of course, put a premium on universality. The cross-fertilization of cultures in intensive intimacy will enrich and enlarge any religion that is creative and vital. A world fired by the passion for truth will melt down innumerable idols, myths, superstitions, magical elements, within the fierce heat of the crematory ovens of scientific knowledge. Unless our civilization itself perish by its own hands, many traditional theologies will also be melted down by our passions for knowledge. Some

fear that this means necessarily that life will become devoid of deeper meanings and wither, seared, if not burned up, by that heat.

Out of the ashes of past religions, however, may arise the truth that cannot be destroyed. Out of an age of transition like this can come at least a new synthesis of faith and reason, deep enough to command life as a whole and intelligent enough to compel the mind. Several religions may converge creatively along the lines of our world needs. Or one religion may stand out as having anticipated, by its inherent universality, the oneness of the world. Civilization will be creatively harmonious, in any case, only when it participates in both faith and thought in the unity demanded by the universe. Judging from the past, we have faith that such a religion, or such a common aspect of all religions, will develop out of our needs. Most likely it will come in ways that we cannot see. However much we think that we can see the absolute, we cannot see it absolutely. History never stands still. We can all, at least, coöperate in creating the conditions necessary for its right arrival by a common concern for the truth, coöperatively sought, and finding coöperation both a way to and an essential aspect of reality.

We have a way of underestimating the way of small things. The world consists of innumerable small things and small people, like ourselves. Our task is to convert our own corner to a world conciousness, in concerned help and imaginative vision. Even "one world" is a world of countless individuals. Religions must stretch out to world methods of coöperation, but their first and foremost function is even the enlightening and motivation of the individual. Thus alone can we effect responsible freedom and faithful fellowship. When terms like these melt the mind by their meaning for the whole man, abstract thought will have begun to find the fuller truth of far deeper man.

A religion for one world must reach trust—in thought, life, and community—in the spiritual Source creative of coöperation. The world is no larger than its gods. Only when God, however, is larger than the world, is there help beyond present attainment for our hopes for a better world. Such a faith cannot be created on paper. There is something futile about the writing of papers. A paper can, however, point to the fact that a religion for one world will rise out of the personal and social concern for the needs of a new world. Such a religion, whether an aspect of many religions or one actual faith, will not increase conflicts but further coöperation. Any thought and step any of us takes in this direction will to that extent help make possible a world of coöperation. Vital religion transcends human life but includes all of it in freedom and faithfulness by the common life. Creative civilization depends on creative souls. Our predicament is that we are confused and nearly baffled as to how to go

about "regaining the use of a spiritual faculty which we have been doing our worst to sear and sterilize."[4] Creative concern for the common good, *raised to its ultimate dimension,* is the womb of the creative spirit. The answer to our problem lies thus in coöperation with regard to both cosmos and conduct.

The writer is a believing Christian. Some will say, however, upon reading this analysis, that he has surrendered the absoluteness of the Christian claim. The answer is "yes," insofar as this claim is arbitrary, artificial, defensive, irrational, and noncoöperative. But it is decisively "no," insofar as Christianity is conclusively open to truth and coöperative, constructive activity. If Christianity is *the* truth, is it not the truth that God is live, seen in Jesus the Christ? How can such a truth be taught dogmatically and imperialistically without self-contradiction? Does not the "what" involve the "how"?

[4] A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, V, p. 459.

THE WORD AND THE FLESH

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THE DISCREPANCY between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics is familiar to all, and needs no further remark here. It may be noted, however, that recent study has often moved in the direction of narrowing the gap. The Synoptics, it is suggested, are also directed by a theological motive. So it may be worth inquiring whether, on the other hand, the Fourth Gospel may not reflect more of the primitive Christian outlook than some have recognized.

A word of caution must be uttered before we pursue the inquiry. The terminology of the Fourth Gospel is quite different from that of the Synoptics and, we must assume, of Jesus himself. Its cultural background is hellenistic rather than Jewish. If there is agreement at any point, it must be found in fundamental attitudes toward life, not in the forms in which they happen to be expressed. So we must consider the situation in which John[1] was placed.

I

In the first place, the evangelist stands squarely upon the Jewish-Christian tradition of Jesus of Nazareth, who had lived and taught in Galilee and died in the province of Judæa while Pontius Pilate was procurator. Even though John prefers not to stress the humanity of Jesus, he will not abate one whit his insistence upon its reality. Though he passes over the story of Jesus' birth and years of childhood, he is firm in the assertion that he truly lived (1:14; 9:6; 12:3; 13:5), truly suffered (18:22; 19:17-18, 28), truly died (19:30, 33-34; 10-11, 17; 12:32-33), and that his body was really buried (19:38-42). And with equal insistence he affirms that Jesus was really raised from the tomb (chaps. 20–21; 10:17-18; 2:21, 7:34). In all these statements the evangelist stands squarely upon the apostolic tradition. This was for him the given. This was the story in which he had believed, the very foundation of his faith. This was something he could not go back upon.

On the other hand, the evangelist was a product of hellenistic culture, no less than of Christian tradition, and he shared the common dualistic view which affirmed the primacy of the perfect and ideal, and set that sphere over against the world of human experience and endeavor. This dualism runs through his gospel in the familiar antitheses of flesh and

[1] The present article assumes, in line with the general positions of form criticism, that the author of the gospel was not the original apostle, but a later Christian who drew upon the cycle of traditions current in his own locality. But for convenience he is refered to as "John."

spirit, earthly and heavenly, darkness and light, death and life. So he faced the necessity of reconciling the two viewpoints—reason with religion, philosophy with tradition.

The task was not simple. Philo might throw light upon it, but John could not follow Philo's expedient of allegorizing the tradition. The life was too recent, and its reality too important. True it was not long before Gnostic leaders did just that, projecting the whole gospel history into that abstract realm of the ideal. But John rejected that possibility, and equally rejected the alternative of limiting the whole to the lower realm, the real, denying that God was in Christ.

Instead he ventured a great affirmation which no Philo, no Platonist, would ever have dared: that in Christ the two realms have become one, the ideal is the real, "The Word became flesh" (1:14). This great assertion, especially if we add its sequel, "we have beheld his glory," though it appears in the prologue, really voices the principal theme of the gospel, echoed wherever Jesus is named Son of God, echoed not least in the favorite, "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son" (3:16).

The implications of this assertion are far-reaching. The apparent dualism of life is resolved. Fundamentally all life is one. Even the material life, then, is not something to be escaped or ignored, as the Gnostics of John's day were teaching. It is part of the great unity, and reaches its consummation when it is transformed by the ideal and comes into harmony with it. This transformation, moreover, is not just the conclusion of a theorem; it is an event in time, the great consummation of the ages: "The Word became flesh"; "that they may have life and have it abundantly." Eternity has entered into time, that men may be born again into the ideal realm of the spirit (3:5-6).

Of course, such an affirmation could only bring confusion into a Platonic system. It is not, in the final analysis, a philosophical conclusion at all. For the static metaphysic of Plato it substitutes a dynamic more akin to the primitive Christian eschatology. The great affirmation is that a change has taken place in the very constitution of the universe: the Word *has become* flesh. That is a religious assertion, a tremendous affirmation of faith, which leads philosophy at the chariot wheel of past and present experience and of the boldest hopes of the human race. For implicit in it is the affirmation that the ideal can become the concrete, the finite human can ascend to perfection.

II

So we ask, How well does this affirmation accord with the central themes of Jesus' teaching and of the primitive Christian gospel?

First, we should note that the tradition of Judaism was always monistic. Recognizing that man is compounded of flesh and spirit, the Jew could not think of either as complete in itself. He could no more readily imagine a spirit having conscious, satisfying life without the body, than he could think of the body living without the spirit. So John, affirming the ultimate unity, stands directly in the line of Hebrew tradition, as Jesus himself must have done.

There is a further agreement. Judaism, while insisting that this is God's world, could not fail to recognize the vast disparity between the ideal consummation of his will and the evil state of the world as it was. The antinomy was resolved by eschatology, by projecting its solution into the future; for solution there had to be, if unity under God were ever to be realized. So Jesus preached the kingdom of God, not only as the present performance of the divine will, but also as the future renewal of the world, when those who sought righteousness within should no longer be beset by evil without.

John, too, perceived the divine necessity of this unity, and goes one step further: he brings the resolution of the antinomy into the present of every man, even to the dawn hour of the church. The Word *has* become flesh. Eschatology therefore disappears from his gospel, for he conceives as present the realization for which eschatology waited. Nor is this far removed from Jesus' sense that the new age was indeed dawning. It is hardly pertinent to question how realistic John's view actually was; by some fortune of situation or defiance of circumstance he was, at any rate, able to believe it. And it must be remarked that, different as his expression of it may be, he is not far removed from the central Christian faith in the unity of all things under God.

III

In describing the quality of this ideal life, no less than in affirming its actuality, John reveals again his identification with the common Christian tradition, though as usual in fresh terminology.

Jesus, of course, had centred his teaching around the phrase "kingdom of God," but he had given the term a double meaning. Though he never really dichotomized the nature of man, he recognized that righteousness, truth, and love are in the end more important to a man than bread and wine; that in the practice of them man acknowledges the reign of God, and in the enjoyment of them he enters into its rewards, Thus, Jesus' challenge to "enter" the kingdom of God was in the main an appeal to the inner life, the spirit, an appeal not discordant with the voices of other religious teachers of the day, though where the Stoic regarded the

spirit as a last refuge from life, Jesus instead found it life's fulfillment.

It was characteristic of Jesus that he described the ideal life in terms of relation to God, but John is perhaps more precise—as well as more Pauline—when he substitutes the term "eternal life," understanding that the adjective implies not mere duration but the whole sweep and scope of life's interests. His intention, however, is the same. He stresses the inner life, the need that men be born of the Spirit (3:6), and illuminates his meaning with his antitheses of darkness and light, flesh and spirit, earth and heaven. Nor does John intend to return to dualism here: the antitheses are dynamic, the poles toward which men gravitate, but which reveal a single axis. He thinks of Christian disciples as in the world, though not of the world, certainly not taken out of the world (17:15-16). The antitheses are embraced in the greater unity.

Thus John can give enhanced meaning to the work and purpose of Jesus, even though he loses sight to some extent of the human Jesus, in his stress upon the divine Christ who moves unconditioned through his gospel. Still, the very challenge with which he opens, "The Word became flesh," invests with awful significance every gesture and every hour of that majestic figure.

So he does not limit the saving work of Christ merely to an atonement which will avail men at some final assize, as Paul inclines to do. Rather it lies in revelation. In flesh Christ has revealed to men the eternal truth, eternal life, the light and way of life which represents the unification and perfection of all. He is thus the light of the world, the way, the truth, and the life (8:12; 14:6). He is the door (10:9), for men may see in him the perfect union of spirit and flesh, and the way of eternal life. His words are life (6:63). Even when John penned the familiar words, "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son" (3:16), he must have been thinking primarily of this work of revelation (3:19)—and this probably is a key to the type of his own religious experience—more than of the significance of Jesus' death on the cross. Eternal life had appeared in the world in the person of Jesus Christ, and by the pattern and contagion of his example, and the guidance of his words, men might walk in that light which reveals the wholeness of life (12:35; 8:31).

In this estimate of the work of Christ, John stands closer to the primitive tradition than to Paul, and not far, it would seem, from Jesus' own first estimate of his task. For such an emphasis upon his teaching is implicit not only in his familiar "Truly I say to you" (Matt. 5:18, *et passim*), but in all the appeal to human assent which his teaching makes: "What do you think?" (Matt. 21:28; 16:3). And John would, it seems, interpret even the cross in term of revelation of the divine appeal (12:32).

IV

Here a further point of agreement becomes apparent. John carries his idea of salvation, as a consequence of his unifying theme, over into the daily living of men. So Jesus, with his stress on entering the kingdom of God, had laid primary emphasis on the present aspect of salvation; and both to him and to the early church the prevalence of miracles and other gifts of the Spirit seemed "signs" (Matt. 12:28) that the kingdom truly was present.

John, then, convinced that life is a unity, simply carries on the primitive tradition at a further point, in his assertion that salvation can be a present possession. Indeed, this is a natural corollary of any emphasis on the spiritual. Eternal life thus is known by its quality, not by its length. Judgment is not a judicial award at some future assize; it is the present and inevitable outcome of men's own choices and attitudes. "This is the judgment, that the light has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light" (3:19; 8:44; 12:47-48). "Truly, truly I say to you, he who hears my word and believes him who sent me, has eternal life; he does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life" (5:24; 6:47; 8:51; 10:28). The great event has happened, the Word has become flesh, the ideal has been made real, eternal life has become contemporary.

John, like Jesus, sometimes describes this enhanced life in the present as a change in the man himself, or he may think of it as an incursion from outside him, particularly an invasion by the Spirit (7:37; 14:16; 16:7-11; 16:13). For the Spirit represents that ideal world which is a part of the cosmic unity; and the end result is the same; whether one speaks of the larger world embracing the man or the man enlarging his own vision to take in the ideal world. John employs more mystical figures, too—the invisible presence of Christ and of God (14:18,23; 16:16; 17:24), and mystic abiding in God (15:1, 4-5; 17:21). But whatever the figure (and all such expressions are only metaphors for that which cannot be described), the fundamental idea is the same, that in Christian profession the eternal has met and joined with the human, not simply for the future but in present experience. And in this assertion, also, John stands in full agreement with the Christian tradition both of Jesus and of Paul.

V

In meeting practical problems, John seems to fall back upon the same fundamental philosophy of the unity of life. Is it with this he opposes Gnosticism. Its very dualism is intolerable to his passionate belief in the oneness of the whole man; and his great keynote, "The Word became flesh," is a bold challenge to its fundamental assumption

of the evil of all matter. So too, though his gospel more than the others portrays the Christ in his divine nature, the very fact that he has framed it as a gospel, has taken up into it the tradition of Jesus of Nazareth, has brought it to its climax in a painful death upon a cross—all this reëchoes that same great affirmation, all this insists that the ideal and the real are no longer two but one, that the spirit and the flesh are not opposed but meet under Christ in a single harmonious whole.

There were others, like the followers of John the Baptist, who denied from the other side the evangelist's gospel of wholeness in life, looking for such a consummation only in the future, and unable to share the evangelist's passionate belief in its present reality. He deals gently with these Johannites, though he hints at their scanty numbers (4:1), merely suggesting that the fulfillment the Baptist had led them to expect has truly arrived (1:29-34; 3:28), and that their leader himself had in a sense deeded them over to the greater successor (1:36; 3:30).

John is far more explicit about the Jews. They all, not any of their sects merely, are made the opposition party all through the gospel, until their hostility finally makes away with Jesus. Probably these Jews in the gospel narrative stand mainly as types of the Jews of his own day, whose great colonies in the cities of the Roman empire were largely impervious to the call of Christianity, and furnished indeed its most active opponents. And on the doctrinal side the Jews, even more definitely than the Baptist's followers, would have denied that the eternal Spirit could as yet have entered the present world, that the Word could have become flesh. Even though the old Hebrew tradition had always maintained the unity of things under God (5:39-46; 7:19), they looked for its consummation only in some distant future. To John they seemed to have chosen darkness rather than hope (9:41; 3:19-20), preferred death to life (8:24; 5:40; 6:27); and he traced their age-long frustration to this want of faith in the present.

To lesser problems likewise the evangelist brought the touchstone of his fundamental belief in the oneness of life. What was the church? The "catholic" spirit was growing, with stress upon ecclesiastical organization, the power and responsibility of the bishops and officers *(cf.* 10:12; 17:18; 20:21). On the other hand, some, like the Montanists later, rejected ecclesiastical control and sought to revive the ecstatic basis of Christianity, finding the true church where the Spirit was manifested *(cf.* 20:22-23; 14:17; 16:13). John recognized the truth in both ideas, and, giving a far more literal meaning to Paul's figure of the church as the body of Christ (Rom. 12:5; I Cor. 12:27; Col. 1:18), depicted the Spirit as incarnate in the church much as the Word was incarnate in Jesus (7:39, 14:16; 16:7; 20:22-23).

What of the sacraments? Again, John unites the two extremes. The elements are necessary (6:55; 13:8), but the Spirit must be joined to them (3:5; 6:63; 1:33). What was the gospel? John finds the whole greater than the parts: the gospel is not only the tradition from the past, or the words of Jesus (8:31; 10:4; 14:21, 23; 15:10); it must embrace also the continuing testimony of the Holy Spirit, the Counselor (14:26; 15:26; 16:13). Here John gives charter to all liberal and progressive thought.

VI

We have seen, then, that the Fourth evangelist, faced with the contrast between his Christian tradition and his hellenistic culture, has reconciled them, in his own mind at least, and reintegrated the dualism of the latter, with his more-than-Platonic affirmation that the ideal has been embodied in the real—"The Word became flesh." This unifying idea did much to keep him squarely in the line of the essential insights of primitive Christianity and of its founder. Where Jesus taught a dynamic eschatological unifying of the cosmos, John brings it forward to a more static philosophic unity, possibly less realistic yet giving expression to the same fundamental intuition. With Jesus he sees salvation as primarily achieved in the inner life, and therefore a present possibility; and he conserves, far better than Paul, Jesus' sense of the importance of teaching in the process. And when he faces practical problems, his conviction of the identification of the ideal and the real in Christ enables him to meet Gnostics, Baptist followers, and Jews effectively and clearly, and to reconcile conflicting extremes within the church.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

ONE OF THE commonest of our epigrams is "So plain, that he who runs may read." The poets have made use of it, and regularly in this form. Thus the sixteenth-century du Bartas, in his epic of the Creation, *La Divine Sepmaine,* wrote:

"And reads, though running, all these needful motions."

Cowper's line is more familiar to English readers:

"Shine by the side of every path we tread
With such a lustre, he that runs may read."

John Keble expressed the same note in his verses for Septuagesima Sunday in *The Christian Year*:

"There is a book, who runs may read,
Which heavenly truth imparts,
And all the lore its scholars need,
Pure eyes and Christian hearts."

Simplest of all perhaps is Tennyson's word, in "The Flower":

"Read my little fable:
He that runs may read."

And yet, as is true of many epigrams and proverbial sayings, the original statement from which the later quip came was somewhat different. There can be little question that the basis for this commonplace is Habakkuk 2:2, "Write the vision, and make it plain upon tablets, *that he may run that readeth it.*" Thus the poets and common usage alike would seem to have inverted the original saying and to have introduced an element not intended by the seer. Surely there is no intent to suggest that the oracle is to be written so that a man may read the tablet which he holds in his hands, while running down the road, nor even that he may read it, without slowing his pace, as he runs by the place where it is set up. In a word, the whole notion of physical running is probably entirely gratuitous. In passing, it must be said with regret that the occasional homiletic twist given to it, namely, that "he who reads may run with haste to tell others," is equally unwarranted. What is implied by "running" is the ease or rapidity with which the reader may run his eye over the text and ascertain its meaning. The Douay version is certainly right in rendering the Vulgate *ut percurrat qui legerit eum* "that he that readeth it may run over it." And Jerome's own comments on the verse and his paraphrase of the somewhat obscure rendering in the Septuagint make clear that this was his understanding, too. Both Grotius and Luther agree. Of it the former wrote: ". . . it was to be so written that the reader should

be quick in interpreting it or able to read it easily"; the latter: "das es lesen künde wer fur uber leufft" (*dass es lesen könne, wer worüber läuft*). Such is also the rendering of the modern Jewish version: "that a man may read it swiftly." Moffatt agrees: ". . . plainly, that one may read it at a glance." Most of the standard commentators express the same opinion: "That he who readeth it may run, *viz.*, in his reading, *i.e.*, may read it fluently, without being hindered by any indirectness in the writing" (Driver); ". . . that the reader may run on in his reading without being hindered by any obscurity or unwontedness in the writing" (A. B. Davidson). J. M. P. Smith probably understood it in the same sense although his rendering in the *American Translation:* ". . . that one may read it on the run," is ambiguous, perhaps intendedly so.

At any rate we can be reasonably sure that the prophet is not thinking of wayfaring men, fools or otherwise, failing to read it as they dash along, but rather of the more sober word of Deut. 27:8, "And thou shalt write upon the stones all the words of this law very plainly."

And it appears to me that this is a word which is particularly pointed today. As a student, I knew a preacher who sought, with apparent complacence, to explain his small congregation by the word: "They're too dumb. They can't get me. I preach over their heads." It seemed to me then, and through the years I have seen no reason to change my mind upon that point, that while there was a case of marked dumbness, it was not on the part of the congregation, save as they refrained from speeding him on his way to fields of larger usefulness.

Words are, or should be, the medium for making clear one's ideas, not for obscuring them. Simplicity, clarity, a style uncluttered with inconsequential and distracting rosettes and furbelows—these are qualities of which no one needs be ashamed. And through the years I have constantly seen the unfortunate result when these homely qualities are casually dismissed. Most of the sermons preached in our Seminary chapel by visiting ministers which have been disappointments—and they have been legion—have failed, not becaue of the lack of ability by the preacher, but because of his mistaken notion that on such an occasion he must be profound, must show the students the reason he has been selected to address them, must show the faculty that he has become far more of a thinker or theologian than they had ever expected he would. And the result was a failure, not because it was too profound, but because it was muddy and obscure. It is no indication of a preacher's acumen when a reasonably intelligent and alert listener discovers after the sermon is nearly over what it probably is that the preacher is talking about.

Nor need it be limited to the preacher. It is an almost equally common failing for writers. Many authors, especially young and inexperienced

ones, feel that if their book or article proves readable it has manifestly failed to make the scholarly grade. This appears to me absurd and jejeune in the extreme. It has long been my contention—and I have seen no reason to change *that* view either through the years—that any subject, be it never so technical or complex, can be made interesting and readable. It all depends upon the competence of the writer. I can conceive that a treatise on the logarithms tables or on atomic fission could be presented in a captivating and fascinating manner. As I remember back through the years the lectures by visiting scholars which aroused the greatest interest and which sparkled the most, the one which stands out in my memory as received with the greatest acclaim was one on textual criticism. This was achieved not by "talking down" or striving for an unwarranted popular appeal through shallowness or the interlarding of wisecracks or funny stories. It was an address which any editor would have been glad to publish, be his journal never so technical. It was presented by a man who knew his subject and knew how to present it in such a way that his hearers, untrained in his field though they were, could follow him with ease and delight.

As a boy I was spoiled for any appreciation or enjoyment of the poetry of Browning. And the chief reason, as I look back over the years, was his reported remark that his writing was deliberately composed in such a wise that the reader must grapple with and study it if he would understand it. That remark rubbed me the wrong way. It still does. There are enough problems of life to be wrestled with which none seems able to make simple. It is wisdom to accept them and pray for increased strength. But deliberately to introduce obscurity has never seemed to me the mark of the true poet, in whatever sphere his type of poetry may lie.

Thus, as in so many other cases, this book of the years, when hearkened to aright, is almost frighteningly new. And, once again, "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly."

From Off the Campus and On

After a most exacerbating delay due to a city-wide strike which has closed our composing room for over five months the Crozer Quarterly is able once again to greet its many friends and express appreciation for their patience during this time of waiting. We particularly appreciate the many letters expressing understanding and anticipation for the coming issues. We *hope* that subsequent numbers will not be delayed. If they are, please be assured that your anguish is not to be compared to ours. Delays and apologies are alike very distasteful.

Mr. Baker's essay discusses a subject much in the public eye at the moment. His forthright treatment of it is characteristic of this man who for eighteen years has been minister of the Second Baptist Church, Wilmington, Delaware, with a congregation liberally besprinkled with scientists trained to dislike bunk and camouflage. He is a graduate (1927) and trustee of Crozer. He has served three terms as president of the Wilmington Council of Churches and has been active in the social aspects of religion in his city. At present he is vice president of the local Citizens Housing Association. He has also been active in the Northern Baptist Convention.

Mr. Opitz is a New Englander by birth and a country minister by choice. He is a graduate of Maryville College (Tennessee). He took his theological work on the west coast, graduating from the Pacific Unitarian School for the Ministry. During the war he was in India for the Red Cross. He is a frequent contributor to journals of liberal religion at home and abroad.

Dr. Keene is associate professor of the history and philosophy of religion in the Howard University School of Religion. Prior to going to Howard in 1943 he had taught at International College, Smyrna, Turkey (1931-1934), and Colgate University (1937-1943). He received his Ph.D. from Yale, and his A.B. from Lebanon College. He is book editor of the *Journal of Religious Thought* and a member of the Society of Friends.

Professor Brush is no stranger to these pages. Several articles and reviews have appeared during recent years. He is professor of church history at Andover Newton, of which school he is a graduate, and holds a doctorate in philosophy from Yale, in divinity from Colby. Before returning to Newton he had had distinguished pastorates in New Haven and Waterville.

Mr. Enslin was born on the Crozer campus. He was a student at Episcopal Academy and the New England Conservatory of Music and a special student of Nadia Boulanger and Wilhelm Valkenier. He lives now on Cape Cod and is devoting himself to farming and writing. His article raises several questions which it is convenient to overlook or disregard.

It is always a pleasure to welcome Professor Ferré to the Crozer Quarterly. Few theologians are exerting a greater influence than is the present incumbent of the Abbot chair of Christian theology at Andover

Newton. A native of Sweden, his education has been American (Boston University, Andover Newton, and Harvard). He is the author of several much discussed books and numerous articles. His present essay was presented at the eighth symposium of the Conference of Science, Philosophy and Religion.

Dr. Perry has been for many years head of the department of New Testament at Bangor Theological Seminary. His careful and penetrating work in New Testament criticism, especially in connection with the gospels, has been highly appraised by his fellow critics. It is a source of real satisfaction to be able to present him to our readers, with the assurance that another essay from his pen is scheduled to appear in an early issue.

No less than thirty-three books are reviewed in this issue. Once again we express our appreciation to the twenty-six reviewers who make this section of the CROZER QUARTERLY possible. Most of them have appeared frequently in these pages. To them and to the eight new members of our reviewing staff a hearty Thank you. Mrs. Aubrey, long an expert in matters dealing with the Y. W. C. A., is a member of the national board of that organization. Dr. Austin, who took his doctor's degree in philosophy at Pennsylvania, is minister of the Baptist Temple of Charleston, W. Va. Mr. Back, a recent graduate from Crozer, is minister of the First Baptist Church, West Chester, Pa. Dr. Bixler is president of Colby College. Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. Dr. Enslin has the chair of New Testament at Crozer and is editor of this QUARTERLY. Professor Ferré has been introduced in an earlier paragraph. Dr. Flight is professor of Old Testament at Haverford and president of the Society of Biblical Literature. Professor Gaines is a member of the department of modern languages at the University of Richmond. Mr. Gehr is minister of the Church of the Restoration (Universalist), Philadelphia. Dr. Gordon is professor of Assyriology and Egyptology at Dropsie College. Professor Guiles is professor of pastoral psychology at Andover Newton. Mr. Hiltner is executive secretary of clinical training for the Federal Council. Mr. Jones is a member of the French department of the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. King was until his recent retirement dean of the theological faculty of United College, Winnipeg. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of the Boston University School of Theology. Dr. Kramer, a Sumeriologist of international reputation, is a member of the staff of the University of Pennsylvania Museum. Dr. Mould has the chair of Bible at Elmira College. Dr. Neisser is a professor *emeritus* of Crozer, of which institution Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament. Professor Speck is head of the department of anthropology at Pennsylvania. Professor Stinespring has the chair of Old Testament at Duke. Dr. Vogt, a retired Unitarian clergyman, was for many years a minister in Chicago and is an authority on church architecture and liturgics. Dr. Waterman, one of the translators of the so-called "Chicago Bible," is professor of Old Testament at the University of Michigan. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth. Dr. Young is assistant professor of New Testament at Duke.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Study of the Bible Today and Tomorrow, edited by Harold R. Willoughby, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947, pp. xviii, 436, $6.

To review this book is similar to an attempt to review an encyclopædia. The reviewer felt that at the start; after a reading of it, and the making of copious notes, and a re-reading of selected parts, he is the more confirmed in his first impression.

This volume is the production of a group of experts in their fields of study of the Chicago Society for Biblical Research. It embodies a planned piece of work, "to cover in survey fashion the immediately past accomplishments, the current status, and the immediately future opportunities for biblical research in the main areas of study: Old Testament, intertestamental, and New Testament." This survey forms Part I of the book. A second part is concerned with special investigations of particular problems in the foregoing fields.

The object which the authors of this work had before them as they wrote is stated in the Introduction. Briefly, it was to sound "a clarion call for a strategic redeployment of scholarly forces more evenly along all important fronts in biblical study and research. Theology is not the only interest in biblical studies." All this for a correct understanding and interpretation of the Bible.

As one might be led to expect from the Introduction, two main interests mark the volume. The main one is to survey the accomplishments of critical scholarship in the biblical field and to set out certein crucial problems that are demanding special attention at present.

He would be a foolhardy man who would attempt to put an appraisal upon the work of the two dozen experts who contributed to this volume. Their names and their positions give authority to what they have written, and a debt of gratitude is due them for the work they have done. The most one can do in the way of appraisal is here and there to touch upon a few matters in the fields largely of one's own interests.

A good survey of "Intertestamental Studies since Charles's Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha" is presented by J. Coert Rylaarsdam, which should be read alongside of Harry M. Orlinsky's "Current Progress and Problems in Septuagint Research" and Ralph Marcus' "The Future of Intertestamental Studies." In the first of the aforementioned studies it might have been pointed out that, under the influence of George Foot Moore, there is much less tendency today to place such heavy emphasis as Charles did upon minute editorial carving up of the pseudepigraphic documents, this from a recognition of the part played by oral transmission in their origin. Moore saw them too as popular literature and stressed the fact that any theology they contained must be evaluated on that basis. Orlinsky refers to Montgomery's *International Critical Commentary on Daniel.* In the lack of an index to this work, the reviewer has been able to find little reference in these studies to recent work on Daniel. Biblical scholars would appear to have missed entirely W. R. Taylor's important review of Montgomery's commentary which appeared in the *Canadian Journal of Religious Thought,* Vol. V, No. 5 (October, 1928), pp. 426-437. His suggestion that in the seventh chapter of Daniel an earlier apocalypse has been brought up to date in Maccabean times by various insertions in the text not only solves the vexed problem of the relation of that chapter to the rest of the book, but pushes back the frontier of apocalypse.

"New Testament Criticism in the World-Wars Period," by Merrill M. Parvis,

covers the ground fairly well. The author points out that he could not pretend to offer a list of all important books and articles of the period. He gives a substantial list, and considering the wealth of available material, it is not to be wondered at if occasionally he misses significant work. Under "Synoptic Studies," Mr. Parvis might have mentioned M. S. Enslin's well-sustained suggestion that Luke may have made use of Matthew, making such editorial changes as suited him in the material which he took over. This theory has the virtue of reducing the number of sources to be reckoned with in the gospels and it deserves a full working out. It is unfortunate that so few studies are mentioned under "Fourth Gospel Studies." It is surprising that under "Acts and Pauline Studies" no mention is made of the growing list of studies of Acts as an apology. So far as the reviewer is concerned, that is no longer a theory, but a fact. Scholars in Britain have consistently ignored American work in this field and they have a long way to go to catch up. In Chapter XVIII, "Reassessing the Religious Importance of Paul," Donald W. Riddle calls attention to the basic procedure of future Pauline studies, "the abandonment of the principle of harmonizing the story of Acts and the data of Paul's letters and the complete commitment to the use of the letters as primary sources." Such books as C. H. Dodd's *The Apostolic Preaching* might require considerable revision if this procedure were adopted. With respect to the relation of Acts to the letters of Paul, M. S. Enslin's illuminating article, "'Luke' and Paul," *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* Vol. LVIII, No. 1 (March, 1938), pp 81-91, wherein he shows the possibility that the essential data of Acts might well have been derived from the letters, deserves consideration.

Felix A. Levy, in "Contemporary Trends in Jewish Bible Study," points out much that will be new to Christian scholars, with which they should be acquainted. The reviewer is a little surprised that Mr. Levy, while referring to Jewish work in fields other than Hebrew, should omit any reference to work in Aramaic and Mishnaic Hebrew. He mentions the name of M. H. Segal in another connection, but not his work, *A Grammar of the Mishnaic Hebrew,* Oxford University Press, 1927.

It should be pointed out here that not one of the least values of this book is its presentation of work done in the biblical field by other than Christian and Protestant scholars. Besides the work of Orlinsky, Marcus, and Levy, already noted, there is also "Current Trends in Catholic Biblical Research," by James Harrel Cobb. The Protestant scholar will gain much from the insights this study affords into Roman Catholic thought and viewpoints.

Allen Paul Wikgren presents "A Critique of the Revised Standard Version of the New Testament." The reading of this study confirmed the reviewer's conclusions from his own study that the Revised Standard Version is not the final translation superseding all others and increased his doubt as to whether a group of scholars, working together under the conditions laid upon them, can achieve *the* acceptable translation.

It is impossible even to make mention of all the contents of this rich volume. One can hardly think of any field of biblical enquiry that is left untreated. The pages of the book are rich in suggestions for postgraduate studies.

A second most striking interest marks this volume, that of the reassertion of "the validity of historical spirit and methodology in biblical research" as over against "an unbalanced overconcentration of effort in the single area of biblical theology." It is significant that scarcely a Protestant Christian contributor to the volume but admits the need of emphasis in biblical studies upon the religious values of the

Scriptures for today. So Raymond A. Bowman, in his study, "Old Testament Research between the Great Wars": "Nevertheless, the definite resurgence of the study of Old Testament theology reflects the conviction that the critical, analytical, historical, and descriptive approach to the Bible is not sufficient in itself and that a further approach must be adopted if the entire truth of the Bible is to be known and the full needs of the inner spiritual life of man are to be met. In this task the Old Testament scholar and the theologian must cooperate." In similar vein writes Merrill M. Parvis (p. 73), Frederick C. Prussner (p. 184), and others.

On the other hand, there are studies in this volume which lean decidedly to the support of the primacy of the theological interpretation of the Bible, if not indeed to a derogation, whether the writers intended it or not, of critical work. Floyd V. Filson, for example, in his "The Central Problem concerning Christian Origins," asks us, in the study of the origin of Christianity, to take account of the New Testament explanation, "that the gospel and the Christian movement have their explanation only in God's purposeful working through Jesus Christ for the salvation of men," and would seem to imply that we must start our study with the acceptance of that thesis. Thus is achieved "the fruitful co-operation of personal attitude and honest study." He does not explain how one can make an honest study of the New Testament and bring to it a preaccepted measuring rod. Possibly his thesis is true, but it should be a discovery at the end of an honest search and examination. Similarly too with Otto J. Baab, in "Old Testament Theology: Its Possibility and Methodology," we are asked to begin our study of the Old Testament with an acceptance of "the experience of God" of the men of the Old Testament, and go on from there. In other words, we are to make an assumption of what should be a conclusion from a study of the facts. It would appear to the reviewer that in making use of his foot rule Mr. Baab reads much more into the Old Testament narrative than critical research on the whole would admit.

On the other hand, there will be found in a number of the studies a clear-cut resistance to the presuppositions of a theological interpretation of the Scriptures. Donald W. Riddle, for example, in "Reassessing the Religious Importance of Paul," quite frankly says: "Neo-orthodoxy need have but slight, if any, effect in the study of Paul; Barth's commentary is sufficient illustration of the barrenness of that position, and this example is not likely to be followed." And William A. Irwin states bluntly, at the beginning of his very scholarly and readable study of "Revelation in the Old Testament," that "Valid and indispensable also as are the methods of the philosopher and theologian, it must, nevertheless, be realized that these may speak of man's knowledge of God only after the biblical scholar has spoken," and in the pages that follow he ably maintains his case.

If this volume shows anything, it is that no solution of the problem of the interpretation of the Bible will be reached which does not start with the Scriptures *as critical-historical research shows them to be.* For such research there must be a coöperative endeavor and a pooling of resources such as has scarcely hitherto been attempted. It will be the valid task of the theologian from time to time, as Professor Irwin points out, to offer an evaluation of the facts gleaned from research and to intergrate them into organized religious statements.

GEORGE B. KING

The Book of Books: An Introduction, by Solomon Goldman, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xiii, 459, $3.75.

This is the first volume of an ambitious series entitled *The Book of Human*

Destiny. Thirteen or more volumes are planned. Each book of the Hebrew Bible is scheduled for detailed treatment: translation of the most important pages—about sixty per cent of the contents of the Old Testament will appear in translation—commentary, bibliography, and notes. This is a task large enough for a dozen scholars; if carried through, it will be a monument to the amazing industry of Dr. Goldman, rabbi of what is said to be one of the three largest Jewish congregations in America.

Chapter One deals with the vitality of the Hebrew language and credits it with much of the popularity which the Hebrew Bible has enjoyed. There follows a discussion of the Hebrew artistic ability. The Hebrew canon is dealt with in another brief chapter. In Chapter Four the author, armed with the views of Cassuto and Kaufman and an occasional reference to archæology, assails the critics. Sometimes the target is Wellhausen, but more frequently it is the vague term "critics," those who "have unfortunately so often grasped at the moon that they have overreached themselves." The author asserts that the Patriarchs were real people, that monotheism erupted among the Jews in the infancy of their career and completely destroyed all mythological vestiges, that full trust must be placed in the Mosaic tradition. Unfortunately he offers little by way of proof for his contentions.

Particularly irritating is Chapter Five, "The Dawn of Conscience," which is little more than a scurrilous attack upon the late James Henry Breasted. According to the author, the critics have come to the Bible with "egotism and subjectivity," each has been "bent on putting mankind under special obligation to his chosen field of investigation," and they have been zealous for their vested interests. Others have sought to "establish the inferiority of the Hebrew Bible to the ethics and religion of the Gospels and the Epistles." Other motives attributed to critics with whom the author disagrees are: attempts to discredit the story of revelation, "deep-seated prejudice against the Jewish people," and an attempt to destroy a thousand years of Jewish history (Wellhausen). In sarcastic language the author would make Vatke, Wellhausen, Delitzsch have a share in the composition of *Mein Kampf.* Typical of the irresponsible and malicious summaries of contributions of former critics is the sentence: "It must be more than a coincidence that Wellhausen, Delitzsch, and Breasted, for example, should have each begun by selecting a people upon whose head they placed the halo that history had for centuries bestowed upon the Jews, then exposing the latter's lack of originality and inherent baseness, and finally bringing the thesis to an end with a pæan to Jesus" (p. 72). Breasted is quoted with the remark, "Is not this the kind of half-truth that we have learned to expect in the insolent pamphlets of Jew-baiters?" Egyptian religion is called "silly sorcery," early Egyptian texts are characterized as "rigmarole," Egyptian ritual is termed "meaningless gibberish and hocus-pocus," "infantile and stupid." Page after page of ridicule for the religious system of Egypt—by one who is not an Egyptologist—is interspersed with brief quotations from prominent Egyptologists who chanced to disagree with Breasted at certain points. The superficiality of the treatment of Breasted's position is apparent in the conspicuous absence from the general bibliography of Professor Breasted's earlier work, *The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt,* 1912. The author's proclivity for exaggeration of his opponent's views is seen in the grossly unfair statement that Professor Breasted's thesis is "that the Hebrew Bible is some kind of revised edition of Egyptian pyramidal texts and papyri" (p. 101). If one is willing to overlook a caustic spirit, a superficial treatment of secondhand sources, and to read this entire chapter, he will find it a digression from the main theme announced for the book and one of small consequence for introducing the

book of human destiny.

One half of his book is a collection of quotations dealing with the Bible. Into this section, called "Echoes and Allusions," has gone a vast amount of labor. Not only have hundreds of books and encyclopædias been searched for any mention of the Bible, but statements have been solicited from contemporary literary figures on the subject. It is of interest to learn that Cecil B. De Mille says he can take any fifty pages of the Bible and make a good picture, that Henry A. Wallace believes "The Biblical record is heavily loaded on the side of the Progressive Independents," that Havelock Ellis thinks he has suffered from too early familiarity with the Bible, that Harold Laski wrote the author that he did not himself hold any religious belief. One wonders at the relevance of the quotation of Jefferson's letter to Mrs. Cosway, October 13, 1867, "If your letters are as long as the Bible, they will appear short to me." Other echoes are as distant. The sources are widely different. Under the topic of "alcohol" there is a long quotation from John Macy's *Rum, Reading, and Rebellion* credited to *The Smart Set Anthology* and a paragraph from Cuthbert A. Simpson's speech over the Columbia Broadcasting System. H. L. Mencken appears frequently with either echoes or allusions; so does Isaac Watts and John Wanamaker. The Bible is endorsed by Fannie Hurst, Louis Bromfield, F. D. R., John Erskine, President Truman, and many others; Bernard M. Baruch thinks everyone should read and study the Bible, and Aldous Huxley says he has found rich treasures of physiological psychology buried in the language of the Old Testament. This olla-podrida will probably be the most useful section of the volume.

One shudders to think of twelve more volumes appearing in this work, as announced on the jacket of volume one, but this reviewer—now that he has finished reading this one—takes courage from the realization that he will not be forced to read the remaining twelve.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Kingship of Christ, by W. A. Visser 't Hooft, New York Harper, ©1948, pp. 158, $1.75.

The subtitle of this book, "An Interpretation of Recent European Theology," would be more correct if the "an" were italicized. To be sure, the author, the European youth secretary of the World Council of Churches (in formation), quotes extensively from recent European works; but his references are used mostly in order to buttress his own point of view, which is a right wing Reformed theology.

As far as the book goes, its driving direction aims to establish the fact that the message of the early church, "Jesus Christ is Lord," should still be our controlling message, without which the world must remain in sin and darkness. Whatever other message the church may have can, therefore, be no more than an explicated implication of the lordship of Chrsst. The first chapter, "The Kingship of Christ in Protestant Theology," aims to illustrate how this theme has returned to primacy within Protestant thought in Europe, though one strand of theology is naturally most heavily drawn upon. The second chapter describes how this claim was tested in fire during the recent years of fierce struggle against pagan forces. Then follows a supporting chapter depending primarily upon the kind of New Testament scholarship that has come heavily under the Kierkegaardian-Barthian influence. Finally come two chapters on the kingship of Christ in the church and in the world.

These Stone Lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary perpetuate generally the strong Calvinistic approach to Christianity, though there are minor signs of the author's awareness and possibly ajarness to a more pliant view. God's power and

glory in Christ are the central themes. Action is glorified to the point of obscuring meaning. The love of God is not decisively the central theme, and consequently the whole discussion is off centre. There is more stress on vigor than on light. This is a fighter's faith, rather than that of the constructive builder. Perhaps there is no chance today, particularly in Europe, for fighting with one hand while building with the other. The authority of the book is also too much of a narrow biblicism rather than the full gamut of the Christian faith that is needed to meet the demands of the day when there is more time even in Europe to build. What is needed is surely authority and motivation, but we cannot be saved by any return to external authority.

Fortunately the author rejects mere realized eschatology as being either biblical or adequate. Biblical eschatology cannot be reduced to such sophisticated denials of the cosmic drama in terms of real *chronos*. No, he rightly maintains that the kingdom has rather both present and future significance and reality as the enactment of concrete events. My only problem with his view is that Christ's triumph is not sufficiently defined. Is it to be in terms of power as such or the power of his redemptive love? If the latter, does not the final triumph involve inevitably the total redemption of history and nature? Is Visser 't Hooft prepared to accept the full implications of our full faith? It may be more convenient not to define terms too precisely.

Many doctrinal questions stirred me as I read, such as the relation between the kingdom and the church, the doctrine of creation as fiat and process, the possibility or reality of sanctification, the actual involvements of Christ's being king over the world, God-centredness and Christ-centredness, and so on. There is no hiding the difference between those who define God in terms of holiness and power primarily and those who define him in terms of creating and redeeming love. Both can be supernaturalists and have a vigorous eschatology, but I simply fail to see how there can be any kind of adequate theology to face all the facts with full faith and compassionate concern unless all our presuppositions and all our applications of the Christian faith are seen in the light of the sovereign love of God. I admire Visser 't Hooft for his fighting faith, and honor this as a vigorous, valuable presentation of this kind of Christianity; but for a total conquest by Christianity of all fields of thought, I feel that we need a different approach.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

The Heathens, by William Howells, New York, Doubleday, 1948, pp. 306, $3.75.

To students of religion in the wide sense for whom this review is intended, *The Heathens* will prove both satisfying and perhaps disillusioning. It will prove satisfactory as a huge compilation of thoughts on religious philosophies and practices of tribes of men other than Christians chiefly to students concerned with creeds, cults, and practices of the supernatural. Indeed the book might better have been placed in the hands of a teacher of religious history in seminary or university than given to an anthropologist for review. To advanced students, however, it may not be found more satisfactory than Lowie's *Primitive Religion.* But who is there who can write an over-all book on such world-wide and ocean-deep phenomena as the religious mentality of our "primitive contemporaries"? Dr. Howells has achieved it with a degree of success, doing what most other anthropologists are willing to talk about in class and seminar but what few would venture to expose to critics in published form His self-confidence in such a venture is to be envied and given its due, with more left unsaid.

The approach, fortunately for this class of literature, is not theological or deductive. Yet the older comparative method of treatment of Westermarck, Tyler, Marrett, and their contemporaries and disciples is evident in places. The religious sense has after all such an all pervading functional value in so many activities of life in "heathen" cultures that it frightens off most of those who have witnessed its procedures. So much for the field which Dr. Howells has had the courage to essay in book magnitude.

He writes in an intimate, cursive, lecture style, modest, cautious, brilliant in the use of figurative ideas, and amusing to the reader who is not obsessed with conceit over his own religious traditions. Chapter I provides a lively and sympathetically approached introduction to his subject, followed by an evaluation of man among the primates and a review of definitions of religion which has so far defied its definers. In Chapter III the discussion of mana and tabu with their analogies in North America are taken up and illustrated by synopses of matter drawn chiefly from Crow Indians and Polynesians, with comparative touches on tabu in the classical religions. The text is threaded with references to the kind of ideation that the theological student needs to level off his basic concepts. Magic, black and white, comes in for definition, illustrated by selection of instances from diverse primitive and modern groups. Divination, oracles, and ordeals of test are treated as broadly as the other chapter sections. An example of the spicy tone of Howell's style is irresistible. "And the country is full of well-dressed church goers who have no idea of the extent of their own heathenism in such beliefs" (p. 85). One could go on through the succeeding chapters on disease and medicine, witchcraft, the shaman, another world, souls, ghosts and death, ancestor worship, totemism, demons, gods, the art of worship, the rise and fall of a religion, and finally origins and conclusions. To comment on them, so full is the subject matter, would require a twenty-page review, at least. The reader will be a wiser person when the book is laid aside and will not be led down the wrong track on any of its premises or references. It is a book for every public library nonfiction shelf and a source for lecture substance for every teacher of the humanities.

In choosing a popular title for so comprehensive a work on a widely agitated subject, Dr. Howells has put forth a challenge to the Christian student of religions which may lead one to wonder whether Christians or "heathens" are more heathenish in the stuff which has gone into the formation of their sacred creeds and practices. To quote here some of the trenchant passages in the book on this question would either whet the appetite of the religious skeptic for more or offend the fundamentalist with what would be considered sacrilege in the author's leveling of all religious traditions to a common plane of human need and satisfaction. And this review has no intention of serving as an advertisement of the book. The reader must choose his own attitude toward its content, so the reviewer leaves this open.

FRANK G. SPECK

Pillars of Faith, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 128, $1.50.

In this little volume the Abbot professor of Christian theology at the Andover Newton Theological School sets for himself the task of making "a statement of faith in the simplest of terms." Thereby he hopes to give a "straightforward and solid exposition of the heart of the Christian faith."

He finds the key to his exposition of the Christian faith in the unfolding history of Christianity. In its earliest stages Jesus was the authority for the disciples and their standard for judging their faith. When he was gone, the age of the Spirit,

that other counselor, dawned, and the witness of that Spirit in individual Christian lives and the life of the church became the standard of faith. As Chistianity consolidated its position more and more, the age of the institution emerged and the church came to be regarded as the agency for determing the standard of the faith. Abuse, however, led to revolt against the excesses of the institution, producing the Reformation in which Protestants accepted the Bible as their standard of faith. Finally, since the days of Schleiermacher, a strong emphasis has been placed upon Christian experience as the criterion of faith. These are the five pillars of faith which Dr. Ferré discovers. His book is largely an exposition of them. He contends that the Christian faith can express itself in strength and remain stable only as it relies on all five of these pillars.

Corresponding to the five pillars of Christian faith have been the five ages of Christian history. These are the age of the person, the age of the spirit, the age of the church, the age of the book, and the age of reason and experience. The way in which the individual Christian incorporates these five ages is strikingly summarized by Professor Ferré: "The Christian life can never be right, except as it is in Christ, through the Holy Spirit, within the fellowship of the Church, and regulated and fed by the Bible. Insofar as any of these aspects is lacking or starved, Christian whole-life is wanting. All that God has done must be appropriated *in life*" (p. 107). Thus the Christian life is one of unified experience, fructified and deepened by the various aspects of faith which have emerged across the Christian centuries.

Dr. Ferré's treatment of Christian faith in this small volume can be described neither as comprehensive nor exhaustive. It should rather be characterized as impressionistic and stimulative. The author skips across the mountain tops of Christian history, but does not descend for lingering reflection into the valleys. One might regard his little book as a springboard from which one can be catapulted into the deeper waters of Christian faith and experience. If the volume serves that purpose, then the author will be satisfied that he has reached the goal which he sought to attain, namely, "a statement of faith in the simplest of terms."

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Bible in the Church: A Short History of Interpretation, by Robert M. Grant, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 194, $2.50.

The author aims to "examine the principal methods which Christians have employed in the interpretation of scripture, and the circumstances which led to their employment." In doing this he undertakes an important service for the Protestant church, divided, as it is, into numerous and often opposing groups because of differences in biblical interpretation. The movement for an ecumenical church is seriously hindered by such disagreements. As he proceeds with his discussions he does not let his readers forget that there are limitations to the historical method; that the church, which antedated the scripture, is its proper environment; and that the student of the Bible, while he must be free, has a responsibility also to the Christian community. As a worshiping, as well as a rational, animal, man experiences "a tension between the mystery which he worships and the truth about the mystery which he attempts to understand."

After discussing the freedom with which Jesus interpreted the Old Testament, the Christocentric exegesis of Paul, and the struggle to secure the recognition of the Old Testament as an integral part of the Christian scriptures, the author traces the development of allegorization by the Alexandrian group, the reaction toward literalism by the school of Antioch, and the claim by the Catholic church that it was the

authority which could determine the true and permanent meaning of the scriptures. He then goes on to consider the historical and grammatical methods of interpretation found necessary by the Reformers, the subsequent growing vogue of rationalism, the development of historical criticism in Germany, and the influence of Albert Schweitzer through his work *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. He sums up the situation as follows: "In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, critics laid great emphasis on the presumed objectivity of their studies. They tried to place biblical criticism among the sciences. But a cursory examination of the 'assured results' of their investigations will show that they exaggerated their own objectivity. There always remains a subjective element which necessitates variety in exegesis. And the art of interpretation reveals that a would-be 'scientific' exegesis robs the thing interpreted of most of its interest."

In taking a look ahead the author presents neoörthodoxy as having "revitalized modern Protestant theology and biblical interpretation." Even so, it finds itself facing the ever-recurring problem of interpretation: "How is the historical meaning of a passage of scripture to be reconciled with its 'over-meaning' which centuries of Christian faith have laid upon it?" Various answers have been given, from affirmation of the validity of tradition to insistence upon the need of illumination by the Spirit. The writer's conclusion is, "If Christian theology is interpretation of God's working in history, an historical understanding of the biblical record is indispensable. But it must, while remaining historical, become theological. It must ask theological questions. It must seek for answers which are historical and theological as well."

The closing chapter of the book is occupied with what interpretation means. The author issues a warning against the modern tendency to stress faith as above reason. He emphasizes the subjective element in historical exegesis and insists that account must be taken also of the objectivity inherent in theological interpretation. What is valuable in earlier methods must not be lost. The critic must above all else be competent, and not allow himself to be turned aside into so-called "reverent criticism," which issues in "neither sound religion nor sound science." He quotes with approval a statement of J. N. Sanders: "perhaps true exegesis must begin as a science, but must end by being something else—an illumination by God's Holy Spirit of the mind which has undergone the preliminary *ascesis* of historical criticism." He insists that there must be at all times a "fruitful tension" between the approach of the historical critic and that of the theological interpreter. His conclusion is: "Science without theology is aimless, and theology without science is moribund."

The reader must needs be grateful to the author for his discriminating and interesting account of the history of interpretation. All honor to those who toil to uncover the historical and theological truth in the Bible! We need to enter into their labors. The book offers as models for "the correct understanding of exegesis and its task," Martin Luther, who, by the way, did not hesitate to expunge from the canon what he considered "strawy," and Wilhelm Dilthey, who "calls the highest type of interpretation 'divination' and argues that it 'has always an element of genius, i.e., it reaches a high degree of perfection only through inner affinity and sympathy.'" It hails Karl Barth as the one who has "restored the Bible to its place of honor in the structure of Christian faith," and predicts that neoörthodoxy may be the "Protestant orthodoxy of the future."

The vast majority of readers of the Bible are neither expert critics nor theologians, but they are in need of at least enough knowledge of the results of historical criticism to enable them to distinguish the wheat of abiding truth from the chaff of temporary circumstances and passing modes of expression. This volume is helpful

in meeting that need, but its repeated emphasis upon divination, illumination, and the subjective element in general, throws open the door to both extreme theological assumptions and fanatical ideas.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

Doctor Freud, by Emil Ludwig. New York, Hellman Williams, 1947, pp. 317, $3.

This volume was written some years ago in German, but has only now found its way into English translation and American publication. In his preface to this edition, the author says that for over forty years nearly all his biographical writings have been affirmative and positive in character, and that it is with reluctance that he has felt compelled to present an unsympathetic account of Freud. His decision to do so, he reports, was precipitated by an experience in Santa Barbara, California. A sixteen-year old garage helper had been trying to get Ludwig's car running, without success. Finally he said under his breath, "It's my darned inferiority complex, that's what it is."

Let it be clear that Ludwig is against Freud hook, line, and sinker—or, more accurately, *id, ego,* and *superego*. His separation of himself from those other critics of Freud who are against Freud because he "bravely attacked the dust of centuries" merely puts him in a stronger position to criticize and does not mitigate the criticism itself.

Here, in brief, is Ludwig's position on Freud. He was a brilliant man, with great courage, scientific insight, and with the potentialities for fundamental pioneering in the field of neurology. But Freud would not stay in his own field of competence. "He ventured into the world of hypnoanalysis and ultimately lost his way in an attempt to encompass with his theories all philosophy and culture."

As Ludwig sees it, the fundamental accusations against Freud are as follows. First, Freud wrongly generalized on all behavior from his observations of neurotic behavior. Second, he explained all neuroses as disturbances of the sexual function. Third, by the power of suggestion he has given people new tools for justifying their aberrations or weaknesses. Fourth, Freud reduced all art, culture, religion, and philosophy to instinctive impulses, "and only sexual ones, at that."

This cleverly written volume is divided into three parts. In the first, on "The Living Sacrifices," the author discusses and rejects all aspects of Freud's theory and practice, the Œdipus complex and all the rest. In the second, on "The Past Sacrifices," he takes apart Freud's analyses of such historical personages as Leonardo da Vinci and Goethe. In the third, "The Sacrificial Priest," he analyzes Freud himself as a person, from what is known about his life.

Conceding that Freud's value in "breaking a trail" has been "enormous," Ludwig says he has carefully avoided reference to Freud's former disciples who broke away from him but acknowledge some degree of debt to him. He does not want, he says, to take sides in that controversy. But it is time, he believes "for the world to turn its attention, if not its homage, to newer prophets."

There does not appear to be anything basically new in Ludwig's criticism of Freud, unless it be the biographical and writing skill which he applies to the attack. He is better informed about Freud and Freud's writings than most attackers have been. Even so, his small use of quotations from Freud's writings, and failure at any time to give the references, tends to weaken his case. From such quotations as I have been able to trace, it appears that a not altogether objective use of Freud's real meaning has been made.

The fact remains, however, that Freud is vulnerable, to those who understand

him as well as to those who do not. And it becomes still more difficult to assess him and his significance in the light of the fact which apparently is a major irritant to Ludwig—that he is the recipient of "homage." Some psychoanalysts and others do have an attitude toward Freud which makes him into a saint, which considers any statement of inadequacy about Freudian theory or practice to be a wholesale attack on him and on psychoanalysis.

Freud knew more about biology than about sociology, more about men than about women, more about neurosis than about psychic health, more about psychopathology than about psychotherapy, more about guilt than about redemption. No good cultural anthropologist, for example, can accept Freud's picture of primitive society. And yet he must, in honesty, acknowledge that his anthropological science might not have been developed had not Freud performed the trail-blazing function of suggesting that even primitive society was incomprehensible without an understanding of psychological and social dynamics.

One can imagine that, if all those who now acknowledge indebtedness to Freud were to say at the same time that they correct him on this or that fundamental point, Ludwig would not have felt compelled to write this book. It is, seemingly, the continuing capacity of Freud to attract not pupils but blind followers which Ludwig believes makes necessary an exposé type of book.

What can we think today of Freud? He was a Viennese Jew, his philosophy rooted in the nineteenth-century "scientistic" presuppositions then current in scientific circles. He got hold of an idea and a practice which were revolutionary both in their break with the past and in their therapeutic significance. Freud tested them on people who needed help; and then, finding them fruitful, he began to exercise his imagination in applying them elsewhere, to art, religion, culture, great figures of the past. He was a reductionist, less interested to give a complete picture than to show how his own point of view affected the matter under consideration.

Apparently he was dogmatic and authoritarian in dealing with others. Scrupulously honest in all his personal dealings, unconcerned with wealth, he lived as a kind of ascetic—devoting himself with tremendous energy through a long life to the pursuit of psychoanalysis and its implications for many phases of human and cultural life. Yet he demanded loyalty of all who professed to follow him at all.

Is it a virtue or a vice that, when informed of Nietzche's foreshadowing of some of his theory, he replied that he did not want to be influenced by others in developing his ideas? In having the flexibility to change the character of his theory of instinct three times, is he to be commended for willingness to see new truth or damned because he did not get it right in the first place?

It is not easy to know what to think of Freud, and it is not made any easier by the wide range of attitudes toward him held today by different schools of psychoanalysis who all make at least some acknowledgement of their debt to him. Nor can the question be answered merely by putting oneself on a pedestal and saying, "Freud was a great man but . . ." or in contrast "Freud had many faults but . . ."

My own view is that proper assessment of Freud is today being equally hindered by those who are blindly loyal, who read into Freud new findings which there is no evidence that he was aware of, who believe that his system must be left quite intact and who resent any criticism as being *ipso facto* fundamental—and those who overlook the searchlight character of Freud's historical contribution because they do not like this or that idea or practice, or even his philosophy.

Freud can, properly speaking, only be understood historically. That is, he can be assessed only if we see the impetus he gave to a study of man's inner life as

absolutely essential to any possibility of man's continued existence to say nothing of fulfillment. In the culture of the western world, where technology and emphasis on the external force man more and more to look elsewhere for his values, Freud's lead was in this direction, "There is no fundamental reason why we can not understand man as we have understood the world without." Pessimistic as he was, and deeply aware of what he would have been horrified to call man's sinful nature, he nevertheless had a deep interest and faith in truth. If we thought that man could only be an everlasting enigma to himself, that there was no way of understanding ourselves, the external chaos of our world would drive us to a suicidal form of despair, not to the midway form of despair about which the dialectical theology talks, the despair with hope peeking around the corner.

At the same time, Freud, literally interpreted, holds to a reductionistic, biologistic philosophy which must be rejected on evidence from the sciences themselves. Even his therapeutic method, founded on free association, needs to be redefined unless the free association is to be compulsory association regardless of the patient's readiness to accept an insight. His conception of feminine psychology was created on grounds which we see are largely culturally determined, and not biologically as he thought. He even had an imperfect notion of sexuality.

The closer we can come to viewing Freud objectively, the deeper and more far-reaching appears the greatness of his social contribution. At the same time, the more we see his theory and practice in the light of more recent knowledge, the more we are compelled to question many of its premises. It is equally to be regretted that a biographer of Ludwig's stature should have felt compelled, by the uncritical homage many pay to Freud, to debunk him—or that many others (most recently an Anglican clergyman) feel equally compelled to set forth a complete defense of every idea Freud ever had because some of these ideas are still true and relevant.

It may be a very long time before there is a definitive and objectively sympathetic treatment of Freud. Meanwhile, we do well to be as suspicious of blind attacks as of blind defenses.

SEWARD HILTNER

Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind, by George Seaver, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 346 (illustrated), $3.75.

Albert Schweitzer: An Anthology, edited by Charles R. Joy, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xxviii, 323, $3.75.

A recent journal refers to Dr. Albert Schweitzer as the "greatest man in the world." When one lays aside the first of these two volumes, the fascinating biography by George Seaver, and has supplemented his reading with the anthology of Charles R. Joy, he is hesitant to take issue with the statement. Many an aspiring young doctor has written to Dr. Schweitzer and anxiously awaited the personal reply he makes to all letters. The student of Bach has familiarized himself with Schweitzer's somewhat revolutionary interpretation of the famous composer or perhaps has actually heard his best interpreter in concert. The New Testament scholar knows his invaluable studies on Jesus and Paul, the philosopher his work on Kant and his partly completed history of philosophy, the religious historian his studies in Indian thought. These two recent books awaken us once more to the unmistakable fact of genius that has refreshed the intellectual and spiritual questing of scholars from such diverse fields of interest.

The author of the first volume has presented his material with utmost skill. Although the actual biographical data consume only about half the book, the first

half, the story seems complete. For this we must pay tribute to the author's unusual powers of discrimination and selection and his amazing ability to crowd paragraphs of meaning into concise sentences. He knows his subject intimately. In the mind of the reviewer two characteristics of the book deserve particular mention. In the first place, the careful portrayal of the actual conditions surrounding the production of each of Dr. Schweitzer's major works is noteworthy; in the second place, the absence of any persistent preoccupation to search out some hidden clue or clues (psychologically analyzed or otherwise) to explain the fact of genius adds to the charm of the book. The author entrusts the facts and the subject to the sincerity of the reader without feeling the necessity of explaining how it all happened. The last half of the first book deals with the thought of Dr. Schweitzer. The approach is made through a study of his major works, a chapter being devoted to each. Here again a remarkable amount of pertinent material is contained in relatively brief chapters. Perhaps the specialist will desire more; but considering the nature and scope of the work, he must be more that satisfied.

The story of Schweitzer's decision to leave the comforts of the continent, the classroom he dearly loved, the pulpit he so ably graced, and the books that were his intimate friends, is familiar to most of us. But familiarity with the conditions surrounding the decision and its execution in no way detracts from the freshness of the story as told by the author. For example, he writes: "The brain of the man who a few years earlier had astonished philosophers with his insight into the mind of Kant, and the world of music by his brilliant interpretation of the soul of Bach, and had startled the world of biblical scholarship by the radical results of his quest for the historical Jesus,—behold him now, in a shed by a riverside in Equatorial Africa, holding with a comrade's grip the hand of a primitive negro whom his surgical skill has just rescued from an agonizing death." This passage is typical both of the poignant style of the author and of his ability to articulate with genuine literary skill those dramatic episodes which are as constant in Schweitzer as his own goodness. As the reviewer read these words he could not help but see them in the light of a brief section from Schweitzer's *Goethe Prize Address*, delivered at Frankfort, August 28, 1928 (and published in the last chapter but one of this biography). Among other things Schweitzer said on that occasion: "I came once more on the real Goethe when it struck me in connection with his activities that he could not think of any intellectual employment without practical work side by side with it, and that the two were not held together by their character and object being similar, but were quite distinct and only united through his personality. It gripped me deeply that for this giant among the intellectuals there was no work which he held to be beneath his dignity, no practical employment of which he ever said that others on account of their natural gifts and of their profession could do better than he, and that he was always ready to prove the unity of his personality by the union of practical work with intellectual activity." And after the author of the biography has taken us with Schweitzer to spend many hours repairing an organ before a recital, into the jungles of Africa where he helped build with his own hands the hospital in order to be able to relieve distress and where he supervised the clearing of the trees and planting of a crop in order to stave off famine, we cannot refrain from a question. Is this not also the greatness of Schweitzer: the unity of thought and action in his personality? Where is this better demonstrated than in his own theory of the "interim ethic" of Jesus? Who in the history of Christianity has more completely dedicated himself to the actualizing of that same interim ethic than Dr. Schweitzer?

The second of the two volumes contains an extensive selection of passages from all the works of Dr. Schweitzer available to the author. Its usefulness as an anthology is greatly enhanced by the unusually adequate organization of the subject matter. His plan makes readily accessible passages dealing with the major aspects of Dr. Schweitzer's thought. These excerpts are of necessity brief; but they are amazingly sufficient. Indeed this would seem to be part of the genius of Dr. Schweitzer: every paragraph tells its own story with lucidity. A few examples of the categories under which quotations are gathered will suffice: The Timelessness of Jesus, The Humanity of Paul, The Dignity of the Individual, The Transformation of Society, Reverence for Life, Retrospect and Prospect. The preface is followed by a bibliography of Dr. Schweitzer's works; a detailed set of biographical data in chronological order is found at the end of the book. The anthology and the biography are valuable additions to our literature on the life and thought of Dr. Schweitzer. They should find their way to the study of any minister or teacher who would refresh his mind and his spirit through a closer friendship with the life and thought of the "greatest man in the world."

FRANKLIN W. YOUNG

The Song of Songs, translated and interpreted as a dramatic poem by Leroy Waterman, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1948, pp. 88, $2.

As is well known, modern interpretations of the Song of Songs, leaving aside the extravagantly purifying allegorizing of the earlier Jewish and Christian exegetes (love of God for Israel; love of Christ for the church), have followed three main lines: the dramatic-poem idea; a collection of independent love lyrics or wedding songs from various sources; a reworked liturgy of the fertility cult. Among interpretations of the first type, perhaps the most significant American example is W. M. Forrest, *King or Shepherd?* (Boston, 1928); outstanding among those interpreting as detached lyrics are Morris Jastrow, Jr., in *The Songs of Songs* (Philadelphia, 1921) and R. H. Pfeiffer in his *Introduction to the Old Testament* (New York, 1941); and for the fertility-cult interpretation we turn to T. J. Meek in *AJSL*, XXXIX (1922), in *The Song of Songs: A Symposium* (Philadelphia, 1924), and in *JBL*, XLIII, 4 (1924).

Waterman himself published in 1925 (*JBL*, XLIV) an article entitled "The Rôle of Solomon in the Song of Songs," agreeing with Meek that the Song was originally a liturgy of the Tammuz cult, and proposing that Solomon now stands in place of Nergal, king of the underworld, while the maiden supplants Ishtar and the shepherd Tammuz. This readaptation took place in the Northern Kingdom early in its history for the purpose of vilifying Solomon. The escape of Ishtar from Nergal suggested the escape of Israel from the oppressions of Solomon. Thus was "a fertility cult liturgy reduced to folk poetry and reinterpreted by a political *motif*." After the fall of the Northern Kingdom, the Song found its way to the South, where it was re-edited in such a way as to make it more complimentary to Solomon, mainly by removing 3:6–4:6 from the beginning of the poem to its present position and composing 1:1 *ad hoc*.

From this too brief and oversimplified background, we turn with interest to Waterman's present effort. We find that he still holds strongly to the idea of an anti-Solomonic Northern writing that was taken to the South and redacted into a pro-Solomonic composition; but he has given up the fertility-cult basis. He reiterates his belief in the unity and homogeneity of the Song, castigating the idea that it is a "conglomerate." He has gone far in the direction of viewing the book as a

drama. Once he speaks of the "audience" (p. 26); elsewhere he mentions "dramatic action" and compares aspects of the Song to the modern oratorio and opera, though admitting "that drama, as such, is otherwise unknown in Hebrew literature." Finally, he divides the book into two scenes and supplies indications of who is speaking and the *mise-en-scène*. He holds to the device of using 3:6–4:6 as a beginning.

Waterman's drama is the three-chapter variety, with Solomon the villain, so to speak. Moreover, the piece is strictly historical, for the heroine is none other than Abishag (Waterman thinks her name was really Bath-Abishag). After Adonijah requested her, Solomon himself became interested and made a play for her. Although she was more or less officially a member of the royal harem, she was still a virgin. She resisted Solomon and kept talking and dreaming of her shepherd lover up in Shunem. She gained the sympathy of the other harem women, and finally Solomon himself softened and let her go back to her rustic lover. The second (and final) short scene depicts the homecoming.

Far be it from the reviewer to spoil this pretty story by hypercritical onslaughts against Professor Waterman's textual manipulations or tough-minded remarks about this not being the best of all possible worlds. One remark cannot be resisted, however. It would appear that the early (late tenth or early ninth century?) Northern author who attempted to compose a dramatic poem showing up Solomon adversely failed of his purpose. For if Solomon did what is herein suggested, he was more of a gentleman than many of us have given him credit for being. It would hardly have been necessary for the Judæan editor (eighth or seventh century?) to "attempt to make Solomon appear the great lover and the true bridegroom."

There is, of course, the serious difficulty of dating the book so early. Waterman meets it as well as could be expected, by excising or emending late words. But the question of other peculiarities still remains. Are these peculiarities due to early Northern dialectal peculiarities, as Waterman maintains, or to late date, as many other excellent scholars have maintained? In the last analysis, perhaps, since no modern occidental can truly understand the Song of Songs in all its details, each one of us must get out of it what he can for his own enjoyment. If Waterman's interpretation is not altogether convincing, it is at least pleasantly readable.

The book is beautifully printed and bound. The cover bears a facsimile of the Gezer Calendar, which the author thinks illustrates the script in which the Song was first written. Of technical errors, we notice the misspelling "siezed" on p. 11, and the incorrect title, and incorrect date of publication of Bewer's *Literature of the Old Testament* (first edition) in n. 10, p. 4; also the inexactly worded quotation therefrom on the same page.

W. F. STINESPRING

The Canticle of Canticles, by William Pouget and Jean Guitton, New York, Declan X. McMullen, ©1948, pp. xi, 201, $3.

This volume is the first in a series to be known as the Catholic Scriptural Library. The joint authorship, which is explained in the Introduction, is concisely summed up in a footnote: "This work has a triple source. The chief is the notes taken in the cell of Father Pouget in March 1926 (who died in 1933). The second is (Guitton's) study of S. R. Driver's Intro. to the Lit. of the O. T., pp. 436–53. The third is indications by Father Lagrange" of Jerusalem. The final form of the volume is thus due to M. Guitton, whom we may therefore properly refer to as the author.

The book starts out with four basic proposals: first, the Song is a complete unity as it stands; second, there are three main characters; third, Solomon is not

the author, nor the true lover, nor the Solomon of history; fourth, the Song is not an allegory, nor a historical account, but a charming drama that extols the grandeur of conjugal love, by an unknown author.

These proposals are dealt with in the four main divisions of Part I. The usual arguments in defense of these propositions are given. However, the indefiniteness of approach to the book as a whole dulls all arguments, and thus other possibilities are not excluded.

Failure to discern any concrete basis or motivation of the poem makes the background proposed, namely, a garden at the foot of the Lebanon Mountains, almost a pure artificiality. The division of the text into twelve scenes follows Driver's listing of Franz Delitzsch's arrangement into six acts of two scenes each, with the "acts" omitted. Since these so-called "acts" correspond to nothing in particular in the text, their omission is on the whole an improvement. However, inasmuch as the only indications of separate scenes by our authors is the assumed exit of certain characters, of which action there is no textual indication, there actually appears to be only one scene as arranged. On the other matter of dating, the author has rendered a good service by listing the brilliant and incisive arguments of Renan for an early date, against which our author's remarks make slight headway in an attempt to clear the ground for his choice of a late date.

The authors are to be commended for seeing that Solomon is not the hero and that he is not honored in the poem, (see my *Song of Songs,* University of Michigan Press, 1948). And in spite of the artificialities above referred to, the recognition by the authors of a strong dramatic element in the poem (not necessarily a real drama) makes their rendering decidedly preferable to the allegorical interpretation of the Douay Bible, Jerome, and the early church Fathers, and should make all Catholic readers greatly the gainers.

LEROY WATERMAN

Seal Impressions of Nuzi, by Edith Porada [Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research, XXIV for 1944-1945], New Haven, American Schools of American Research, 1947, pp. viii, 138, plates 54, $3.50.

About sixteen miles from the modern city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq is situated a mound known as Yaghlan Tepe. Here between the years 1925-1931 were conducted a series of excavations under the auspices of the Iraq Museum, the American Schools of Oriental Research, the University Museum, and the Harvard Semitic Museum. The first to begin excavations at the site was the late Edward Chiera. He was followed as director of excavations by Robert Pfeiffer of Harvard. The latter was succeeded by Richard Starr who prepared the definitive archæological report on the excavations.

The excavations at Yaghlan Tepe revealed that the mound covered a city which in the middle of the second millennium B. C. was known by the name of Nuzi, or perhaps better Nuzu; it was then inhabited largely by a people known as Hurrians. One of the most significant finds at the site consists of some four thousand tablets dating from the fifteenth century B.C. or thereabout. In spite of the fact that a majority of the inhabitants of Nuzi were not Semites and spoke the Hurrian language, practically all the excavated tablets were written in Accadian; hence their translation offered relatively little difficulty. The publication, translation, and interpretation of these documents—they are almost entirely legal and administrative in character—have now been going on for some two decades; not a few of the leading Assyriologists in this country and abroad have participated constructively in this all-important effort. As a result we can now follow the economic and social structure of Nuzi

society during the middle of the second millennium B. C., with extraordinary clarity, and in unusual detail. Indeed, in more than one respect, the name Nuzi has come to be outstanding in Near Eastern archæology.

Now while the Nuzi tablets are primarily important for the light they shed on the economic and social structure of the local Hurrian society, they are not without significance for our understanding of its religious life. For they are covered with seal impressions depicting scenes from their ritual practices and mythological tales. But unfortunately this Nuzi glyptic material has remained very largely unavailable to the student of Mesopotamian culture. For while it is true that hundreds of the Nuzi tablets have been copied and published to date, it is only the inscriptional material that was included; the seal impressions remained very largely uncopied and unpublished. It is this serious gap in Mesopotamian scholarship which Edith Porada's new book, *Seal Impressions from Nuzi,* helps to fill to no small extent.

The basic portion of the volume consists of fifty-four plates. On the first fifty are reproduced photographs of more than one thousand seal impressions; on the last four are reproduced line drawings of fifty-four of these. The seal impressions are arranged in accordance with stylistic criteria into two main divisions, those of the "common style" and those of the "elaborate style." Within these two styles, the sealings are further subdivided into twenty-six groups in accordance with a number of criteria relating particularly to the engraving technique and subject matter. In addition there is a twenty-seventh group consisting of impressions made with cylinders which had been engraved in periods preceding that of Nuzi. Even a superficial glance over the plates will give the reader some idea of the variety and complexity of the ritualistic and mythological motifs utilized by the Nuzi seal makers.

Naturally enough, it is these fifty-four plates with their more than one thousand photographs and line drawings which constitute the more essential portion of the volume. However, the plates are preceded by more than one hundred pages of descriptive, explanatory, and interpretative material which the student will find both illuminating and valuable. Miss Porada's introductory text consists of five chapters. By far the longest is the first which describes briefly but clearly, and group by group, the scenes represented on each of the sealings. Following this descriptive chapter is one on the relations of the Nuzi material to such earlier glyptic groups as the Syro-Cappadocian, the Syrian, the Babylonian, and Kassite. The third chapter summarizes and interprets the iconography of the Nuzi seal impressions. It analyzes such ritualistic symbols as the "tree" which plays a predominant rôle in Nuzi iconography, and the "winged disk"; also such ritualistic elements as music, dance, and mask, and such mythological motifs as "the battle of the gods," and "the death of Humbaba." Finally, after a brief discussion of the influence of the Nuzi glyptic on later Near Eastern art, the introduction concludes with a detailed index of the names of the Nuzi seal owners.

As is evident from the preceding brief outline of its contents, *Seal Impressions of Nuzi* is a mine of source material for the student of Mesopotamian culture, and all orientalists are highly indebted to Miss Porada for the vision with which the volume was conceived, and the patience and devotion with which it was prepared. And once again, the American Schools of Oriental Research are to be congratulated for making available a major contribution to Near Eastern culture research.

SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER

Ugaritic Mythology, by Julian Obermann, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, pp. xxii, 110, $2.75.

The mythological texts from Ugarit have deservedly attracted wide interest in

Old Testament and Semitics circles. For these clay tablets of the early fourteenth century B.C. from a buried city on the north of Syria, gives us the Canaanite side of Syro-Palestinian religion. In poetic form, the agreement with Hebrew literature is almost complete. In language there is similarity. But in religion and theology, the Hebrews were in basic and conscious disagreement with their Canaanite neighbors, whose northern branch in Ugarit has left us these remarkable texts.

The Ugaritians know El as the chief god in their pantheon; but while El is the kindly ancestor of other gods, he is eclipsed as a personality by the colorful and active Baal and by the warlike Anat, Baal's devoted sister. Sex, wine-bibbing, and even crime including murder are included in the activities of the Ugaritic pantheon. It was this religion that the Hebrew spiritual leaders opposed so vigorously; but it was also this religion that the common people among the Hebrews kept lapsing into to some extent. The discrepancy between official and popular religion is a common phenomenon, not limited to ancient Israel; it occurs in America today, where in church the common man may identify himself with the loftiest biblical religion; and during the week the same man may pay an astrologer for a horoscope based on a pagan superstition of ancient Babylonia.

The interpretation of the Ugaritic texts is still in need of considerable elucidation. Books like Professor Obermann's are the rungs on the ladder of progress toward a clear understanding of a literature interesting not only as a valuable source of collateral evidence on the Bible but also in its own right as an artistic creation. Most of Dr. Obermann's interpretations concern one of the several main groups of the mythological texts; namely, the Baal and Anat cycle, of which one of the aspects is the construction of a stately domicile for Baal. Obermann points out the well-known parallel to the biblical account of the construction of Yahweh's temple, and adds an attractive and original slant: both Yahweh's and Baal's temples reflect a technological advance in civilization. Yahweh's temple reflects the transition from the nomad's tent to the edifice built by the best Phœnician craftsmen. Baal's palace, constructed by the god of Egyptian craftsmanship, meant the erection of the most magnificent building that the finest artistic achievements of the day allowed men to dream of. This new approach of Obermann's contains an unmistakable element of truth but it is not the only factor. In a private communication, Mr. Sidney Smith, the distinguished Assyriologist of the British Museum, has kindly called to my attention a difference, that cannot be disregarded, between Baal's palace and Yahweh's temple. Baal was a young god, whose rise in importance required a palace to enable him to live up to his newly-won position; whereas Yahweh's position as the one and unchallenged God of the Hebrews was established long before Solomon had the temple built.

I take this opportunity to point out that Ugaritic literature should prove stimulating to New Testament, as well as Old Testament, studies. Of the following two illustrations, the first advocates a figurative, the second a literal, understanding of the biblical text.

1. In the Ugaritic poems, when the goddess Asherah rides to the abode of El, she is led by a god who shines like a star. Indeed a single root (*bʿr*) is used which may prove to mean both "to lead" and "to shine." However aside from the interesting question as to whether the Semitic idiom lent itself to the verbal identifying of "leading" and "shining," real life provides the equation. For what is it that both shines and leads caravans or ships? It is the star that guides by night across deserts or seas. I am inclined to regard the star that led the wise men of the East to adore the infant Jesus as a reflex of that old Semitic concept. I cannot subscribe to the widespread view that the New Testament implies a natural astronomic phenomenon; to wit, a star moving along at a caravan's pace, night after night, from afar to Bethlehem.[1]

[1] For the sources of the parallel, see my *Ugaritic Handbook* (Rome, 1947), p. 219, no. 407.

2. One poem from Ugarit has a scene dealing with a general mobilization of a people on account of war. This means that classes of inactive people have to emerge from their retirement or lethargy and lend a hand. Thus the widow takes a job, the solitary man closes his house, and the invalid "carries the bed." The latter signifies that the invalid can no longer enjoy the luxury of being sick but must instead act like a well person and do what he can in the national emergency. What we must remember is that whether an invalid was bedridden at home or in a hospital, the bed was his own. Upon the medical discharge, the physician, instead of saying, "Pack your valise and go home," would say, "Take up your bed and go home." The bed, of course, was light enough to be readily portable. The Ugaritic evidence has an obvious bearing on the New Testament expression "take up thy bed and walk" associated with a cure effected by Jesus and repeated in variant forms in all four gospels. The clearest version is that of John, wherein a helpless paralytic was on his bed at an out-of-door sanatarium. Jesus cured him and thereupon pronounced a standard medical discharge with the words, "Take up thy bed and walk." Orthodox Jews, witnessing the event, objected because it happened to be the Sabbath, when work (ranging from the practice of medicine to the moving of furniture) was forbidden. Jesus, of course, did not break the Sabbath for the simple purpose of committing a violation. Instead, Jesus (whose stand has since been accepted by all Jews, including the most legalistically orthodox) humanely held that healing the afflicted was permissible even on the Sabbath; and telling his cured patient to take up his bed and go home was only a routine medical usage in the ancient Near East.[2]

It should be noted that these Ugaritic parallels to the Bible do not change the meaning of the biblical text. If we were gifted with perfect understanding, we could have reached our conclusions on the basis of the Bible alone. However, our knowledge of the Bible world, and our interpretive capacities, fall far short of perfection; and it takes fresh evidence, such as we find at Ugarit, to rouse us out of our scholarly shortcomings and show us the plain meaning of the text before us.

CYRUS H. GORDON

The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets, by John Paterson, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xi, 313, $3.

This is a sensible and finely sensitive presentation of the prophets of the Old Testament by the professor of Old Testament at Drew Theological Seminary. Its clear, crisp style, its grasp and warm appreciation of the problems and values with which it deals, make it a book to interest, inform, and even inspire readers among students, ministry, and laity. Gathering up much of the best thought of the most competent interpreters, the author adds many fresh and fruitful insights of his own all along the way.

A brief introductory chapter serves to set forth the early stages of prophecy, its growth, nature, functions, its relation to prediction, and its essential message as one of reformation and restoration of a religion already known to the hearers. The almost inescapable method, in dealing with the prophets, of treating each in a separate chapter, tends to break the thread of historical development. The continuity is maintained, however, by observing approximate chronological order and by sketching historical backgrounds. This setting of each by himself actually helps to show the individuality of each prophet as a person in his own right. For while the prophets constitute a "goodly fellowship," they exercised the freedom of originality, of disagreement with their fellows in the succession, each one standing out distinctively and vitally related to the crucial problems of his times.

[2] See *Ugaritic Handbook,* p. 259, no. 1541.

There is here no catering to the relevancy fad, but at approximate points and without vapid moralizing, some of the enduring verities in the prophets' experience and messages are pointed out. It is made clear that these vital and vitalized men were not out to construct a system of biblical theology, which had to wait for less inspired and imaginative minds to perpetrate.

On the critical side, the author proposes no new scholarly theories, but wherever scholarship has registered serious disagreements, these are mentioned. The inclination appears to be to accept as much of the text as possible as genuine oracles of the prophets. Though recent vigorous criticism of Ezekiel is recognized, the author stands with those who regard the whole work as, in the main, from Ezekiel, located in Babylon, 597-571 B. C.; "the strange variety of the book may be due to the strangely composite personality of Ezekiel as prophet and priest." But concerning the *servant songs* of Deutero-Isaiah, the author feels that "the prophet is utilizing material from an earlier writer of remarkable insight" and that "he may be using the words of another to correct certain narrow conceptions that are found in the oracles outside these songs."

The author has omitted few important points pertinent to an understanding of prophecy or of the individual prophets. But there is no bogging down in technical or academic discussions. One topic of current interest may be mentioned, namely, universalism in the prophets. Here he is undoubtedly on firm ground, especially in his presentation of Deutero-Isaiah's concept of the mission of Israel and of Jonah's "plea for universalism." It would seem, however, to be carrying the idea close to the straining point to see this breadth of view very clearly exemplified in Habakkuk, or in Zechariah's new Jerusalem "without walls," or to interpret Nahum's exultation over Nineveh's destruction as "sympathy for a world enslaved, lifting him above his nationalism." For the most part the discussion of this subject is restrained, universalism being seen as largely theoretical, as held by most of the prophets alongside their nationalism, or as a "seminal thought," to use one of the author's favorite expressions.

The book is brought to a conclusion in a brief and impressive chapter on "Christ, the Goal of Prophecy." Here the author speaks of a "profound organic connection between the Old Testament and the New" in which "an age-long search finds its end and full reward"; Christ completes what was imperfect"; "the prophetic emphasis on moral and spiritual values receives a new strength in the teaching of Jesus." The "fulfilment" is not, however, to be regarded as mechanical, but organic. No literalism, no jigsaw manipulation of proof texts is called for but realization of a vital and living process—the divine self-disclosure—coming to fruitage in a free spirit, a "vital person directed wholly from within and not regulated from without."

Ample indexes of scripture passages and of names and subjects as well as a selected bibliography, add to the value and usefulness of the volume.

JOHN W. FLIGHT

La Prise d'Orenge, by Blanche Katz, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. xxxv, 209, $2.75.

A new edition of this important *chanson de geste* has long been needed. The only other edition is the one by the learned Dutch scholar, Jonckbloet, published in 1854 together with four other chansons of the Guillaume cycle. Subsequently all had been re-edited except *La Prise d'Orenge,* until Blanche Katz, rescuing the fine old poem from its undeserved neglect, published this excellent *édition critique.* The basic text used in the transcription of the poem was manuscript 774 of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, which is generally considered to be the most perfect version. The volume includes also a preface, an introduction, complete variants

from the four extant manuscripts most closely resembling 774, and over one thousand lines from the remaining four manuscripts, never before printed, and which show considerable divergences from the basic text. Facsimiles of photostat copies of several folios of the basic manuscript are included, preceded by a key to the numerous abbreviations they contain. Study and understanding of the text are facilitated by a glossary and a table of assonances.

In the preface the editor states that her objective was to render as exact a transcription as possible, incorporating only such modernizations as expanded abbreviations, capitalization of proper names, and certain accents. With thoroughness and skill the editor has fully attained her objective. Moreover, her respect for the orthography of the ancient scribe is the attitude now generally adhered to by modern philologists. Fully justified is her condemnation of Jonckbloet's method of altering the manuscript in order to bring the language into closer phonetic conformity with his personal conjecture as to what the sounds must have been in the twelfth century.

Certain topics are lacking in the introduction. Of interest to this reviewer would have been a discussion of the significance of the poem as a work of literature and its relationship to the other members of the cycle of William of Orange. Of course, the field has been well spaded by other scholars, but a re-examination of the terrain might not have been inappropriate.

The glossary is good, but far from complete, and yet some of the items would be recognizable by any one with a knowledge of modern French. Some of these, possessing little etymological interest are: *aaige (aage), bis, corage* (which also sometimes means "heart" in seventeenth-century French), *pucele, veü, voix*. Among those I do not find, but which would appear essential to any but a specialist in Old French, are: *regné (royaume), o (avec), joise (jugement),* etc. These remarks, however, are observations rather than criticisms. The book is an outstanding piece of scholarly work, and with its neat typing beautifully done by the offset process, is a noteworthy achievement of editing and publishing.

WILLIAM J. GAINES

History in the ENCYCLOPEDIE, by Nelly Noémie Schargo, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. 251, $3.

The word *encyclopædia* comes from two Greek words which signify "circle or cycle of human knowledge." In 1735 there was a bookseller, Le Breton, who wished to have translated the *Encyclopédie of Science and Arts,* published in London in 1727. He found that this work of Chambers was already behind the times, and it would be much more sensible to undertake something entirely new and different. For this work he commissioned first Abbé de Malves, then Diderot and d'Alembert. This was the basis for the *Encyclopédie.* The work was divided among the scholars just mentioned, and Diderot published a prospectus explaining the object of the undertaking. There were also certain collaborators. The cost was about 950 francs, and from the beginning there were 5,000 subscribers. There were some stormy periods, and political events caused crises of one sort or another. Diderot was director and editor-in-chief of the *Encyclopédie* and took his work very seriously. He wrote articles on history, philosophy, and especially on the applied sciences. Among the approximately 60,660 articles in the *Encyclopédie* 6,199 are historical. Most of the brief ones are unsigned as well as some of the longer ones. Diderot, the editor, naturally heads the list.

The subject for our consideration is Nelly Noémie Schargo's *History in the Encyclopédie* or *Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers.* There

are many possible ways of approaching history as expressed by those men in the *Encyclopédie*. One could study the opinions of the Encyclopedists about the techniques of history. One could also confine oneself to an examination of the methods of studying history proposed by the philosophers. Again, one might study the types or branches of history favored by this group. All in all, Dr. Schargo seems to have a combination of all branches: the methods as well as the application of the methods, opinions of the Encyclopedists concerning historical facts together with their opinions on the utility and necessity of history.

Everything seems to be of importance to the historian. So many influences, social and political, are intertwined in the study of any movement. We might cite political history, articles on Rome and her kings, military history, social history, including the dress of a people, games, festivals, ceremonies, economics, and commerce. Dr. Schargo has devoted a most interesting section to political history. The article in the *Encyclopédie* was almost exclusively the work of one man, Antoine Gaspard Boucher d'Argis. Jurisprudence for him means something about the law of nations with a knowledge of geography, chronology, and history, all involved in the customs of nations and the revolutions which occurred in them. Law should not be confined to those who wish to be doctors of law. "Property, which Diderot treats from the point of view of ethics and natural law, is treated by Boucher d'Argis from the juridical point of view, and not in a sense of the possessions of one individual, but rather in a sense of what belongs in a family in general or in one branch to the exclusion of another." Dr. Schargo is very painstaking in pointing out certain phases of law—feudal law, and French law in particular. Almost all categories of political law, it would seem, ranging from the peerage to French roads are examined by the author of this book. Only the French would think of honoring an inspector of highways with the title, "grand voyeur." There is dignity in that term! The Encyclopedists in studying history aim to relive the life of a nation and of a given people.

The latter half of this volume, from chapter three on has to do with types of history: "Literary" is perhaps the most scholarly section of the book. Dr. Schargo discusses very fully the history of philosophy in the *Encyclopédie*. She tells us that Diderot, for example, devoted almost 100 pages to the ancient Hebrews and their philosophy. The article on Jesus Christ leaves out the non-Christian aspects of mediæval philosophy, and these are discussed in two separate articles about Arabic philosophy. Diderot says further, in discussing the philosophy of the seventeenth century that "One page of Locke contains more truths than all the volumes of Malebranche [a 17th century philosopher and ordained priest who never assumed parish duties] but one line by the latter shows more acuteness, imagination, genius even, than Locke's entire fat volume."

The author, after a discussion of science and the mechanical arts, rises somewhat climactically in chapter four to the interpretation and rôle of history, likewise an important contribution to scholarly research and following on the same high plane as chapter three. We might find the text in d'Alembert's statement: "The history of science is naturally bound up with that of the small number of geniuses . . . most of the sciences were invented little by little; a few men of genius discovered, at different intervals of time, a certain number of truths." In respect to the treatment of individuals, it was not so much the kings who interested the Encyclopedists, or the generals, but men who, in the realm of politics, contributed to the progress of humanity. Marmontel claims that if a king spends his life to maintain prosperity in his lands and keep harmony and peace among his subjects, his place in history will be very small. "One will coldly say of him 'he was good'; one will never say 'he was great.' Louis IX would have been forgotten, had it not been for the deplor-

able expedition of the Crusade."

Certainly the Encyclopedists did believe in human progress; but it was not a smooth curve that steadily ascended. There were slowdowns and setbacks, as for example in the Middle Ages. It was not really broken, and the Renaissance had a period of acceleration. Nevertheless, the Middle Ages were a part of the steadily progressing forward movement. And these authors felt strongly that the teaching of history—teaching it well—should be one of the paramount aims of educators. D'Alembert even proposed to teach history backwards. In this way a child would not be crammed full of Clovis and Charlemagne, Cæsar and Alexander. This philosopher would start with the contemporary period and work his way back into the past centuries.

Although history was held in high esteem in the eighteenth century, the *Encyclopédie* was still largely misunderstood as far as its historical attitude and its contribution to history were concerned. These studious gentlemen did not present anything new and startling in the way of documentation concerning Egypt or Rome; but they did contribute to the advancement of historical ideas and studies and offered a new outlook upon the study of history and a new attitude toward historical research. There was nothing casual about it. It was important to them that printing and gunpowder and the compass were discovered, even though they could not find the discoverers. There was careful, scientific research. They were amazingly curious about all phases of history and left the results to subsequent criticism. For them, no document should be incorporated into history without minute criticism.

This work of Dr. Schargo shows all the erudition of a specialist's approach. It is quite trivial, and in no way detracting, to say that all of the annotations and appendices are almost without error. The printer on the first occasion writes "hebraïque" without an accented "e", and then on other occasions the "e" is accented. We commonly find the word Encyclopédists with the same treatment and then without the accent. For example, on p. 146 we read "Encyclopedists" and on p. 176 "Encyclopédists"; but if we are to observe the French accent, would we not be more nearly correct in saying "Encyclopédistes?"

JOHN LANGDON JONES

The Pastoral Epistles, by Burton Scott Easton, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xiv, 239, $3.

Once again Professor Easton has produced a distinctly useful book. It falls into four parts, each good. The introduction really introduces. This is characteristic of Professor Easton's commentaries (*cf.* his admirable *The Gospel according to Saint Luke*), but unfortunately it is not a universal habit with commentators. The translation is fresh and vivid, frequently indulging in almost daring paraphrases, but always with restraint and scholarly justification. The commentary itself is crisp and usable, although at times its brevity lays a heavy load on the reader, especially the nontechnical reader for whom it is said to be primarly intended. For example: he regularly refrains from repeating arguments or materials to be found in other volumes. Thus again and again he dismisses the matter with a "(references in Dibelius)." This conserves space and works no especial hardship on the scholar, but will limit the value of the book for the lay readers who, unlike the author, do not have easy access to the scholarly literature. The further contribution of the volume is the series of word studies (pp. 171-237). Some of these are very brief, scarcely more than tabulations of the occurence of the particular word or term. Others are extended and make a distinct contribution. Among these may be mentioned "bishop," "deacon," "elder," "ruler," and (especially) "ethical lists." They provide weighty evidence for the well-nigh universal judgment of modern scholars that the writings are sub-Pauline, that is, were written by a devoted admirer of

Paul, long after the apostle's death. In Professor Easton's judgment this unknown fell far short of understanding the master whose voice he sought to continue. Actually the value of these writings—a valiant contribution to the needs of Christians in the author's own day—is materially lessened if they are regarded as a pale representation of Paulinism.

The purpose of the writings, as Dr. Easton sees it, was to meet a grave emergency which had arisen at the end of the first century, as a result of the combination of oriental dualism with hellenistic thought. This had produced a type of Gnosticism which eventually caused a distinct problem, once practices fatal to Christian conduct had become supported by teachings destructive of Christian truth. One familiar example of the problem which was raised was the dilemma in the matter of Christology: since matter was intrinsically evil, how could an incarnate Christ be divine, or a divine Christ be incarnate?

The three letters are by a single hand, although produced over a period of years. He dates them as follows: II Timothy *ca.* 95, Titus *ca.* 100, I Timothy *ca.* 105. There *may* be fragments of genuine Pauline letters embedded in them, but Dr. Easton sees no real evidence for this view. All attempts to isolate special sources he feels wasted effort. Personally, I heartily agree with these sane conclusions, although I had not felt the argument for the earlier date of II Timothy as compelling. Professor Easton's evidence is not easily dismissed at this point, and his view explains the otherwise perplexing fact of why *three* epistles instead of one.

Dr. Easton considers the question, recently reopened by several Chicago scholars despite Harnack's confident pronouncement, of the possibility that they are post-Marcion. This conclusion he feels unwarranted although I Timothy 6:20 may possibly be a late addition. Marcion, in his judgment, may have known them, but he does not agree with the common view that Marcion "rejected" them. Instead, Easton would incline to view that at the time Marcion made his list they were still not contained in "the Pauline canon he knew in his younger days in Pontus."

While I have not as yet checked all the word lists, those which I did examine in detail were uniformly accurate. One or two inadvertances occur: thus *harpages* should be marked ** (not *) on p. 199, as it does not occur in these letters. On p. 201 the reading surely should be *echousa* (not *ekousa*). In his discussion of faith (*pistis*) on pp. 202 ff. I found his reasoning a bit hard to follow. He sees the word used in a "non-religious sense," that is "fidelity" in Gal. 5:22, while in II Tim. 2:22, 3:10; I Tim. 1:4; 2:15; 4:12; 6:11, since the noun is "combined with the essentially Christian term 'love,' [it requires] the Christian sense in 'faith' as well." But surely "love" *agapē* is the first of the fruits of the spirit in this Galatian list.

This is a book which will not be read and laid aside. It is definitely a volume to be studied. The detailed lexicographical material and the sound and judicious exegetical discussions make it a distinct contribution to the scholar's chest of tools.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Ancient Christian Writers: St. Augustine's Faith, Hope, and Charity, translated by Louis A. Arand, Westminster (Md.), Newman Bookshop, 1947, pp. 165, $2.50.

Ancient Christian Writers: Julianus Pomerius' The Contemplative Life, translated by Mary Josephine Suelzer, Westminster (Md.), Newman Book Shop, 1947, pp. 220, $2.50.

Here we have two more of this excellent and useful series of patristic texts being produced by the Catholic University of America under the editorship of Fathers Quasten and Plumpe, and of which more than a hundred volumes are promised. The same sort of accurate and readable translation, buttressed by schol-

arly notes and oriented with brief, pointed, and unpartisan, introductions, which characterized the two earlier volumes, already reviewed in these pages, is found in these two. The scholarly world, quite regardless of ecclesiastical lines and loyalties, may well be grateful for this welcome and successful attempt to make available writings which for far too long have been forgotten or ignored.

The little treatise, *Faith, Hope, and Charity,* or, as it has been commonly styled, the *Enchiridion,* is one of the most valuable of Augustine's writings for the historian of early Christianity, for here within a reasonably short compass we have a summarized exposition of what seemed to the Bishop of Hippo Christian doctrine. It was written in his maturity, while he was still at work on the *City of God,* in reply to the request of Laurentius, elsewhere styled a "brother of Dulcitius." Since God is to be worshiped by faith, hope, and charity, Augustine felt that a summary of Christian doctrine might profitably take the form of "what we must believe, what we must hope for, and what we must love" (3). These are easy to state, but—doughty warrior that he always was—he found it useless to state them without a refutation of the "calumnies of those who think otherwise" (6). Thus the treatise is, as he frequently remarks, somewhat longer than a conventional handbook. His exposition and refutation fall substantially within the framework of the Lord's Prayer and the Creed, since, as he observes, "faith believes, and hope and charity pray," the respective functions of creed and prayer (7). His discussion, beginning with the doctrine of the creation and the fall, constantly wrestles with the problem of man's freedom and the absolute sovereignty of God. Most modern readers will probably agree that Augustine fares little better at times in this bit of theological logomachy than did Paul himself in Romans 9. Of particular interest are his observations about the justifiability of lying under certain circumstances, a view which he repudiated although held by many of the earlier fathers, his detailed and exact discussion of Christ's paternity—he was "born of the Holy Spirit," but in no sense is "son of the Holy Spirit"—and his treatment of the doctrine of resurrection of the body in its more troublesome features—the fate of babies born too early for survival, of monsters, and of those who after death came to be "converted into the substance of other bodies or into the elements themselves." Father Arand's notes—there are 407 of them, filling thirty-three pages—contain a vast amount of material which unfortunately is for the most part outside the knowledge of the average Protestant historian.

Unlike the celebrated treatise of Augustine, it is safe to say that the one by Pomerius is virtually unknown, even by name, to all save a few specialists. It is the only writing of the rhetor of Arles which has been preserved. Until the late seventeenth century it was attributed to the more famous Prosper of Aquitaine. It has never before been translated into English. The treatise, which falls into three books, and which has been styled the oldest extant pastoral instruction, was apparently produced about A.D. 500 at the request of a Julianus perhaps the bishop of the near-by Carpentras, as a minatory and monitory tract for clerics. The title, *The Contemplative Life,* applies superficially less to the second and third books than to the first, but Pomerius does not draw as sharp a distinction between the contemplative and active life as did many of the early fathers, notably Origen. Nor are they really an either-or; actually the first book is essentially a discussion of the union of the two in the work of the ministry. His own summary, standing as the foreword of Book III, indicates the nature of this writing which may be read and pondered with profit today:

> In the first volume I dealt with the contemplative life and the questions to what extent the active life difers from it and how you can with the help of God become a sharer in the contemplative virtue itself. In the second book I treated, by God's gift, what I thought should be said of the active life, too: I showed the usefulness of religious rebuke and the

virtue of patience and the way the possessions of the Church should be administered and the manner of spiritual abstinence. Now it remains for me to undertake a discussion of the vices and virtues, not relying on an endowment of which I am not conscious, but assisted by your prayers.

Pomerius was not one of the world's great; nonetheless in his own day he seems to have occupied a position of some importance as head of a school of rhetoric in southern Gaul. He was urged by admirers, for example, Ruricius and Ennodius, to transfer his school to their neighborhoods. The fact that Julianus importuned him to produce this composition, primarly for the guidance of the clergy—the present translator argues that it was intended for bishops *(pontifices)*, not parish priests *(sacerdotes)*, as Bardenhewer, "too readily asserted"—would further suggest his fame, or at least his reputation. He presumably was himself a cleric: not only would this seem to be implied by occasional remarks, especially in the preface to Book II, but, as Sister Suelzer remarks, it is not likely that Julianus would have urged a layman to write such a book. The fact that Pomerius was the teacher of Cæsarius of Arles, the champion of Augustine, who played no mean part in preserving to posterity, not only in Gaul but in the whole West, the teachings of the greatest of the African fathers at the time of the decline of this erstwhile important sphere of ecclesiastical influence, is rightly stressed by the editor, who cites with approval C. F. Arnold's judicious observation that in this devotion to Augustine Cæsarius was definitely indebted to his teacher, Pomerius, himself an African *emigré*.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Ancient Egyptian Religion: an Interpretation, by H. Frankfort, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. x, 172, $3.

Professor Frankfort's lectures on Egyptian religion appear as the second volume of the History of Religious Series sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies. These five lectures are similar in theme to the Morse Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary by James Henry Breasted and published thirty-six years ago under the title of *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt.* Like its earlier analogue this series deals with the theology of the ancient Egyptians. Both Breasted and Frankfort are apologists for Egyptian religion: they search for, and succeed in finding basic concepts which serve to render intelligible a great mass of texts, which, when uninterpreted, seems but the product of the confused and muddleheaded. Breasted found the key to be a process of development by which the Egyptian gradually gained his honest god. Frankfort, dissatisfied with the evolutionary explanation of Breasted and the rationalistic interpretation of the German Egyptologists, offers a new principle of interpretation: For the ancient Egyptian the universe was essentially static and for him the permanent only had real significance. This is the solution to the paradoxes of Egyptian religious texts, the key to the understanding of religion, literature, and art in ancient Egypt. The five lectures are a closely knit exposition of this central thesis. Never does the author allow himself to be sidetracked; tenaciously he holds to his central theme as he discusses the Egyptian gods, the state, the Egyptian way of life, hope for life after death, literature, and art. In each of these subjects he finds support for the basic Egyptian conviction that the universe is static.

In these brief lectures Professor Frankfort has presented a vast amount of intellectual stimulation for any reader interested in the history of religion. Like a catalyst his mind has been applied to the religious texts, producing insights which render the material alive with interest. Throughout, his purpose is to suggest rather than to cajole or to convince by assembling a mass of evidence. In Frankfort the ancient Egyptian has found an effective apologist. He never attempts to make his

subject out to be a man like one of us; he does, however, succeed in making him a person whom we respect for his views and one whom we would like to know. His polytheism was not a meaningless confusion, but the result of "multiplicity of approaches" to reality, an attempt to express its many-sidedness. The biblical appraisal of the despotism of the Egyptian monarch is not as sympathetic as Frankfort's. The divine king, the Pharaoh, was no despot holding an unwilling people in slavery. Rather, the doctrine of the divinity of the king was an organic part of Egyptian life, a religious creed which fulfilled certain emotional needs of the people. That the subjects loved their king is apparent from the fact that the king and his court were themes of the literature of popular entertainment. In short, "kingship [was] the pivot of society."

This book will be of considerable interest to students of the Old Testament. Its author is careful to point out contrasts between basic notions of Hebrew theologians and those held by the Egyptians. In Egypt there is a noticeable absence of a concept of sin; the good life was not obedience to divine command but a conformity to the harmony which the Egyptian believed to exist in the universe.

Doubtless Egyptologists will challenge many of the interpretations of Professor Frankfort, adding to and subtracting from the evidence for the framework which he builds. The nonspecialist, however, will read with eagerness the succinct analysis of the Egyptian records which Professor Frankfort offers and find in it *aperçus* which throw new light on traditional beliefs and views. This is a fascinating, informative, and authoritative book.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Christian Nurture, by Horace Bushnell, New Haven, Yale University Press, ©1916 and reprinted 1947, pp. xl, 351, $4.

This famous work by Horace Bushnell with its present sixteen chapters was published in 1861. But an earlier and considerably smaller edition appeared in 1847, which is commonly accepted as the original publication date of the work. This fact explains its reprinting last year (1947). What we now have is the Centenary Edition of *Christian Nurture*. The introduction is written by Dean Weigle, and this is preceded by a brief biographical sketch prepared for the 1946 edition by Williston Walker.

The book is so well known that one hardly needs in such a journal as this to dwell on its merits. It is a classic in its field, and for that reason alone its present reprinting is amply justified. But apart from that it is a book that ought not to be allowed to go out of print at this time. Most religious educators would probably agree with Dean Weigle that it "is as significant today as when it was published one hundred years ago" Its significance, however, does not at present lie so much in its criticism of existing evils or errors as it originally did. It consists rather in the historical support it gives to the modern social, natural, optimistic, and normal conception of the Christian life and Christian nurture, which it did much to create.

It is instructive and inspiring to read the discourses and essays that make up the book and thus become acquainted at first hand with the background and vital sources of our present religious pedagogy. What Bushnell sought to do was to correct the onesided individualism, the crude supernaturalism, the undue reliance on emotional revivals, and the emphasis on human depravity of his day. These corrections have to a large extent been accepted by the Protestant churches of America. The older ideas and practices still linger in some communions, but they are no longer characteristic of American Protestantism in general as they were a century ago. There has, it is true, been a revival of a pessimistic anthropology in recent years, but this has been largely confined to highbrow theologians. It has not to any appreciable extent seeped into the popular Christian consciousness, and is not likely to do so. The main emphases of today are in line with those of Bushnell's *Christian Nurture*.

ALRERT C. KNUDSON

BOOK NOTICES

The Reconstruction of Humanity, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. xii, 247, $3.

How shall we prevent war? Democracy cannot do it, for history knows that democratic nations have been no more peaceful than autocracies. Totalitarian systems are notoriously militant. The United Nations will not help because it is shot through with contradictions. Education is unequal to the task, for, as the world moved from the twelfth to the twentieth century, the increases in education and in wars just about kept pace with each other. Christianity means well but "has not been able either to eliminate war or to make Christians less belligerent than non-Christians." Our one hope is to change human nature and make it altruistic. To do this we must notice first that there is no uniform relation between altruism and bodily factors such as age, race, sex, or cephalic index, or between altruism and economic status or emotional stability. We must note further than an altruist cannot be developed in an egoistic environment. Our present "sensate" culture, where reality is assigned only to sensuously perceived data, must be replaced by a culture that acknowledges an "Infinite Manifold" (*i.e.*, God) with "supersensory, rational, and super-rational aspects." The first step is to eliminate the conflicts brought about by membership in groups whose interests are at odds. If membership in the church makes you doubtful about your membership in Rotary, labor union, or college faculty, drop one or the other. Second, we must eliminate as many as possible of the various occasions for competition and play up the altruistic impulses that are born in us. Third, treat the ideas of Freud about the domination of the selfish and lustful unconscious with the contempt they deserve. Fourth, reorganize our schools so that they will build character. Fifth, recover a sense for the living presence of God. In other words, the attack on the problem is to be made on all fronts—psychological, sociological, and political. Some of the recommendations will not be entirely easy to carry out. For example, in the political area we must strip states of their power to wage war. For this it would be advisable "carefully to rearrange their boundaries detaching a portion of a given state and exchanging it for a portion of an adjacent state." Political parties, also, should give way to leagues organized to support special measures. To accomplish this great end each person must work on himself, each educational system must study the methods of social change, and each organ of government must strive to convince people of the feasibility of the plan as a whole. It is a large order, and a good many of the details are unpleasantly vague. But it is hard to resist the impression that we are up against the alternative of something like this or literally nothing, and that "the reconstruction of humanity" is now really on the agenda.

J. S. BIXLER

The Invisible Encounter, by Igor I. Sikorsky, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 120, $2.

In this swiftly moving little volume, the world's foremost plane designer pleads for spiritual wisdom rather than material power as the great need of our day. Interpreted against the backdrop of the temptations of Jesus, who chose the path of spiritual wisdom rather than radical revolutionary upheaval, he challenges our age to walk the same pathway. Our world cannot be saved apart from the

"forceful ideological reorientation" which must undergird such a redemption. We must leave the ethical relativism of our generation which holds to be right that which one has the power to do or command. In place of such sheer anarchism, we must return to those ethical insights upon which our fathers frequently staked their lives. Starting from there we must make a new start. The world today requires such a new beginning if we are to be delivered from those deceptions and cruelties which are the supreme disgrace of our civilization. Where there are no abiding principles of right, a whole class, or race, or nation—like the Jews or the Germans or the Japanese—can be treated as dangerous and sinful morally. Unless we make a new start, therefore, we cannot avoid deepening tragedy as mankind progressively brutalizes itself. Sikorsky suggests that the start can be attempted by following a principle of Abraham Lincoln which he regards as one of the greatest and noblest ever pronounced by a human leader; namely, "with malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right." Along that path unity and social salvation lie. Sikorsky is a firm believer in the value of the church as an agency for keeping spiritual wisdom alive. Even though he has not shut his eyes to "the liabilities and mistakes of the earthly church," he contends "that the benefits of its guiding influence have been incomparably greater" than its defects. Its ministry has been to give a spiritual foundation to all cultures, a foundation which has been abandoned only at the risk of society's overthrow and final destruction. It is the church's function to impart the spiritual dimension to life today, the absence of which will bring disaster to any civilization, no matter how scientific or intelligent its members may happen to be. The student of the New Testament will have difficulty with the layman's use of biblical materials. Statements from the Fourth Gospel are used as having the same historical validity as those from the Synoptics, while II Peter, which most scholars would date a full century after Jesus, is declared to contain material showing Christian opposition to the revolution which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem and the decimation of the Jewish people in A.D. 70. Despite these uncritical usages of Scripture, the book brings a philosophy which Christians generally will applaud and hold necessary for the saving of mankind from dark night and dissolution.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Still the Bible Speaks, by W. A. Smart, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 171, $1.75.

In this volume are found the Cole lectures delivered in 1947 at Vanderbilt University by the professor of biblical theology at Emory University. The author disclaims saying anything original. He would add his testimony "to the growing volume of insistence upon the abiding worth of the Scriptures," and would encourage others to return to the Bible "as to an inexhaustible reservoir of spiritual power and refreshing." The opening chapter, "The Bible Today," points out that the Bible is well-nigh a forgotten book, despite being the perennial best-seller. Appreciation of it merely as literature does not suffice, for the Bible is a book about religion. Modern biblical scholarship has had some unfortunate by-products: its "inconsistencies" and "prescientific ignorance" give the impression that it is no longer believable because quite out of date; hence it is irrelevant to life today, not interesting and not understandable. "Zeal not according to Knowledge" examines some popular misuses of the Bible. Confusion arises from considering it one book instead of a collection of pamphlets. This chapter is an exposition of a text quoted from someone not named that the Bible is "a literary

expression of the religious development of the Hebrew people, culminating in the life and teaching of Jesus." "God and his World" sets forth that "nothing is more fundamentally true of the Bible than that it confronts men with a God-centered interpretation of our world and of our own lives, and few people have learned to feel at home in a God-centered world." "The 'functional approach' to religion leaves out one essential thing, and that is God." Man can organize and manipulate religion, but he cannot do that to God. The chapter on "God and his People" is the finest part of the whole book. "The Bible speaks to the experiences of every age, not as authority, but as interpreting the experiences common to every age . . . it is the Hebrew-Christian Bible which has given us spiritual birth and nurtured our spiritual growth, and to it we must turn for guidance." "The Final Revelation" is, of course, Jesus, and this chapter is on the significance of him and of the four booklets which depict him. "Our evolution is toward Jesus, not away from him." "It is intriguing to notice how constantly our social development is in the direction of the insights which he had long ago back in his quiet little Palestine." "Jesus has never had to be corrected on the basis of later developments." "'The Final Triumph" is concerned with the place of apocalypticism in the teaching of Jesus, and with the book of Revelation. Jesus held that the reign of God would be realized in God's control of human hearts. Revelation is a vision of victory, of the ultimate triumph of good. The reader will lay the book down with the feeling that every new look at the old, old book revives the assurance of its relevance to every age. It isn't dead, and it still speaks.

ELMER W. K. MOULD

Whitehead's Philosophy of Time, by William W. Hammerschmidt, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. ix, 108, $2.

Probably no other philosopher in recent years has written in as many fields as has Alfred North Whitehead. Æsthetics, religion, history, and contemporary society are included in his purview. This thesis is an intensive examination of the core of his metaphysical position, his theory of process in its space-time dimensions. The author presents an account of Whitehead's developing ideas through three stages. The first period includes all of his philosophical and scientific writing through 1924. The second period includes his important work, *Science and the Modern World* (1926), and is considered by Dr. Hammerschmidt to be a "transitional period." The publication of *Process and Reality* in 1929 marks the last period of Whitehead's thought in this field. Within this framework the author examines Whitehead's theories of extensive abstraction, velocity, duration, causal efficacy, presentational immediacy—all of which are factors of immense importance to all solutions to the meaning of "time" in our modern world. The language of the thesis is the highly technical language of metaphysics, and only those who have an extensive background in modern philosophy could read it with profit. Where is the interpreter who can write in clear and persuasive words about the tremendous changes that have affected our modern world view, so that even the simplest objects that we touch and handle cannot be defined as they were fifty years ago by men of scientific mind? While most of us continue to live in a world of space-patterns dictated by Euclid and time-patterns set by Newton, men like Whitehead and Einstein have moved into a bewildering new space-time world. Probably it will eventuate that what these men have been writing about for twenty years will become clear to the people through substratospheric travel and atomic fission.

EUGENE M. AUSTIN

Confessions of an Agnostic Clergyman, by E. Stanton Hodgin, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 235, $2.50.

For me, the real test of an autobiography—I suspect that it does not hold true for biographies—is whether I would like to know the author. And in the case of far too many of those which I have read the answer is definitely No. I am not overpartial to stuffed shirts or self-admitted big shots—and they are not infrequently the ones who feel impelled to let their lesser brethren peek into the arcana of success. This present volume is very different. Constantly I found myself saying, as I read this simple and unpretentious odyssey from the Dakota territory to the First Congregational Society of New Bedford, with stops en route at Humboldt (Iowa), Helena, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles: "This is a man I would really like to know." And I fancy many, like me, will read it with respect and the feeling that here is a genuinely honest man. Not all will see eye to eye with him on many a point. No matter. It will be hard not to believe that his feet are pretty securely set on solid foundations; for him, at least, his "lifelong search for a satisfying faith" has born rich and satisfying fruit. From his earliest days everything smacking of ecclesiasticism was repugnant. The greatest relief, he confesses, which he ever found was when, as a young man, he fully realized that he did not need to be saved—that he had never been lost. And for many years he sought in a most constructive way to make that fundamental really fundamental. By conventional standards some of his methods and practices will seem startling—I am thinking particularly of a five-year series of sermons preached in Los Angeles, which must have seemed pretty tough corned beef to the average churchgoer, accustomed to the average sermon. And more than that, during two of these five years he discussed on the previous Wednesday night with his congregation what he was planning to preach the next Sunday, and encouraged them to shoot it to pieces. Read this book and enjoy fellowship with one who is every inch a man and who, amazingly enough, cannot seem to grow old. You will, I fancy, agree with me that it is hard to believe that he is eighty. Perhaps that will not seem so surprising when you read his "working hypothesis":

> "In the realm of life,
> Perfection of any kind is impossible anywhere:
> Improvement of every kind is possible everywhere."

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The United Nations Challenge to the Church, by Hugh C. Stuntz, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 169, $1.75.

This is an excellent popular presentation of the reasons why every church and every individual Christian should give wholehearted support to the United Nations in every possible manner. The United Nations are our only hope of averting a third world war with all the horrors of atomic bombs and bacteriological warfare. The United Nations cannot function automatically, but only with the active sympathy and support of everyone. Christians must lay aside denominational differences enough to do this, and they must find ways to coöperate with the adherents of the other world religions—nearly all of whom believe in love and justice and in something close enough to the golden rule so that they can work in harmony with us for world peace. We must insist upon civil and political rights for everyone everywhere upon the earth with no discriminations based on race, language, sex, or religion. It is embarrassing for our state department to urge free elections in the Balkans and Korea, and constantly be reminded that negroes are not permitted to exercise

such rights in many parts of our country. To all these and others of the author's contentions this reviewer entirely agrees; he merely dissents when the author opposes universal military service and every effort to strengthen our armed forces in peace time. However, the book apparently went to press early in 1947, and the author may have altered some of his pacifist opinions since then in the light of recent events.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

A History of the World's Young Women's Christian Association, by Anna V. Rice, Woman's Press, New York, ©1947, pp. 299, $2.

In this day when most of us are groping for international understanding and the "know-how" of working together this account of the origin, organization, and growth of the World's Y. W. C. A. in sixty-nine countries is most timely. The author, Miss Anna V. Rice, former general secretary of the National Board of the Y. W. C. A. of the U. S. A. and member of the World's Council gives us a highly informing, detailed, objective, and carefully documented historical account; valuable, not only to Y. W. C. A. boards and staff, but to students of a Christian movement which from the beginning believed in intercultural exchange and the necessity for adaptation to the needs of the group in which it was at work. This book is not a history of the individual Y. W. C. A.'s around the world, but of that world organization which came into existence in London in 1894, when four countries, Great Britain, United States, Norway, and Sweden, followed, before the turn of the century, by Canada, Italy, India, Germany, and France, organized the World's Young Women's Christian Association. Y. W. C. A. work had started as early as 1855 in Great Britain and 1858 in the United States, and had soon spread, not only to many European countries, but at the request of missionaries had been established in India and China. By 1894 the Y. W. C. A. had become an organized ecumenical Christian fellowship whose bonds have not been broken despite two world wars. Miss Rice gives us not only historical data but vivid biographical sketches of the women who have made the world movement from those English women of the 1890's, of high position and vision, to the statesmanlike executives who have directed the work around the world. To American readers, one of the most interesting and rewarding parts of the book will be the insight given into the early emergence in many countries of the problems still paramount in the Association: "our responsibility in regard to social, industrial, and economic matters"; the need for a highly trained leadership; the recognition that its fellowship is inclusive rather than exclusive; and the efforts to deepen the spiritual life of the movement, relating its religious purpose to the special needs of women and girls of the time. From this study, the World's Y. W. C. A. emerges as a dynamic, flexible, and deeply religious Christian movement.

GLADYS TOPPING AUBREY

Their Faith and Ours: Part I, The Old Testament, by Muriel Streibert Curtis, Louisville, Cloister Press, 1947, pp. 153, $1.50 (student's manual); pp. 110, $1 (leader's manual).

Here is a course of twelve studies written for the upper teen age and calculated to cover a year of study. The most important sections of the Old Testament have been selected with an eye to the interests and capacities of young people. The author of these studies is well acquainted with the field of Old Testament criticism; besides,

she has had wide experience at Wellesley, having had nearly four thousand students in her courses in Bible. The teacher's manual gives complete bibliography of recent and available books; the student's manual is an honest attempt to explain the findings of recent research on the literature of the Old Testament and to point out the revelance of the results of criticism for youth. At the end of each chapter are suggestions for worship, including prayers and suggested hymns with their numbers from the new hymnal of the Protestant Episcopal Church. This is definitely a workbook, full of helpful suggestions for teaching this difficult subject. Its thoroughness, its sensitiveness, and its admirable honesty in dealing with questions of criticism commend it.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Protestant Church Building, by William H. Leach, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 188, $3.

The chief value of this book is its practicality. It covers a multitude of technical matters, many of them often forgotten until too late to do the right thing. They relate to methods of finance, location, landscaping, architectural planning, lighting, heating, cooling, organs, kitchens, educational and social rooms, chapels and offices, furnishings, seating, window glass, electronics, and even the parsonage. Hardly anyone knows all these things, not even among church architects. There are over a hundred illustrations from photographs or drawings. One practical possibility not mentioned is the development of a burial crypt for cinerary urns, suitable to situations in many cities. There are highly important current changes in religious education that should be taken into account by everyone planning a new parish house. Mr. Leach's drawings show this trend toward not so many classrooms and more departmental rooms and workshops. He does not sufficiently discuss the underlying ideas. For the church proper, the author prefers the plan of a central communion table now being adopted by many churches. The vexed and difficult but vital question as to structural mode or style is touched upon, but just barely. We are definitely drawing away from historic modes of architectural expression, but no one has well answered the questions as to what we are doing nor why. It is perhaps too soon to expect it. I wish we could postpone church building until we are better prepared to answer these questions. The author might also have told us about the growth of a more modern religious symbolism already well begun. As to the chancel and its artistic equipment, the text and the abundant illustrations would help any church develop a design which would give the noblest religious spirit to its building.

VON OGDEN VOGT

Letters of the Scattered Brotherhood, edited by Mary Strong, New York, Harper, 1948, pp. 192, $2.

Affirmation is one word to describe this book of devotional readings. You are a spiritual being. Faith overcomes the world. God walks with man. The true world is spirit, and you can live in it. Here is no unmotivated pseudopsychological counseling; without apology the thought of God, immediate and helpful, is always at the centre. If the style of a few of the readings seems a bit starry-eyed and breathless, it may be excused because they come from varied sources, all anonymous. It may be said emphatically that this book will be of help to many in need of a word of balance—and who isn't? Because the language used is lean and many ever-changing vagaries of the spirit are freshly approached with the aim unerringly upon

the reader, this book deserves rank with other excellent modern and ancient works of devotion, such as Thomas Kelly's *Testament of Devotion* or Brother Lawrence's *The Practice of the Presence of God.*

HARMON M. GEHR

Discovering Wayside Treasures, by William N. Hutchins, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1948, pp. 122, $2.

In this book, the author presents a series of two-page expansions on a variety of themes. In an attempt at a semblance of order, he arranges the fifty-odd vignettes in six groups under general headings. If it is possible to imagine a blend of William Stidger and *The Secret Place* with a dash of Halford Luccock's adroitness, this is it. Occasionally, a quick thrust or a sudden turn reminds one faintly of Dr. Luccock's style; indeed, one of the titles, "Pigheadedness or Holy Doggedness," is not dissimilar to a distinction Dr. Luccock makes between "openmindedness" and "emptyheadedness." Dr. Stidger's "sermons in stories" are brought to mind, but mostly the tempo and quality of this volume are akin to the best meditations found in the devotional booklets of the various denominations. The volume is clever without being thoughtful; it is interesting without being commanding; it is discerning without being wise. Perhaps the worst that can be said of the book is that it is merely another publication, and perhaps the best that can be said is that the author from time to time provides helpful insights.

ROBERT NELSON BACK

Thomistic Philosophy in Social Casework, by Mary J. McCormick, New York, Columbia University Press, ©1948, pp. ix, 148, $2.

The statement on the jacket accurately outlines the purpose and contents of this small book. The author, an associate professor of casework and research at Loyola University, Chicago, "interprets the basic principles of casework as they are related to the basic principles of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas." She follows this with two case histories. The book has a clearness and neatness about it, characteristic of the beautiful thought structure of which it is a slight echo. And from the cases cited I have no doubt of the writer's clinical skills within the setting in which she works or has worked. It was one of Richard C. Cabot's great disappointments in the beginnings of medical social work at the Massachusetts General Hospital in 1905 that the women who became attracted to this form of service were not sufficiently grounded in science, philosophy, and theology to hold up under the discouragements they experienced in their work with people, confronted as they constantly were, with human degradation in every form. It would be my preference, that workers with individuals and families have this antiquated thirteenth-century orientation to nature, man, and the Divine, rather than that they be as bewildered as the people they are employed to serve. Among the latter, lost workers with the lost, I would place such idolatrous Protestants as use religious terms, or preach theological doctrines, which have no meaning whatsoever. Aristotelian science and philosophy does have meaning, false though it has proven to be since Newton and Locke. Since non-Roman Catholic presidents of colleges, prominent poets, and very modern mothers of wayward children have been going back to this mediæval synthesis, in their efforts to lay hold upon something which they hope will stand amidst these times, social workers would be in distinguished company who did the same. My suggestion would be that they study the images, allegories, and symbolic language of the New Testament, particularly the first three gospels. Even the Fourth Gospel and the letters of Paul are non-Aristotelian.

AUSTIN P. GUILES

BOOKS RECEIVED

Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Isaiah, by John Calvin, translated by William Pringle, Vol. I, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. xxxii, 496, $3.50.

This is the second of the American photographic reproductions of the English edition of the famous Reformer. The present volume covers Isaiah 1–16.

**The Organization of the Methodist Church,* by Nolan B. Harmon, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1948, pp. 281, $2.25.

Look to the Rock, by P. K. Saunders, Ridgefield (Conn.), Brython, 1947, pp. 186, $2.50.

The book claims to treat of "Political Science in the Light of Prophecy." The author is a mining engineer and "one of the leading students of Biblical research for more than twenty-five years." Its chief value would appear to be as an object lesson as to how the Bible ought not to be treated.

**Christian Apologetics,* by Alan Richardson, New York, Harper, © 1947, pp. 256, $3.

The Lost Gospel, by Robert E. Luccock, New York Harper, © 1948, pp. viii, 183, $1.75.

Sixteen sermons by the minister of the Northport (New York) Methodist Church. Each of these sermons begins with a crisp modern short story.

**The Cloud of Unknowing,* New York, Harper, no date, pp. xxvii, 146, $1.50.

**Witness to the Light: F. D. Maurice's Message for To-Day,* by Alec R. Vidler, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 238, $3.

**High Wind at Noon,* by Allan Knight Chalmers, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. 208, $2.50.

**The Choice Is Always Ours,* edited by Dorothy Berkeley Phillips, New York, Smith, 1948, pp. xxii, 511, $4.50.

The Grand Inquisitor, by Fyodor Dostoevsky, New York, Association Press, © 1948, pp. 49, $1.50.

An attractively printed excerpt from *The Brothers Karamazov,* with wood engravings by Fritz Eichenberg and reflections on the story by William Hubben.

**Naw Su,* by Harry J. Marshall, Portland (Me.), Falmouth Publishing House, © 1947, pp. 351, $2.75.

Have This Mind, by Gerald Kennedy, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. xi, 210, $2.

Fifteen sermons by the pastor of St. Paul's Methodist Church, Lincoln, Nebr. He will be remembered for his earlier volume, *His Word through Preaching.*

**Christian Voices in China,* by Chester S. Miao, New York, Friendship, © 1948, pp. viii, 216, $2.

**Reflections of the Spirit,* by Winnifred Wygal, New York, Woman's Press, © 1948, pp. 200, $2.

**Religion through the Ages: an Anthology,* edited by Hermon F. Bell and Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Philosophical Library, © 1948, pp. xlvi, 445, $5.

**Letters to Young Churches,* by J. B. Phillips, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. xv, 224, $2.50.

Zulu Woman, by Rebecca Hourwich Reyher, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. xiv, 282, $3.

The interesting story of Christina, "first wife" of a king of the Zulus, who demanded and received a divorce from her husband, in protest against polygamy. Not only is it a human-interest story but it is a real contribution to the research into human relationships in various cultures.

**Rising through the Dust,* by Archie R. Crouch, New York, Friendship, © 1948, pp. ix, 179, $1.50.

**On Our Own Doorstep,* by Frank S. Mead, New York, Friendship, © 1948, pp. viii, 167, $1.50.

Beyond the Atom, by John De Vries, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. 200, $2.50.

An ultraconservative but nöncantankerous attempt at an "appraisal of our Christian faith in this age of atomic science." The ten chapters have titles composed of quotations from the Bible. The author is a professor of chemistry at Calvin College. Even in that stronghold of orthodoxy he will probably not be suspected of heresy for the findings in the present volume.

**Selected Mystical Writings of William Law,* edited by Stephen Hobhouse, New York, Harper, 1948, pp. xxiii, 425, $4.50.

**More Than We Are,* by Margueritte Harmon Bro, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. 144, $1.50.

**Pastoral Counseling in Family Relationships,* by Leland Foster Wood, New York, Commission on Marriage and the Home, 1948, pp. 96, sixty cents (paper).

Mr. Benjamin's Sword, by Robert D. Abrahams, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1948, pp. 183, $2.

An interesting and fast-moving story in the days following the fall of Richmond in 1865. The story of the escape of the able and resourceful American Jew, Judah B. Benjamin, Secretary of State of the Confederacy, is told by the (fictional) Billy Hart. It should prove a good book for church and Sunday-school libraries, distinctly more interesting than many which used to be found in such collections.

**The Religion of Maturity,* by John Wick Bowman, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1948, pp. 336, $3.

**Prayer and the Common Life,* by Georgia Harkness, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1948, pp. 224, $2.50.

**Goethe: Two Addresses,* by Albert Schweitzer, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 75, $2.

**The Psychiatric Study of Jesus,* by Albert Schweitzer, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 81, $2.

**What Is Happening in Religious Education,* by Raymond B. Johnson, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 88, $1.50.

Gifts You Can Make Yourself, edited by Isabelle Stevenson, New York, Greystone, © 1947, pp. viii, 344, $2.98.

"An exciting treasure trove of easy things to crochet, knit, and sew . . . will delight any woman with nimble fingers." Husbands take notice.

Jackie Robinson, as told to Wendell Smith, New York, Greenburg, © 1948, pp. 170, $2.

The life story (illustrated) of the first Negro to reach the Major Leagues.

**Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work: Selected Papers, 1947,* edited by Gertrude Springer, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. xi, 512, $5.

**John Milton at St. Paul's School,* by Donald Lemen Clark, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. x, 269, $3.50.

**The Protestant Era,* by Paul Tillich, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, © 1948, pp. xxxi, 323, $4.

**The American Churches*: an Interpretation, by William Warren Sweet, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, © 1948, pp. 153, $1.50.

**An Introduction to Christian Apologetics,* by Edward John Cornall, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1948, pp. 379, $3.50.

**Main Issues Confronting Protestantism,* by Harold A. Bosley, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. xi, 204, $2.50.

**The Gospel, the Church, and War,* edited by Rufus M. Jones, New York, Harper, © 1948, pp. xii, 169, $2.

**The Protestant Church and the Negro,* by Frank Loescher, New York, Association Press, 1948, pp. 159, $3.

**The Faith of Reason,* by Charles Frankel, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. x, 165, $3.

The Quaker Message, compiled by Sidney Lucas, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill, 1948, pp. 90, n.p.

Extracts from Quaker writings showing the belief and practice of Quakers and the present significance of their underlying principles.

**The House of Nasi: Doña Gracia,* by Cecil Roth, Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1947, pp. xiii, 208, $3.

**Revision or New Translation?* Oswald T. Allis, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1948, pp. xi, 164, $2.

**Is God Evident?* by Gerald Heard, New York Harper, © 1948, pp. xx, 254, $3.

We Beheld His Glory, by Susan S. Hubbell, New York, Island Press, © 1948, pp. 12, 60 cents.

Graceful studies in verse of the twelve disciples.

**Saadia Gaon: the Book of Beliefs and Opinions,* translated by Samuel Rosenblatt, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, pp. xxi, 496, $5.

* To be reviewed.